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Zealand Banking 
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A multinational banking and financial services 
company that is third largest bank by market 
capitalisation in Australia. 
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resource 
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in which they perform their functions that can act 
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cards and items of value from one location to 
another. 
CRT Current reality tree A technique of the thinking process method of the 
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visualising many systems or organizational 
problems at once to assist in identifying root 
causes. 
DBR Drum-buffer-rope A production planning and scheduling solution 
proposed by the Theory of Constraints 
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DE Desirable effect Depicted in the (theory of constraints) thinking 
process future reality tree representing the desired 
effect resulting from removing the constraints that 
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EFTPOS Electronic Funds 
Transfer at Point of 
Sale 
A payment system which allows faster and safer 
digital fund transfers at payment terminals located 
at the point of sale where debit or credit cards are 
used for the acceptance of payment. 
FRT Future reality tree A visualisation of a desired, improved future state 
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methods (theory of constraints) to illustrate how a 
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FSC Financial supply 
chain 
An ecological system of organisational 
characteristics, people, activities, information, and 
resources involved in moving financial products or 
services from a financial services company to its 
retail and business customers. 
FSCR Financial supply 
chain risk 
Financial-related risk from a supply chain 
perspective with impacts on the operations of 
financial institutions. 
FSCRM Financial supply 
chain risk 
management 
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monitoring of financial supply chain risks in 
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IT Information 
technology 
The use of computers to store, retrieve, transmit, 
and manipulate data, or information, often in the 
context of a business or other enterprise. 
M2M Machine to machine Any technology that enables networked devices to 
exchange information and perform actions without 
the manual assistance of humans. 
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NAB National Australia 
Bank 
One of the four largest ddeposit taking financial 
institutions in Australia in terms of market 
capitalisation, earnings and customers. 
ODM Operational demand 
management 
A planning methodology used to forecast, plan for 
and manage the operations organised to meet the 
demand for products and services. 
OPT Optimised 
production 
timetables 
A production scheduling and inventory control 
system that aims to simultaneously raise 
throughput while reducing inventory and operating 
costs, and achieve a smooth, continuous flow of 
work in process. 
RQ Research question An objective of an investigation of an issue to be 
examined through the application of methods of 
rational inquiry. 
TOC Theory of 
constraints 
A management philosophy that views any 
manageable system as being limited in achieving 
more of its goals by a very small number of 
constraints. 
TP Thinking process The thinking processes in the theory of constraints 
are methods to enable the focused improvement of 
any system (especially organisational systems). 
UDE Undesirable effect A theory of constraints concept, visually depicted 
in current reality trees. It represents the perceived 
undesirable effects of a small number of root 
causes, the constraints. 
VAR Value at risk A measure of the risk of loss for investments. It 
estimates how much a set of investments might 
lose, given normal market conditions, in a set time 
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ABSTRACT 
The management of financial supply chain risks (FSCR) in financial institutions is important for 
their performance. FSCR are defined as financial institution risk effects viewed from a supply 
chain perspective that constrain attainment of institutional objectives. With limited research on 
FSCR in the context of financial institutions, the literature identifies a need for holistic research 
that advances understanding of how risk factors operate jointly rather than in isolation. To 
contribute to addressing these issues, this research examines FSCR in Australian financial 
institutions. A conceptual model of FSCR was developed and the research used the thinking 
process (TP) of the theory of constraints (TOC). The methods of TP, such as the current reality 
tree (CRT) and the future reality tree (FRT), are employed respectively to investigate the existing 
situation and to propose alternatives. These methods can accommodate the examination of 
multiple FSCR factors jointly from the perspective of an organisation in its entirety. The case 
study participants comprised nine senior risk management participants, three from each of three 
Australian financial institutions. The institutions represented each of three Australian deposit-
taking capitalisation tiers: large, medium and small.  
The current state of financial institution risk causation was depicted in CRT maps aggregated from 
the three cases. CRTs mapped the most influential core effects contributing to risk. The results 
showed that the most influential risk core effect types comprised people-centred failures, external 
service provider disruptions, policy and regulatory compliance limitations, and technology hub 
failures. The results also showed the causal risk pathways arising from these effects as risk moved 
dynamically among the operational level, business strategy level and corporate strategy level of 
the financial institutions and across the major business types, comprising retail financial services, 
 xix 
 
wholesale and business financial services, product management and enterprise information 
technology services and management.  
The TP FRT method was applied to depict a desired future, with a comprehensive range of 
complementary risk management system initiatives modelled. This was to simulate the conversion 
of the current state undesired effects (UDEs) identified in the CRT analysis into desired effects 
(DEs). This comprised an interconnected system of risk controls, including an enterprise network 
of risk monitoring, risk assessment and analysis, and mitigation solutions. A finding was that 
effectiveness was dependent on the strength of interconnectedness of the risk control elements 
across the organisation in its entirety. 
This research showed that an entire organisation perspective provided by the application of TP 
methods to Australian financial institutions has both theoretical and practical implications. The 
theoretical implications are that TP methods used in this research facilitate a comprehensive 
examination of financial institution risk from a supply chain perceptive that encompasses an entire 
organisational view. First, multiple risks were jointly identified and mapped together to provide 
an entire organisational view. Second, the relative importance of the risks for explaining business 
disruption was evaluated. Third, the interrelationships among the risks and the pathways of risk 
movement through the institutions were identified and the interconnected nature of risk processes 
demonstrated. The application of TP methods to FSCR in this research contributed to the better 
understanding of the nature of risk in financial institutions. A theoretical implication is that rather 
than portraying risk as arising from a discrete subset of variables and manifesting in isolation, the 
results revealed the complexity of supply chain risk determinism in Australian financial 
institutions, such that risk causal pathways were found to be interconnected and crossed over 
organisational functions and structures.  
 xx 
 
Informed by this comprehensive examination of risk from a perspective that encompasses the 
entire organisation, the dependencies among risk management phases and approaches that were 
demonstrated also contributes to a better understanding of interconnectedness among risk factors 
relevant to the consideration of risk mitigation effectiveness. The FRT analyses illustrated the 
practical contribution of the results, where applied risk controls simulated the effectiveness of risk 
mitigation. In practice, the risk mitigation implementation approach is recommended to be highly 
interconnected and comprehensively managed as an interacting system of risk controls. The 
research was a novel application of TP methods from a supply chain perspective to examine risk 
and risk mitigation in Australian financial institutions. A limitation of the research is qualified 
generalisability to other financial institutions, especially those with different service mixes. Also, 
international generalisability may be limited by the Australian context because of regulatory 
environment differences.  
Keywords: risk assessment, financial institutions, theory of constraints, current reality tree, future 
reality tree, banking, supply chain, supply chain risk, financial supply chain risk 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This research examines the causes of financial supply chain risks (FSCR) in Australian financial 
institutions. Adapted from Ho et al. (2015), FSCR in this research is defined as the likelihood and 
impact of unexpected macro- and/or micro-level financial-related effects or conditions that 
adversely influence any aspect of a supply chain and constrain operational, tactical or strategic 
attainment in financial institutions. Based on a review of the literature, a conceptual model of the 
determinants of FSCR was developed. A generic model of Australian financial institution 
functions and structure was constructed from aggregated participant information. Guided by these 
models, the nature and operation of FSCR were examined in a whole-of-organisation current state 
analysis of aggregated multi-case study data to identify the most influential contributing risk 
factors. A future state analysis was then undertaken to provide a whole-of-organisation 
perspective on how a set of risk remediation elements might work together in a comprehensive 
and coordinated solution approach to managing financial institution risks. The findings of this 
study extend what is known about FSCR determinants and mitigation, taking into account the 
complexity in Australian financial institution risk dynamics. 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the research. Section 1.2 presents background 
information about organisational financial risks. In Section 1.3, problem identification is 
described, while Section 1.4 reviews the preliminary literature and outlines the research rationale 
of the study. The objectives of the research and the specific research questions are proposed in 
Section 1.5. A brief overview of the methodology adopted in this study is given in Section 1.6, 
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while Section 1.7 describes the scope of the research. The theoretical and practical contributions 
of the study are stated in Section 1.8. Section 1.9 outlines the subsequent chapters, and finally, a 
summary of the thesis is provided in Section 1.10. 
1.2 Background 
The management of supply chain risks (SCR) in organisations is critical to avoid financial loss 
and improve organisational performance (Babich & Kouvelis 2018; Ivanov Sokolov & Dolgui 
2014; Ivanov et al. 2017). A supply chain view of risk considers the whole organisational 
operating environment context, as well as discrete organisational characteristics. It refers to all 
business practices that are assimilated for the purpose of the provision of services and products 
required by consumers (Harland 1996; Cousins et al. 2008.  
While no agreed definition exists, authors have stressed the multifaceted and complex nature of 
SCR (Fan & Stevenson 2018; Ho et al. 2015; Sohdi, Son & Tang 2012). Ho et al. (2015), in a 
systematic review of the literature, provided a comprehensive and inclusive definition (p. 5035) 
of supply chain risk: 
the likelihood and impact of unexpected macro and/or micro level effects or 
conditions that adversely influence any part of a supply chain leading to operational, 
tactical, or strategic level failures or irregularities. 
In this research, FSCR utilises Ho et al.’s (2015) definition, adapted to include operational 
financial effects or conditions as they might apply in financial institution organisations. FSCR 
concerns the examination of financial-related risk from a supply chain perspective with impacts 
on the operations of financial institutions. The effect of environmental financial disruptions from 
systemic macro-economic risks cannot be ignored in the financial industry sector; however, the 
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scope of this study is concerned with controllable risks that adversely affect financial institutions 
operations, from a supply chain perspective. In financial institutions, it is expected that most 
aspects of supply chain risk are either directly or indirectly financially related in some way, as the 
nature of their business is inherently financial. 
Ellram, Bals and Tate (2018) highlighted the importance of SCR, arguing they significantly 
influence competitiveness and organisational viability. According to a survey carried out by the 
Association of Financial Professionals (2014), 90% of respondents indicated that risk 
management was strategically important. The survey also showed that 84% of respondents 
indicated that their organisations currently had increased exposure to risk than in the previous 
three years. Organisations, including banks, have strategically used investments and other 
financial techniques to indirectly offset potential losses as an approach to manage SCR (Cole & 
Ji 2018; Ziman 2013). For instance, a number of studies of American companies showed that over 
60% employed derivative contract techniques (e.g., Wuttke, Blome & Henke 2013) to manage 
risk of future financial losses. Viswanadham and Samvedi (2013) indicated that up to 90% of 
large firms in the UK used derivatives to manage risk of financial loss, as do banks in Australia 
(Cole & Ji 2018). Monitoring data from the Bank for International Settlements showed increases 
in hedging investment (Sodhi, Son & Tang 2012). Even with the increased use of derivative 
contract techniques, over the years, the increase in SCR has continued (Sodhi, Son & Tang 2012). 
However, there is limited research to provide guidance about direct assessment, mitigation and 
recovery from the impact of SCR on financial institutions (Ivanov et al. 2017). 
Despite the importance of financial-related risks from a supply chain perspective on financial 
institution risk, the literature review in Chapter 2 found that FSCR in financial institutions has 
been subject to limited examination. This research investigates FSCR in a sample of three 
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Australian deposit-taking financial institutions, comprising one with large capitalisation, one 
medium and one small (Gorajek & Turner 2010). Next, information on the impacts of risk is 
reviewed. 
1.3 Problem identification 
Supply chains are considered the backbone of the international economy (Malaket 2013, 2014). 
Organisational risk of financial loss can result from multiple factors in the supply chain (Jereb, 
Cvahte & Rosi 2012). The supply chain refers to all business practices that are assimilated for the 
purpose of the provision of services and products required by consumers (Harland 1996; Ho et al. 
2015). In particular, the financial-related aspects of supply chains are an essential part of business 
operations, and this is particularly so for financial institutions where the product is comprised of 
some aspect of money, and the services involve the movement of money through a network of 
transactional processes in the supply chain. The transaction process system comprises devices, 
databases, procedures and people (Stair & Reynolds 2010). For example, banks and their 
technology infrastructure service providers risk manage the machine-to-machine (M2M) 
networks comprising Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and Electronic Funds Transfer at Point 
of Sale technologies (EFTPOS) (Tuna et al. 2017). To mitigate the probability of loss, FSCR 
management (FSCRM) refers to those components, procedures, technologies, techniques or 
treatments that are applied to a FSC to reduce risk of loss (Stair & Reynolds 2010). 
FSCR can also result from interorganisational relationships (Wallenburg et al. 2011; Blijleven et 
al. 2018). For example, historically, business organisations requiring working capital and liquidity 
for the purpose of supporting operations worked independently of trading partners and sought this 
capital on the basis of their own requirements (Manuj & Mentzer 2008). Often, companies had 
goals that were in conflict with those of their trading partners. While buyer firms attempted to 
 5 
 
procure additional inventory with extended terms of payment, resulting in a rise in revenues, the 
supplier firms sought to reduce the selection period (Machowiak 2012). To sustain growth in 
business and to compete in a volatile economy, firms have sought collaborative methods via which 
to improve their working capital and liquidity (Liu, Anderson & Cruz 2012). By emphasising 
business flows that include only buyers that are highly rated, and other methods, financial risk 
from partner organisations can be mitigated (Jereb, Cvahte & Rosi 2012). 
To remain competitive in the market, financial institutions require the necessary adaptive skills to 
reduce supply chain risks, where exposure to even one component of such FSCR can render the 
entire system unstable (Park 2012). As deposit-taking institutions in Australia have expanded, a 
number of technology-related risks have emerged in the supply chain; for example, disruptions 
caused by technology cause system disruptions to financial transaction processes (Withers 2018). 
Risk exposure can disrupt the flow of FSC management in financial organisations, as encountered 
in daily operations (Handfield & Nichols 1999; Ho et al. 2015; Fan & Stevenson 2018).  
As business competition has increased, FSCR management has become a focus for financial 
institutions internationally, as reducing risk creates a competitive advantage over other financial 
institutions in similar markets (Dyckman 2011). The availability of techniques for FSCR 
management in Australian financial industries to combat financial supply chain vulnerability and 
risks remains an issue of industry concern. For example, over 70% of corporate treasury and 
finance professionals are hesitant about adopting mobile payments at their organisations, as they 
question the security of this payment method (Association for Financial Professionals 2017). 
Financial loss risk from the FSC is a major issue for Australian financial institutions. The more 
visible FSCR includes theft, forgery and hacking (Association for Financial Professionals 2017). 
In 2017, as Australian consumers spent more than ever on cards, the overall value of card 
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transactions grew 5% from 2016, to $748.1 billion. The value of fraudulent transactions grew in 
line with this total, also increasing 5% to $561.4 million from 2016 to 2017 (Australian Payments 
Network 2018).  
There is a trend of worsening impact of financial transaction risks—fraud related to Australian 
payment card transactions has more than doubled from 32 cents per A$1000 in 2008 to 75 cents 
in 2017 (Australian Payments Network 2018). This shows an increase in the card fraud rate is 
commensurate with the growth in electronic payment card use in Australia (Australian Payments 
Network 2018). Further, there has been an increasing trend in debit card transaction fraud from 
2008. Fraud through card skimming or counterfeit cards has the highest value compared with 
other fraud incidents, accounting for about 80% of all fraud involving debit cards alone 
(Australian Payments Network 2018).  
In addition to the cost impact of transaction risks illustrated above, recent effects concerning 
financial institution risk has received considerable public attention in the Australian media. These 
include the establishment of the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry in 2017 (Commonwealth of Australia 2018, 
2019). Risk of reputation loss and customer dissatisfaction is shown in the interim report, where 
the report’s executive summary (p. 1) found that ‘conduct by financial services entities that has 
brought public attention and condemnation’, and where ANZ, BOQ, CBA, Macquarie Bank, NAB 
and Westpac all acknowledged misconduct. Another example of FSCR is technology services 
provider failures causing major disruptions; for example, the Australian provider of network 
services caused a national outage that left many bank customers unable to use EFTPOS or ATMs, 
leading to nationwide retail and other business disruptions (Withers 2018). 
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1.4 Research rationale 
There is a lack of comprehensive and in-depth research on FSCR and risks in financial institutions 
(Ho et al. 2015; Fan & Stevenson 2018). In addition, in relation to SCR in general (Kim, Mabin 
& Davies 2008), there is a lack of research that has application utility and could be adapted to 
more effectively mitigate FSCR. In Australia, banks comprise banking businesses as well as a 
range of other financial products such as insurance and investment products. For this reason, they 
are usually referred to as financial institutions in this thesis, but the term bank is also used where 
the literature refers to financial institutions as banking entities specifically. 
Researchers (Ho et al. 2015; Fan & Stevenson 2018) indicate that while there is substantial 
research on various risk factors in the supply chain, these are often examined in isolation, with 
little indication of complex real-world applicability or generalisability. Consequently, supply 
chain risk researchers have called for more holistic examination of risk (Fan & Stevenson 2018; 
Ghadge et al. 2012; Gelsomino et al. 2016; Ho et al. 2015); in particular, research on the joint 
impact of risks could lead to better management of risk. Ho et al. (2015) suggest that field and 
case studies are methodologies able to accommodate research that can make sense of real-world 
complexity in a way that offers practical risk mitigation models and understanding. According to 
Ho et al. (2015), research that examines the joint impact of multiple risks has potential to assist 
scholars and risk practitioners to better understand the impact and control of financial risks. To 
address the gaps in relation to the limited research on FSCR in financial institutions and the use 
of methods able to accommodate a holistic perspective on FSCR, this research makes use of case 
study and risk analysis methods that are able to accommodate complex risk determinism in 
financial institutions from a supply chain perspective.  
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1.5 Research objectives and questions 
The objective of this research is to provide an in-depth understanding of FSCR and their 
mitigation in Australian financial institutions. An in-depth understanding aims to identify the 
nature and causes of FSCR in Australian financial institutions by taking a whole-of-organisation 
view of FSCR from a supply chain perspective. A further aim is that this in-depth analysis provide 
a basis to devise approaches for mitigating the identified FSCR appropriate for practical 
application in Australian financial institutions. 
To fulfil these objectives, the following research questions (RQ) are posed: 
RQ1: What FSCR are identified as currently present in Australian financial institutions? 
RQ2: What is the nature of the causal relationships among the FSCR that adversely affect 
financial institution business functions? 
RQ3: What future risk control practices could mitigate FSCR in Australian financial 
institutions? 
 
1.6 Methodology 
1.6.1 Multi-case study design 
A qualitative multi-case study design was adopted to achieve the aims of this research and address 
the research questions. The cases selected comprise three financial institutions stratified from the 
three tiers of Australian deposit-taking institutions (Gorajek & Turner 2010); in terms of relative 
capitalisation, they comprise one large (Tier 1), one medium-sized (Tier 2) and one small financial 
institution (Tier 3). The participant sample comprised nine participants, three from each of the 
three financial institution cases. The participants all occupied senior risk management roles within 
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the institutions, with one from each institution occupying a chief risk officer or equivalent senior 
risk manager role with whole-of-organisation strategic risk management role scope. The other six 
participants, two from each of the three institutions, were senior risk managers or analysts with 
more discrete role scope, but all occupying risk management specialised roles. 
Case studies investigate a contemporary phenomenon within real-life context, and are well suited 
for exploratory and theory-building research (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2017). The number of cases 
and participants selected was judged the best balance between a multi-case design that 
accommodates an in-depth approach without being overwhelmed by voluminous qualitative data, 
and a single-case design with in-depth richness but lacking replication-based generalisability and 
prone to data bias and distortions (Eisenhardt 1991; Yin 2014). In-depth data suit the inductive 
process of FSCR causal theory building to make sense of real-world risk phenomena, and was 
considered more appropriate to provide an in-depth understanding of FSCR and their mitigation 
in Australian financial institutions.  
1.6.2 Conceptual framework development 
To create the context for the case studies, the literature was examined to inform the case study 
design. First, guided by the research questions literature related to the research was reviewed. The 
review of related literature informed understanding of the nature of FSCR. Such an understanding 
led to the development of a conceptual framework that identified what has been found to be the 
main risks relevant to the sample of financial institutions in the case studies. The conceptual 
structure provided by the framework informed the interviewing approach, making sense of the 
qualitative case study interview data and the formulation of the analyses.  
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1.6.3 Current state analysis 
The qualitative multi-case research strategy comprising both interview-elicited data and the 
analyses was guided by a management philosophy (Watson, Blackstone & Gardiner 2006) called 
the theory of constraints (TOC) (Goldratt 1990). The TOC thinking process (TP) analysis methods 
comprising current reality trees (CRTs) were used to address the first two research questions in a 
current state analysis of interview data. This answered the research questions relating to the 
identification and nature of FSCR and the causal relationships among them in the financial 
institutions. The CRTs were used to map the multidetermined nature of problems called 
undesirable effects (UDEs) in the financial institution’s operations, and explain the underlying 
causes of FSCR and risk impacts on business functions. 
1.6.4 Future state analysis 
Guided by the results of the current state analysis, a future state analysis applied CRT maps and 
iteratively verified findings with the participants. This answered the third research question on 
future risk control practices that could mitigate FSCR in Australian financial institutions. The 
CRT results were used as the basis to develop future reality trees (FRTs) to model and map a 
desired future state where risk is effectively controlled. The application of the solutions (which in 
the TOC are called ‘injections’) into the organisation was explored with the participants to 
critically develop an applied risk management approach. Finally, the findings of the data analysis 
are discussed and interpreted to draw specific conclusions to adequately answer the research 
questions.  
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1.7 Scope of the research 
The financial services industry is typically involved in scenarios where systemic or external risks 
tend to affect the whole sector, such as the global financial crisis or other macro-economic shocks. 
Although the effect of systemic risks cannot be ignored in the industry, the scope of this study is 
concerned only with internal controllable risks that affect a company’s operations. The risk effects 
examined include those that interact with institutional customers and suppliers in the financial 
supply chain. In this research, the focus is on FSCR from a supply chain perspective in Australian 
financial institutions. 
1.8 Contribution of the research 
This research contributes to the existing body of knowledge and research relating to financial 
institution risk in several ways, as outlined in Sections 1.8.1 and 1.8.2. 
1.8.1 Contribution to theory 
A major contribution of this research was the examination of risks jointly rather than in isolation 
from a view of an organisation in its entirety. The research utilised TOC TP methods combined 
with a multi-case study method in a novel approach to examining financial institution risks from 
a supply chain perspective. The approach was novel in that it used complex process mapping 
rather than simple theme description typical of case study thematic description approaches more 
generally. For example, the TP is capable of handling complex causal relationships between 
undesired effects which is usually not possible using simple case study or survey methods.  
Systems dynamics methods have capacity for portraying complexity but TP is more usually 
applied in organisational contexts that have a problem solution emphasis (Größler 2009) 
Furthermore, the process mapping was illustrated though whole organisation visualisations. This 
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approach accommodated the complexity of a whole-of-organisation perspective, and the practical 
application utility that such a perspective provides. Further, it revealed the dynamic and 
interrelated nature of risk causal pathways when risks are examined jointly and contextualised 
within financial institution functional and structural characteristics. It also showed that 
distinctions between FSCR and other non-financial SCR when applied to Australian financial 
institutions are not readily separable. This is both because of the intrinsic financial nature of the 
business of financial institutions and the dynamic and interconnected nature of risk causal 
pathways.  
1.8.2 Contribution to practice 
An objective of this research was to design strategies to manage FSCR that have potential for 
application in practice. The findings of the analyses contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics of financial institution risk, and how they can be practically implemented in a financial 
institution to control risk. The results show how the existing risk profile of an organisation, which 
is informed by the current state analysis method, could be transformed through transition to a 
desired future state, which is informed by the future state analysis method. The practical usability 
of the findings for financial institutions is facilitated by the holistic, in-depth approach undertaken, 
and its translation to inform practical, implementable risk management strategies. The research 
showed that the TP methods have the capacity to accommodate the reasons and activities 
responsible for adverse organisational outcomes, as well as the identification of the risks and their 
natures. A practice implication from the findings is that financial institutional risk should be 
managed in a holistic way, unencumbered by organisational boundaries that normally segment 
areas of work. This is because it was found that both the nature of risk, and the elements of the 
system of risk treatments, are all highly interconnected. This practical application utility is also 
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facilitated by taking a perspective that encompasses the entire organisation, in contrast to 
approaches that examine isolated activities or processes artificially removed from their 
organisational context. 
1.9 Thesis structure 
Chapter 1 of this thesis provides an introduction to the research. This chapter presents a brief 
description of the background of the research, the rationale for the research, the research aims and 
questions, and the research methodology used to meet the research objective. 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature relevant to this research. First, supply chain risks are 
reviewed. This is followed by an examination of transactional risks. Next, the impacts of financial 
risks to both global and Australian financial institutions are discussed. Research on FSCR is then 
reviewed, and approaches to the management of risks in the supply chain are examined. Based on 
the literature, a conceptual model is presented that describes the major types of risk components 
of the supply chain, including demand and supply operations, information technology risk in the 
supply chain, and product management in the supply chain. Next, the complex multidetermined 
nature of risk is summarised, and TP methods used in applied risk operations research reviewed. 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology and the steps followed to meet the research aims, 
through the application of the adopted research strategy. First, the paradigm that forms the basis 
of the methods utilised to address the objective of this study is described. The methodology 
employed to address the research questions is explained, including how the cases were sampled 
and the participants selected. Finally, the structure and design of participant inquiries, the 
interviewing process and ethical considerations are described. 
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Chapter 4 describes the analysis and results of the current state analysis. It provides the findings 
of the application of the TP CRT method of inquiry with senior risk management participants 
from three financial institutions. First, it describes the nature of the function and structure of what 
the informant’s thought was typical of financial institutions in Australia. Second, it provides a 
description of the core risk effect types thought to face financial institution businesses. Third, the 
findings of the CRT method over three functional levels of financial institutions (the operations 
level, business strategy level and corporate strategy level) are presented, which describe the 
contributions to risk and the proposed causal pathways among the risk effects both at and between 
each functional level.  
Chapter 5 describes the analysis and results of the desired future state analysis. It provides the 
findings of the application of the TP FRT method, which proposes a number of solutions that 
jointly respond to the risks identified from the CRT in Chapter 4. The FRT findings show what 
the participants considered a desirable future, where the risks previously identified are effectively 
controlled. 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of how the research questions were answered, summarising the 
findings and describing how the research could be implemented in practice. Chapter 7 discusses 
the theoretical and practical contributions of the thesis and implications for future research. The 
limitations of the research are described, followed by a summary and conclusion of the research. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the flow of chapters in this thesis. 
1.10 Summary 
In summary, this chapter provided a background to the importance of supply chain risk for 
financial institutions. Based on the literature, this chapter also identified research gaps regarding 
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the examination of FSCR and gaps relevant to Australian financial institution risk. The other 
major gap identified relates to taking a more holistic view of risk than was typically the case in 
previous research. The study’s research objective, developed in this chapter, is to create an in-
depth understanding of risk and risk mitigation in Australian financial institutions. Finally, a brief 
discussion of the methodology used and the significance and limitations of the research were also 
presented in this chapter. 
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Figure 1.1 Overview of thesis structure 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature related to this research, especially the research related to 
financial risks from a supply chain perspective in the context of financial institutions, in three 
broad categories. First, identification of the range and diversity of supply chain risks is described. 
Second, the nature of organisational relationships with suppliers, customers, product management 
and technologies, particularly in the context of FSCR, is discussed. Third, FSCRM and risk 
mitigation are discussed. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses supply chain risks. Section 2.3 
discusses the management of risks in the supply chain. Section 2.4 examines transactional risks. 
Section 2.5 discusses supply chain risk and Australian financial institutions. Section 2.6 examines 
FSCR. Section 2.7 reviews FSCR risk factor types. Section 2.8 describes the conceptual model of 
the major types of risk factors in the financial supply chain, including demand and supply, product 
management, and information technology risk in the supply chain. Section 2.9 describes FSCRM 
complexity accommodation and the TOC, which provides a holistic approach to the examination 
and explanation of organisational risk. 
2.2 Supply chain risk 
A supply chain perspective takes an inclusive ecological view of risk on organisational operations. 
This includes supplier and business-to-business processes through to customer end product 
delivery and includes business-to-customer processes such as the demand side of the supply chain 
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(Tang 2006; Ho et al. 2015; Zhao & Huchzermeier 2015). A supply chain view considers the 
entire organisational operating environment context, as well as discrete organisational 
characteristics. It refers to all business practices that are assimilated for the purpose of the 
provision of services and products required by consumers (Burgess, Singh & Koroglu 2006; 
Cousins et al. 2009; Harland 1996;). While no agreed definition exists, authors have stressed the 
multifaceted and complex nature of supply chain risk (Fan & Stevenson 2018; Ho et al. 2015; 
Sohdi, Son & Tang 2012; Tang & Sodhi 2012). Ho et al. (2015) in a systematic review of the 
literature provided a comprehensive and inclusive definition (p. 5035) of supply chain risk: ‘the 
likelihood and impact of unexpected macro and/or micro level effects or conditions that adversely 
influence any part of a supply chain leading to operational, tactical, or strategic level failures or 
irregularities’. 
Consistent with this definition, Ellram, Bals and Tate (2018) highlighted the importance of supply 
chain risks as significantly influencing competitiveness and organisational viability. Cavinato 
(2004) provided a useful conceptual overview of the characteristics of supply chains that have 
potential to contribute to risk. Cavinato (2004) proposed that supply chains consist of five inner-
chain or network constructs: real, financial, educational, relational and innovative. The first, 
physical chains, represents traditionally viewed logistics, in the form of movement, storage, 
handling, processing, production and other forms of activities. Risks encompass transportation 
disruption, product loss, the inability to access inventories and supply discontinuity. Every supply 
chain also maintains a financial subchain working in parallel, in which parties in the chain have 
varying investments and costs, and cash movements and settlements from one firm to the next. 
These risks can arise through settlement process disruption, improper investments and by not 
bringing cost transparency to the overall supply chain (Cavinato 2004; Popa 2013). Security in 
settlement processes involving purchasing and distribution is an area of risk concern, as is the 
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management of securitised accounts receivables between firms (when this mechanism is in use) 
(Cavinato 2004; Ellram, Bals & Tate 2018; Shabbaz et al. 2018; Zhao & Huchzermeier 2015). 
Informational subchains parallel the physical and financial chains through the processes and 
electronic systems used for creating effects and triggered product movements and service 
mobilisation. According to Cavinato (2004), a longer-term risk involves the creation and 
investment in information systems that are neither fully capable nor efficient for intended 
purposes and future business needs. Relational subchains relate to the chosen linkages among 
buyers, sellers and logistics partners. A spectrum of relationships that range from arm’s length 
price ones on the traditional side to closer and more sophisticated forms, which include 
cooperative, collaborative, innovation focused, joint venture and vertical integration forms of 
interorganisational relationships (Cavinato 2004; Ellram, Bals & Tate 2018).  
Innovative subchains map the discovery, flow, creation and bring-to-market processes both within 
a firm and involving suppliers and other outsiders (Cavinato 2004; Sawik 2013). Supply here is 
the creation and bringing to market of a form of innovation for the benefit of the firm through 
increased market share or supply to new market segments. Innovative risk may represent the 
failure to effectively innovate and the loss of market share and reduced profitability. 
Table 2.1 illustrates further supply chain risk definitions in the literature. The definition provided 
by Waters (2011) regarding any type of operational input as a potential source of risk is a more 
inclusive definition that comprises all supply chain inputs and their inherent risks. In contrast, the 
other definitions appear less inclusive; for example, Zsidisin and Ritchie (2009) focus on 
information and communication to the exclusion of other factors.  
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Table 2.1 Examples of supply chain risk definitions (compiled by author) 
 
Author Definition 
Ho et al. (2015) The likelihood and impact of unexpected macro and/or micro 
level effects or conditions that adversely influence any part of 
a supply chain leading to operational, tactical or strategic 
level failures or irregularities 
Jüttner, Peck & Christopher 
(2003) 
Any risks to the information, material and product ﬂows from 
original suppliers to the delivery of the ﬁnal product for the 
end user 
Khan & Zsidisin (2012) Risk of any factor or effect that can materially disrupt a 
supply chain, whether within a single company or spread 
across multiple companies 
Sodhi, Son & Tang (2012) Negative deviation from the expected value of a certain 
performance measure, resulting in negative consequences for 
the focal firm 
Waters (2011) Threat of risk to inward flows of any type of resource to 
enable operations to take place; also termed ‘input risk’ 
Zsidisin & Ritchie (2009) Threats and vulnerabilities of commercially acquired 
information and communications technologies within 
Nixon et al (2003) defined service supply chain risk as a measure of the probability of a transaction 
failing. According to Wagner and Bode (2008, service supply chain risks are risks that are linked 
to the services, service provider or business and reduce the trust of services provided within the 
supply chain. Wagner and Bode (2011) argued that these risks are associated with transactions 
within the supply chain. For example, a customer may trust a supplier who is perceived as a high 
risk if the services offered by the supplier cost $12, but may not trust a high-risk supplier if the 
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supplied services cost $12,000. Table 2.2 illustrates other supply chain risk types that have been 
described in the literature. 
There is a lack of consensus on which risks the supply chain may be exposed to, and many authors 
have attempted to create overarching classifications (Louis & Pagell 2019; Rangel, de Oliveira & 
Leite 2014). Perhaps in part reflecting the diversity and ecological complexity of the nature of 
multicomponent supply chains that also vary across industries, there is a large number of risk type 
classifications with diverse terminologies and definitions. Table 2.3 shows more recent supply 
chain risk classifications identified in the literature and illustrates both the diversity and 
complexity of risk classification, and where some authors have attempted, in turn, to re-classify 
the classifications (Louis & Pagell 2019; Rangel, de Oliveira & Leite 2014). 
While there are a multitude of factors thought to contribute to risk of diminished performance (see 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3), part of the difficulty in creating a supply chain risk classification consensus 
may relate to the ambitious attempt to accommodate the diversity of all multi-industry factors 
associated with supply chains in general into a single descriptive classification. As the current 
research for this thesis has a focus on the financial supply chain in financial institutions, in 
particular, the remainder of this review narrows its focus to examining risks associated with the 
movement of financial products through transactions in the supply chain, through complex 
systems and processes to fulfil organisational purposes and objectives. 
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Table 2.2 Summary of supply chain risk types (compiled by author) 
Author Risk Types  
Cavinato (2004) Physical, ﬁnancial, informational, relational and 
innovative risks 
Chopra & Sodhi (2004) Disruptions, delays, systems, forecast, intellectual 
property, procurement, receivables, inventory and 
capacity risks 
Christopher & Peck (2004) External to the network, external to the ﬁrm but internal 
to the supply chain network: internal to the ﬁrm 
Harland, Brenchley & Walker 
(2003) 
Strategic, operations, supply, customer, asset 
impairment, competitive, reputation, ﬁnancial, ﬁscal, 
regulatory and legal risks 
Jüttner, Peck & Christopher 
(2003) 
Environmental risk, network-related risk, organisational 
risk 
Lin & Zhou (2011) Risk in the external environment 
Louis & Pagell (2019) Internal to firm, internal to supply chain, external to 
supply chain 
Manuj & Mentzer (2008) Supply, demand, operational and other risks 
Ravindran et al. (2010) Value at risk: labour strike, terrorist, natural disaster 
Samvedi, Jain & Chan (2013) Supply, demand, process and environmental risks 
Tang (2006) Operational risks: uncertain customer demand, uncertain 
supply and uncertain cost 
Tang & Musa (2011) Material ﬂow, ﬁnancial ﬂow and information ﬂow risks 
Tang & Tomlin (2008) Supply, process, demand, intellectual property, 
behavioural and political/social risks  
Trkman & McCormack 
(2009)  
Endogenous risks: market and technology turbulence 
Wagner & Bode (2008) Demand side, supply side, regulatory and legal, and 
infrastructure risk and catastrophic risks  
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Table 2.3 Examples of supply chain risk classifications (complied by author) 
Cavinato 2004 Christopher & Peck 2004 Chopra & Sodhi 2004 Hallikas et al. 2004 Hartland et al. 20I3 Ho et al. 2015 Louis & Pagell 2019 Manuj & Mentzer 2008
 Physical 
Financial 
 Informational 
 Relational 
 Innovative 
 Environmental 
 Demand 
 Supply 
 Control 
process 
 Disruption 
 Delays 
 Systems 
 Forecast 
 Intellectual 
property 
 Procurement 
 Receivables 
 Inventory 
capacity 
 Demand 
 Customer 
 Financial 
 Weakness in 
resources, 
development and 
flexibility 
 Strategic 
 Operations 
 Supply 
 Customer 
 Asset 
impairment 
 Competitive 
 Reputation 
 Financial 
 Fiscal 
 Regulatory 
 Legal 
 Macro 
 Micro (demand, 
manufacturing, 
supply, 
information, 
transportation, 
financial) 
 Internal to firm 
 Internal to 
supply chain 
 External to 
supply chain 
 Currency 
 Transit time 
 Forecast 
 Quality 
 Safety 
 Business 
Disruption 
 Survival 
 Inventory and 
tool ownership 
 Culture 
 Oil price increase 
        
Miccuci 2008 Rangel, de Oliveira & Leite 2014 Rao & Goldsby 2009 Shi 2004 Tang & Tomlin 2008 Wang & Yang 2007 Wu et al. 2006 Wu 2010 
 Interruption  
 Supply 
 Strategic  
 Inertia 
 Demand 
 Capacity 
 Plan 
 Source 
 Making 
 Delivery 
 Return 
 Other 
 
 Environmental 
factors 
 Organisational 
factors 
 Industry factors 
 Problems-
specific factors 
 Decision maker 
factors 
 Value chain 
 Operational 
 Effect 
 Credit 
 Market 
 Tax 
 Supply 
 Process  
 Demand  
 Intellectual 
property 
 Behavioural  
 Political/Social 
 Political 
 Economy 
 Culture 
 Technical 
 Natural 
 Demand 
 Logistics 
 Capital 
 Information 
 External 
controllable 
 External 
partially 
controllable 
 External 
uncontrollable 
 Internal 
controllable 
 Internal partially 
controllable 
 Internal 
uncontrollable 
 Uncertainty in 
external 
environment 
 Uncertainty 
between node 
enterprises 
 Uncertainly in 
node enterprises  
 Uncertainty in 
market demand 
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2.3 Supply chain risk management 
In the past, organisations have strategically used investments and other financial techniques to 
indirectly offset potential losses as an approach to manage financial risk (Ziman 2013). For 
instance, a number of studies of American companies show that over 60% employed derivative 
contract techniques (e.g., Wuttke, Blome & Henke 2013) to manage risk of future financial losses. 
Also, Viswanadham and Samvedi (2013) indicated that up to 90% of large firms in the UK use 
derivatives to manage risk of financial loss. Monitoring data from the Bank for International 
Settlements show increases in hedging investment (Sodhi, Son & Tang 2012). However, even 
with increased use of derivative contract techniques, the increase in financial risks has continued 
(Sodhi, Son & Tang 2012). In this section, rather than simply insuring against loss from 
uncontrolled risk (Wu, Blackhurst & Chidambaram 2006), more direct management of the supply 
chain risk within the potential control of an organisation is discussed. 
Supply chain management is the management of all business practices that are assimilated for the 
purpose of the provision of services and products required by end consumers (Cousins et al. 2008; 
Harland 1996). Supply chain management also involves the strategic and systematic integration 
of tactics and traditional business practices across all business functions in the supply chain. This 
ultimately improves company performance in the long run as well as the supply chain as a whole 
(Mentzer et al. 2001).  
Ho et al. (2015) noted that the majority of scholars have focused on manufacturing supply chains, 
whereas service supply chains have attracted less attention. In view of the importance of the role 
of service industries (Ho et al. 2015) and the fact that this research is concerned with supply chain 
risk in financial services, here, there is a focus on literature relating to services. 
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Supply managers navigate numerous hazards that exist in their increasingly competitive 
surroundings (Giunipero & Eltantawy 2004). Typically, this designed buffering is directed 
towards concerns of sub-optimal functional efficiency. Risk management may be a superior 
method to cope with these types of uncertainties by identifying possible cutbacks (Giunipero & 
Eltantawy 2004). According to Bambos (2011), service providers normally employ risk analysis 
methods to persuade their prospective service clients that their regular services are trustworthy. 
Moreover, environmental assumptions may be employed to characterise the assumptions of 
service providers regarding the infrastructure of prospective clients or partners in the supply chain 
(Govindan & Chaudhuri 2016). 
Research by Belkhamza (2009) found that risk management may be adopted in a supply chain to 
secure cost-effective services that enable the development and application of cost-effective 
measures to decrease service supply chain risks. Service support and provision integrate or 
combine various technology control weaknesses and strengths for different parts of the supply 
chain, processes and technologies comprising a new service. At times, it may be beneficial to 
integrate risk management and technology assessments into service-related supply chains (Wan 
& Wan 2010). This process of integration is effective for the assessment of security weaknesses 
and strengths of the technology. Giunipero and Eltantawy (2012) proposed that service supply 
chain risk management processes provide details on who is accountable for performing the 
identified controls on a regular basis. This helps in maintaining services that are trustworthy to 
the potential partners or customers in a supply chain.  
Fan and Stevenson (2018), in a review of SCRM, encapsulated the latter into four key stages: risk 
identification, assessment, treatment and monitoring. They concluded that much of the existing 
research tends to focus on single aspects of risk rather than taking a holistic approach, where all 
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four stages are examined together. They found that the monitoring stage, in particular, has 
received limited attention in the literature. While the risk of diminished performance can arise 
from any of the sources or stages of risk in the supply chain, the next section describes risk arising 
from transactional processes in the supply chain. 
2.4 Transactional risks in the supply chain 
Transaction processes are structured movements, economic incidents or exchanges that take place 
between two or more entities in a supply chain (Stair & Reynolds 2010). The transaction process 
system is a structured collection of devices, databases, procedures and people involved in the 
process of business transactions, and may be used to store data regarding the supply chain 
transactions (Stair & Reynolds 2010). 
The transactional movements in the supply chain comprise a process component of the supply 
chain. Most companies aim to enhance their transactional activities, through such mechanisms as 
technology, costs and other variables, to reduce transaction time and costs, as well as for other 
benefits (Stair & Reynolds 2010). Supply chain transactions contain various transaction types, 
which serve effective and significant purposes in the business supply chain, such as ordering, 
commerce and socialising. A business may seek to enhance a supply chain transaction in which a 
single data or database source is inadequate in providing effective and reliable services to the 
customers and partners (Monczka & Handfield 2010). 
According to Vrijhoef (2011), various market adjustment costs are greatly decreased or eliminated 
in well-managed supply chain transactions. For example, a business supply chain may use long-
term contracts to reduce the total number of transactions and costs in a supply chain. In addition, 
the majority of consumers purchase most of their services and products through transactions 
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where the contractual basis is applicable to all the transactions and use of the transaction infers 
that an agreement has been established. Transaction process systems have been implemented by 
most companies or businesses with the main aim of storing, processing and collecting transactions 
and generating valuable documents associated with the management of business operations 
(Vrijhoef 2011). 
Manual transaction processes require significant time input compared with computerised 
transactions to generate regular documents (Shah 2009). Moreover, computerised transaction 
processes and advancements in technology enable transaction supply chains to be operated or 
processed in a reliable and timely manner. These processes and arrangements enhance the 
activities in the supply chain. However, the advent in recent years of electronic transactions 
(Chaarani & Abaid 2018) has also introduced new risks, such as new types of fraud (Australian 
Payments Network 2018). Banks and other financial institutions are implementing various 
technologies and security systems to reduce or eliminate these types of financial supply chain 
transactional risks (Australian Payments Network 2018).  
2.5 Supply chain risk and Australian financial institutions 
In Australia, banks comprise both banking businesses as well as a range of other financial products 
such as insurance and investment products. For this reason, they are usually referred to as financial 
institutions in this thesis, but the term bank is also used where the literature refers to them as 
banking entities. There is a trend of increasing profitability of major banks (Reserve Bank of 
Australia 2018a), and Australian banks are among the most profitable in the world. According to 
2015 data, the International Banker’s survey of the top 1000 banks around the world showed 
Australian banks make the highest profit as a share of GDP (cited in The Australia Institute 2018). 
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However, this profitability, according to the Reserve Bank of Australia (2017), partly reflects the 
more favourable economic conditions that prevailed in Australia in the period following the global 
financial crisis and a comparatively simple asset mix, with lower exposure to trading and 
institutional banking. Also contributing to higher profitability is that Australian net interest 
margins are higher than in a number of other countries (Reserve Bank of Australia 2017). 
Despite increased profitability, most banks, both globally and domestically, are vulnerable to risk 
factors. For example, financial institution risk has received considerable public attention in the 
Australian media. The terms of reference of the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the 
Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (Royal Commission) in 2017 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2018, p. 2) aimed to examine:  
• ‘The adequacy of the existing laws and policies of the Commonwealth relating to the 
provision of banking and related financial services; 
• The adequacy of the internal systems of financial services entities; 
• The adequacy of existing forms of industry self-regulation, including industry codes 
of conduct, to identify, regulate and address misconduct and conduct falling short of 
community expectations and to provide appropriate redress to consumers; 
• The effectiveness and ability of regulators to identify and address misconduct;  
• Whether any further changes to the legal framework, practices within entities, or the 
financial regulators are necessary to minimise the likelihood of misconduct in the 
future; and 
• The effectiveness of mechanisms for redress for consumers of financial services who 
suffer detriment as a result of misconduct.’ 
 29 
 
Risks that affect institutional performance also include loss of public confidence, risk of reputation 
loss and customer dissatisfaction, where customers convert to sector competitors. Banking and 
other financial institution misconduct is noted in the interim report’s executive summary (p. 1), 
which found that ‘conduct by financial services entities that has brought public attention and 
condemnation’, and that the major financial institutions all acknowledged misconduct 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2018). 
The Royal Commission (Commonwealth of Australia 2019) found deficiencies of culture, 
governance and risk management within Australian banks. The deficiencies found in Australian 
banking practices reflected scandals and prudential concerns about effective governance, risk 
management, risk controls and incentive-based compensation that had also occurred in Europe 
and North America. This deficiency in risk management affects the banks’ prudential standing 
and was thought to significantly reduce the value of their issued capital. The report found that the 
conduct by financial services entities had brought public attention and condemnation, and that the 
major financial institutions all acknowledged misconduct. The disclosures in public hearings 
prompted banks and regulatory authorities to begin to consider how to address shortcomings in 
risk management and misconduct (Commonwealth of Australia 2019). 
Financial transaction risks in banking supply chains are also vulnerable to risk, including theft 
and unlawful bank transactions (Association of Financial Professionals 2017; Australian 
Payments Network 2018). According to a survey carried out by the Association of Financial 
Professionals (2014), 90% of respondents indicated that risk management was strategically 
important and 84% of respondents indicated that their organisations had increased exposure to 
risk relative to the previous three years.  
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This increased risk perception coincides with the increasing automation and electronification of 
financial transactions (Chaarani & Abiad 2018), such as contactless card payments (Australian 
Payments Network 2018). These changes may have implications for the nature of the risks and 
the potential for financial loss and present new challenges for contemporary banking 
organisations. Financial institutions, in particular, face major risks, including fraud, because of 
the movement of financial products from one point to another (ACI Worldwide 2016; Australian 
Payments Network 2018). 
Technology-related impacts of FSCR occur when technology services provider failures cause 
major disruptions, such as when network services cause national outages and mean that bank 
customers are unable to use payment cards or ATMs, leading to nationwide retail and other 
business disruptions. For example, the Australian provider of banking network services caused a 
national outage that left many bank customers across Australia unable to use EFTPOS or ATMs, 
leading to nationwide retail and other business disruptions (Withers 2018). 
The literature regarding impact of risk on Australian financial institutions illustrates the 
importance of understanding the contribution of supply chain risk. The supply chain is an essential 
part of business operations (Fan & Stevenson 2018), and this is particularly so for financial 
institutions where the product is usually comprised of some aspect of money and the delivery of 
financial services, which involves the movement of money through a network of financial 
transaction processes. The financial supply chain, discussed in the next section, is an important 
part of supply chain transactions, management and business operations. 
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2.6 Financial supply chain risk 
Ho et al.’s (2015) definition of supply chain risk described in Section 2.2 is adapted for this 
research on financial-related risks from a supply chain perspective. The definition in this research 
of FSCR is the likelihood and impact of unexpected macro- and/or micro-level financial-related 
effects or conditions that adversely influence any aspect of a supply chain and can lead to 
operational, tactical or strategic level failures or irregularities. This definition encompasses supply 
chain financing risk related to risk concerning adequate funding of supply chain activity (Popa 
2013). It is also more inclusive than the finance perspective described by Fan and Stevenson 
(2018) related to accounting, such as working capital optimisation, asset financing, and so on. 
Table 2.4 lists several definitions of FSCR that have appeared in the literature. 
Importantly, the supply chain in financial institutions is unlike the physical products or non-
financial-related service products of non-financial service businesses. In the latter, the financial 
and non-financial aspects of supply chain risk are sometimes definitionally separated (Popa 2013). 
However, banking and financial institutions deal almost exclusively with products and services 
that are essentially financial in character. Therefore, the financial and non-financial aspects of 
financial institutions’ supply chain risk do not appear to be so easily separated. For example, the 
functional banking equivalent of the logistics of the movement of goods through a supply chain 
is the movement of money through electronic banking networks. Further, it is possible that 
financial-related risks may interact with financial risks and that their potential joint effects may 
not be easily separated or attributed. In this research, a more inclusive definition of FSCR is 
adopted to accommodate the financial nature of the institutions under investigation. 
The financial attributes of the supply chain have been described as including a set or series of 
financial operations for the safe transportation, distribution and storage of products or services  
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Table 2.4 Definitions of FSCR (compiled by author) 
 
Author Definition 
Belkhamza (2009) Chance that business cash flows are not sufficient to pay 
creditors and fulfil other financial responsibilities 
Cousins & Lawson (2007) Variability of actual returns on an investment around an 
expected return, even when those returns represent positive 
outcomes
Hull (2012) Risk that involves financial loss to firms; financial risk 
because of instability and losses in the financial market 
caused by factors such as movements in stock prices, 
currencies and interest rates
Gelsomino et al. (2016) Short-term risk accounts payable risk and supply chain 
finance risk related to lack of working capital optimisation
Manuj & Mentzer (2008) Risk that a firm will be unable to meet its financial 
obligations; risk is primarily a function of the relative amount 
of debt that the firm uses to finance its assets 
Popa (2013) Risk from activities of planning and controlling all financial 
processes, within a company and for communication with 
other enterprises
Stair & Reynolds (2010) Possibility that a bond issuer will default by failing to repay 
principal and interest in a timely manner
Wan & Wan (2010) Probability of loss inherent in financing methods that may 
impair the ability to provide an adequate return 
Yeates (2014) Risk that an effect will trigger a loss of economic value or 
confidence in a substantial portion of the financial system, 
and increases in uncertainty about the financial system that is 
serious enough to have significant adverse effects. 
within a network of industries (Vanany& Pujawan 2009). In financial institutions, particularly, 
products can include money as well as efficient cash flow and working capital availability 
According to Berger and Humphrey (1997), efficient supply chain management has continuously 
reported viable and successful business flows in various markets. With increasingly fierce 
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competition in the business world, FSC risk management has become a point of focus for 
companies across the globe. In a large survey of 760 German managers, Wagner and Bode (2006) 
suggested that multiple components of a supply chain, including those that are financial in nature, 
contribute risk to all industries. Reducing risk in the FSC creates a competitive advantage over 
other financial institutions in similar markets (Berger & Humphrey 1997). Increases in disasters 
and catastrophes have intensified the need for firms and industries to search for ways of combating 
supply chain vulnerability and risks (Bode et al. 2011; Wagner & Bode 2008). As the costs of the 
capital resources of the supply chain continue to increase, the process of managing capital and 
cash flows becomes as essential as managing interactions between supply chain partners (Blome 
& Schoenherr 2011). With only two studies found, there is limited research on supply chain risk 
in financial institutions (Blome & Schoenherr 2011; Lundin 2012); further, no studies could be 
found about FSCR in Australian financial institutions. 
2.6.1 Financial supply chain risk management 
Following a comprehensive review of supply chain risk management, Fan and Stevenson (2018, 
p. 210) defined this as: 
The identification, assessment, treatment, and monitoring of supply chain risks, 
with the aid of the internal implementation of tools, techniques and strategies and 
of external coordination and collaboration with supply chain members so as to 
reduce vulnerability and ensure continuity coupled with profitability, leading to 
competitive advantage. 
Table 2.5 shows contributions regarding FSCR management. These FSCR management strategies 
and techniques address the exceptional risks encountered along the supply chain by implementing 
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continuous risk evaluation and assessment to minimise vulnerability and exposure to ensure the 
continuity of effective product supply. The risk mitigation strategies include both financial and 
operational management strategies (Bandaly et al. 2013; Murali & Rajkumar 2018; Takeishi 
2001). 
Table 2.5 Contributions regarding FSCR management (compiled by author) 
 
Author Area of Interest Contribution 
Bandaly et al. (2013) Supply chain management Impact of risk-averse strategy in 
supply chain 
Blome & Schoenherr 
(2011) 
Supply chain risk 
management 
How companies manage financial 
crises within the supply chain 
Ceryno et al. (2013) Supply chain risk 
management 
Concepts and strategies within supply 
chain risk management 
Christopher & Lee 
(2004) 
Supply chain risk Enhancing confidence to reduce 
supply chain risks 
Fan & Stevenson 
(2018) 
Supply chain risk 
management 
Review of SCRM, definitions and 
theory with research agenda 
recommendations 
Olson & Wu (2010) Risk management Generic risk supply chain framework 
Zhao & Huchzermeier 
(2015) 
Risk management Framework to integrate analytical 
operations–finance interface models 
Wagner & Bode (2008) Supply chain performance Measures and strategies to mitigate 
FSCRs 
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FSCR were considered by Blome and Scheonherr (2011) to be one of the more significant 
contributors to performance risk, and able to serve as barriers to risk remediation. In response to 
FSCR, some industries have combined their efforts to ensure effective and efficient demand, 
supply and financial and transportation management (Wagner & Bode 2008). Supply chain 
financial risk management is primarily aimed at managing the risks in complex dynamic supply 
and demand networks (Dyer & Singh 1998; Dyer Singh & Hesterly 2018). FSCR management 
considers the key strategy for managing the exceptional risks that are encountered along the 
supply chain processes. 
A common theme in the literature is that managing risk is based on continuous risk evaluation and 
assessment with the purpose of minimising vulnerability and exposure to ensure continuity of 
effective product supply in the chain. This is supported by Fan and Stevenson (2018), who, in 
their review of supply chain risk management, followed the typology of Hallikas et al. (2004) and 
distilled the literature into four key processes: risk identification, assessment, treatment and 
monitoring. Although Zsidisin and Ritchie (2009) added a fifth step, organisational and personal 
learning, in this research, Fan and Stevenson’s definition is adapted to FSCR management and is 
here defined as the identification, assessment, treatment and monitoring of financial supply chain 
risks, with the aid of the internal implementation of tools, techniques and strategies and of external 
coordination and collaboration with supply chain members to reduce vulnerability and ensure 
continuity coupled with profitability, leading to competitive advantage. 
2.7 Financial supply chain risk factors 
The literature on the exposure of the supply chain to different types of risk is examined in the 
following sections to identify potential factors that could cause disruption in the financial supply 
chain where those risks could be relevant to financial services. The following sections describing 
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FSCR types are adapted, organised and based on risk factor categories from the supply chain risk 
factor categories distilled by Tang (2006) and Ho et al. (2015) in their literature reviews on supply 
chain risks. These categorisations of risks are demand risk factors, supply risk factors, product 
management risk factors and information management risk factors. 
2.7.1 Demand risk factors 
Demand refers to processes related to business-to-customer interfaces, including retailer 
relationships and outbound processes (Tang 2006; Ho et al. 2015; Zhao & Huchzermeier 2015). 
In every market, there is demand for money from both buyers and sellers. Operational demand 
management (ODM) refers to establishing profitability by meeting customer demands and 
expectations while ensuring delivery of high-quality service (Christopher 2016). At the strategic 
stage, the organisation efficiently handles the total demand as it acquires new technology, skills 
and infrastructure. At the tactical stage, the organisation aligns resources to enhance value to the 
customer in a profitable way. ODM mandates the provision of reliable delivery tasks that occur 
within the constraints of the supply chain (Christopher 2016).  
There are risks associated with demand creation, supply planning, order management and 
communication. In a review of the literature, Ho et al. (2015) examined a number of demand-
related risks. Table 2.6 shows a summary list of demand risk factors that have been identified in 
the supply chain. Demand risks are further discussed and synthesised by Cousins et al. (2008) into 
three types related to shifting demand over time, shifting demand across markets, and demand 
shift against products. 
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Table 2.6 Summary list of demand risk factors in the supply chain (compiled by author) 
 
Demand risk factors 
 Inaccurate demand forecasts (Chopra & Sodhi 2004) 
 Serious forecasting errors (Manuj & Mentzer 2008) 
 Unmanaged demand variability or information distortion (Tummala & Schoenherr 2011) 
 Demand uncertainty (Hahn & Kuhn 2012) 
 Sudden shoot-up demand (Samvedi, Jain & Chan 2013) 
 Demand variability (Chopra & Sodhi 2004) 
 Customer fragmentation (Gaudenzi & Borghesi 2006) 
 High level of service required by customers (Gaudenzi & Borghesi 2006) 
 Customer dependency (Wagner & Neshat 2010) 
 Deﬁcient or missing customer relation management function (Tuncel & Alpan 2010) 
2.7.1.1 Shifting demand across time 
In demand management, shifting demand across time is considered essential (Cousins et al. 2008). 
It has been argued that the following factors should be considered when shifting demand. During 
high or peak seasons, service industries should increase prices (Cousins et al. 2008). During low-
demand seasons, discount strategies should be implemented, advance purchase of goods should 
be encouraged and various payment methods should be incorporated with strategies for 
postponing demand, such as offering price discounts to clients who accept late shipments (Cousins 
et al. 2008). 
2.7.1.2 Shifting demand across markets 
To manage demand against the market, it has been suggested that industries should ensure that 
when they are selling products that have short life cycles, product rollovers should be properly 
managed (Cousins et al. 2008). Further, Cousins et al. (2008) proposed that to mitigate risk, 
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industries might consider selling new products and commodities in different markets, shifting 
demand from the primary market to a secondary market or implementing trans-shipments. 
2.7.1.3 Demand shift against products 
To ensure an optimum balance of shifting demand against products, an industry should ensure 
that it is selling multiple products and commodities in a single market, and that promotion and 
pricing strategies entice clients to switch to different brands or products (Cousins et al. 2008). 
The ultimate purpose of marketing strategies is to assist firms in increasing market share, revenue 
and sales (Cousins et al. 2008). Product substitution can be achieved through selling products 
containing similar features to improve a firm’s product substitutability (McGinnis & Vallopra 
1999). Product substitution occurs when a product dominates the other products in performance 
or quality (McGinnis & Vallopra 1999). Product bundling helps a firm to change the demand for 
its commodities and products by structuring bundles (Handfield & Bechtel 2002). Examples can 
be identified across a wide range of products, including food, apparel, cosmetics and electronics. 
When a product or commodity is sold in bundles, customers are forced to buy all of the 
commodities and products as a bundle. This, in turn, increases demand for the products (Handfield 
& Bechtel 2002). 
This examination of the literature shows that a number of risks have been identified in the 
literature associated with demand operations that govern outbound transactions, usually in the 
business-to-retail-customer interface of the supply chain. More recently, Shahbaz et al. (2018) 
proposed a conceptual model that incorporates several risk source categories, including generic 
demand-side risks, as well as supply-side risks. Next, supply risks are discussed. 
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2.7.2 Supply risk factors 
Supply operations risk is a broad term used to describe various ways of acquiring, managing and 
identifying the products and resources necessary to manage a business or any organisation 
successfully and effectively (Cousins et al. 2008). Supply management components are tools with 
fundamental significance in financial supply chain management (Clark & Fujimoto 1991). They 
assist in the management of the resources and products that are associated with the capabilities 
that an organisation or industry requires to explore its maximum potential to meet or attain its 
targeted objectives (Cousins et al. 2008). In a review of the literature, Ho et al. (2015) described 
a number of supply chain related risk factors (see Table 2.7). Supply operations management 
ensures the effective flow of resources and products to meet client demand. To demonstrate 
effective supply, there should be both physical and information flows (Handfield 2013). 
Physical supply comprises the movement of goods within the market (transportation), whereas 
information supply is effective communication within the chain. For effective and efficient supply 
network design, an industry must ensure good network configuration, product and transportation 
planning, and product and customer assignment (Liker et al. 1996). Table 2.8 shows examples of 
supply operations risks. 
2.7.2.1 Supply network design 
For effective and efficient supply network design, an industry should ensure that there is good 
network configuration, product planning, transportation planning, product assignment and 
customer assignment (Liker et al. 1996). Network configuration ensures that there is effective 
communication to ensure that goods have been supplied appropriately (Liker et al. 1996). Liker 
et al. (1996) also argued that transportation of the product should be planned and that the product 
to be transported must be well packed. If products are fragile or perishable, the most suitable 
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method of transportation should be selected to ensure that the supply is completed without 
problems (Liker et al. 1996). 
Table 2.7 Summary list of supply risk factors in the supply chain (compiled by author) 
 
Authors Supply risk factors 
 
Zsidisin & Ellram (2003) 
 
 Inability to handle volume demand changes  
 Failures to make delivery requirements 
 Cannot provide competitive pricing 
 Technologically behind competitors 
 Inability to meet quality requirements 
Chopra & Sodhi (2004)  Supplier bankruptcy 
 Single supply sourcing 
 Small supply base 
 Supplier dependency 
 Global outsourcing 
Tummala & Schoenherr (2011)  Supply responsiveness 
 High capacity utilisation at supply source 
Gaudenzi & Borgesi (2006)  Narrow number of intermediate suppliers 
 Lack of integration with suppliers 
 Lack of supplier visibility 
 
2.7.2.2 Supplier relationships 
According to Handfield et al (2013), supplier relationships are a source of risk. The 
interorganisational relationship between a company and supplier is crucial to the supply chain, 
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where it can be beneficially cooperative rather than adversarial (LaBahn & Krapfel 2000; 
Leuschner, Rogers & Charvet 2013; Primo & Amundson 2002). In addition, in organisations that 
operate internationally, cross-cultural relationship building is needed to create a mutually 
beneficial financial partnership. Cultural adaption is the strategy that has been put forward as a 
prime mitigation strategy for addressing cultural diversity related risks (Monczka et al. 1998). 
This could include intercultural sensitivity and cultural awareness enhancement approaches 
(Progoulaki & Theotokas 2016). 
Table 2.8 Supply risk examples (compiled by author) 
 
Author Area of Interest Contribution 
Clark & Fujimoto (1991) Supply network design Effect of management, organisation 
and strategy on this critical 
constituent of business strategy 
Handfield et al (2013) Financial risk  Strategies to reduce disruptions in 
the supply chain 
Liker et al. (1996) Supply involvement Mutual dependence, competition, 
performance monitoring and target 
prices to control suppliers 
Wagner & Bode (2008) Supplier relationships Factors (external and internal) that 
affect supply chain risk exposure 
Womack, Jones & Roos 
(1991) 
Lean production Transformation of traditional 
enterprises into paradigms of lean 
success 
In relation to financial risks, Handfield et al (2013) suggested that various types of supplier 
relationships, ranging from a single-time purchase to virtual integration, should be considered for 
adoption. Four types of relationships exist in supply chain management to ensure successful 
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delivery and distribution of goods among clients or consumers (Handfield et al 2013): vendor, 
exclusive supplier, partner and preferred supplier. In addition, Handfield et al (2013) suggest that 
long-term and short-term contract issues should be transparently explored and elaborated to ensure 
that there is a proper supply of goods in the market. 
2.7.2.3 Supplier order allocation 
Supplier order allocation addresses uncertain demand, uncertain supply, uncertain supply lead-
time and uncertain price of products (Handfield et al. 1999; Handfield et al. 2009). Uncertain price 
or cost relates to the currency rates that are set in the international market. It also includes the 
upstream cost that is implemented by partners, as well as the flexibility of changing between two 
plants located in different nations (Handfield et al. 1999; Handfield et al. 2009). Uncertain supply 
lead-time occurs when replenish lead-time determines demand. Uncertain supply denotes cases 
where buyers receive random orders. Uncertain demand entails allocation of single suppliers and 
restriction to two suppliers because of complexity (Handfield et al. 1999; Handfield et al. 2009; 
Leuschner, Rogers & Charvet 2013). 
2.7.2.4 Supply contracts 
Supply partners in various organisations and industries make numerous independent decisions 
that differ from each other. Locally, decisions are always operationally inefficient or globally sub-
optimal, causing an inadequate or malfunctioning supply chain. According to Wagner and Bode 
(2006), a disintegrated or fragmented supply chain occurs because of customer demand, because 
individuals attempt or seek to maximise their personal interest. Optimal decisions that are made 
locally can culminate in complete disruption of the supply chain (Siddiqi 2017; Wagner & Bode 
2006). 
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2.7.3 Information systems management risk factors 
The application of information technology (IT) can enhance supply chain management and 
contribute to competitive advantage. IT can deliver competitive positioning of business 
resourcefulness, such as restructured cross-functional processes and reduced cycle time (e.g., 
Tang & Musa 2011). IT inventions generate different techniques for organisations to manage 
supply chain interactions. IT enables the easy flow of information, materials and finance among 
customers, manufacturers, distributors and suppliers (Olsen & Wu 2010). Therefore, IT is a major 
tool for minimising supply chain risks effectively and efficiently. For example, a bank can use 
different analytic methods to explore the potential effects of currency exchange rates and changes 
in supply chain prices to reduce the risks involved. 
Prior to the application of computers and technology, information flow among the various 
functions and departments of a firm and other related firms in the supply chain was paper based. 
This meant that the dissemination of information was a slow process, vulnerable to complete 
distortion. There were many irregularities in the supply chain that might have led to customer 
dissatisfaction. However, the application of IT has eased processes and communication in the 
supply chain (Cavinato 2004). 
Companies are becoming increasingly aware of the need to depend on efficient supply chain 
networks to enhance their competitive advantage in the market, as well as reduce financial risks 
involved in marketplaces. Customer uptake of mobile and online banking services is increasingly 
important service provision and depends on perceived usefulness, among several other factors 
including trust (Jalil, Talukder & Rahman 2014; Martins, Oliveira & Popovič 2014; Talukder, 
Quazi & Sathye 2014) and managerial reforms (Saneie & Naghneh 2015). In the past few years, 
IT, outsourcing and supply chain globalisation have allowed most companies to effectively reduce 
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financial risks and enhance collaboration among partners within supply chain networks. Risks can 
be reduced when every specialised business partner in the supply chain concentrates on a few 
strategic activities, or even a sole activity (English et al. 2003; Ho et al 2012; Primo & Amundson 
2002). 
Chen, Paulraj and Lado (2004) suggested that strategic purchasing, top management support and 
establishing competitive priorities affect the efficient management of the supply chain. 
Considering that an organisation depends on interorganisational relationships for the supply chain 
to operate, the use of IT can assist building these relationships to reduce risk (Primo & Amundson 
2002). 
Supply network structure is a construct that addresses a non-power, horizontal and decentralised 
structural link between different participants of the supply chain (Harland, Brenchley & Walker 
2003). In this construct framework, logistics integration assesses the extent of materials and 
information integration across the supply chain to determine where information could improve 
performance. 
Uncertainty is another fundamental construct in general business management, such as strategic 
management, marketing and organisational theory. There are three key uncertainty sources that 
influence a company’s supply chain: demand and customer uncertainty, originating from irregular 
orders and prediction of errors; manufacturing uncertainty, originating from supply chain 
performance, machine failure and process performance; and supplier uncertainty, originating from 
the degree of discrepancy, average lateness and on-time performance (Flynn, Koufteros & Lu 
2016). Flynn, Koufteros and Lu (2016) also suggested that increased competition in global and 
local markets and the increase in technology-related innovation are the main fundamental factors 
compelling business needs for first-class suppliers and for advancement of suppliers. 
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The use of IT adds a competitive advantage to businesses seeking to manage FSCR (Nair, Raju 
& Anbudayashankar 2009). According to Nair, Raju and Anbudayashankar (2009), these tools 
facilitate the competitive positioning of business resources by restructuring cross-functional 
processes and reducing cycle time. IT inventions are constantly generating innovative techniques 
whereby organisations can more effectively manage supply chain interactions. The tools enable 
the easy flow of information, materials and finances among customers, manufacturers, distributors 
and suppliers, making IT one of the most significant contributors to successful supply chain 
management (e.g., Dyer & Hatch 2004; Schlegel & Trent 2014; Pfohl, Köhler & Thomas 2010). 
2.7.3.1 Information accuracy and sharing 
Sharing accurate information about supply and demand of the supply chain can result in 
performance improvements for all individuals in the supply chain (Dyer & Hatch 2004). Accurate 
information supply can be achieved through adaption of advanced technologies, which can make 
communication faster.  Jappelli and Pagano (2002 presented evidence of both the benefits of 
modern trends in interorganisational information sharing as well as regulatory risks to protect 
consumer rights. Both Adeosun et al. (2008) and Bloom et al. (2014) described various benefits 
and risks associated with modern IT’s effects on communications and information sharing. 
Agboola (2007) argued that competition is a driving force for the greater uptake of IT. 
2.7.3.2 Information system security and disruption 
Information system security entails safeguarding vital information from unauthorised access, 
disruption and investigation. Exposure of a firm’s vital information may lead to supply chain risk 
(Schlegel & Trent 2014). The most effective way to manage this issue is to use electronic 
computers to safeguard information. Passwords can be set to preffect bypass (Pfohl, Köhler & 
Thomas 2010). Barth et al. (2009) suggested that information sharing can reduce corruption. 
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DuHadway and Carnovale (2019) examined the role of relational risk associated with other 
companies or individuals in the supply chain engaging in malicious behaviours that can lead to 
disruptions. They suggested that effective detection, which comes from information sharing, new 
technologies, supply chain visibility and supplier integration, can detect or prevent a variety of 
disruptions, together with other benefits from supplier integration into the supply chain (Petersen, 
Handfield & Ragatz 2005). 
The advent in recent years of electronic transactions (Chaarani & Abaid 2018) has also introduced 
new risks, such as new types of fraud (Australian Payments Network 2018). As a result of 
increasing ATM and debit and credit card fraud and theft, banks and other financial institutions 
implement various technologies and security systems to reduce or eliminate these types of bank 
fraud. Even though the occurrences of credit card fraud represent only 0.2% of all credit card 
transactions, this results in extensive financial losses (Australian Payments Network 2018). For 
example, of 8.9 billion card transactions in Australia in 2017, $561 million in value was lost to 
card-related fraud (Australian Payments Network 2018). Although there are some refined fraud 
prevention and detection systems adopted by all banks, such as card chip technology, bank fraud 
remains a critical focus, particularly in information systems related card-not-present fraud typical 
of internet-based financial transactions. Likewise, bank fraud has affected many banks across the 
globe. For example, according to ACI Worldwide (2016), 30% of consumers globally have 
experienced payment card fraud in the past five years. 
Additionally, offenders target ATMs, installing ‘skimmers’ near the locations in which bank 
customers insert their cards; card details are copied and later used for fraudulent transactions. To 
further illustrate the extent of financial transaction risks, in Australia, there was an estimated one 
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ATM fraud per 1.1 million transactions in 2012, with a loss of A$23 million in 2016 (Australian 
Payments Network 2016).  
Table 2.9 shows that Deutsche Bank, Bank of Africa and NAB are among the banks that 
experienced the greatest all-cause losses reported in 2014 (Australian Payments Clearing 
Association 2014). The main factors for these losses were management and global financial 
instability, but fraud was also a factor, primarily skimming and counterfeit cards (DuHadway & 
Carnovale 2019; Yeates 2014). 
According to Yeates (2014), in Australia, approximately 3.4% of losses were the result of fraud. 
The total fraud on cheques and cards increased from 16 cents per A$1000 in 2012 to 17 cents per 
A$1000 in 2013. The total number of fraud incidents on payment cards rose by 15%, accounting 
for A$304 million and an increase of 5% to A$634 billion on the entire sum of money spent in 
Australia using cards (Yeates 2014). Moreover, there was an increase from 15 cents to 17 cents 
in every A$1000 transacted on cheque fraud, where the entire fraud on cheque payments increased 
by 13% to A$7 million, in contrast to an increase of 1.3% to A$1330 billion in the entire sum of 
money transacted on cheques (Yeates 2014). 
Although there was a decrease in skimming and counterfeit fraud on all cards by 47% from 2008 
to 2017 (Australian Payments Network 2018), the cost of skimming fraud is still substantial. The 
amount of loss was A$11 million in 2013. The highest skimming fraud on cards in Australia was 
experienced in 2008, followed by 2011, with a decreasing trend for 2017. The difference between 
Australia and overseas is attributed to the greater utilisation of card chip technology in Australia 
(Australian Payments Network 2018).  
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Table 2.9 Banks with the greatest all-cause losses (adapted from Australian Payments Clearing 
Association 2014) 
Bank Country Loss (A$ Billion) 
Deutsche Bank United Kingdom 1.30 
Bank of Africa United States 0.45 
National Australia Bank Australia 0.36 
 
2.7.3.3 Information availability and outsourcing 
Information about a firm’s products should be available to individuals in the industry to eliminate 
risk in the supply chain. Information about the cost or price of commodities should be 
communicated (Dyer 1996). Introduction of new products in the market should also be 
communicated (Dyer & Hatch 2004). This can be achieved through IT implemented in firms, 
which assists in cutting costs and minimising risks (Dyer & Hatch 2004). Further, information 
availability has many contributions to make in minimising risk in the supply chain (DuHadway 
& Carnovale 2019; Kallberg & Udell 2003) as well as outsourcing information supply to external 
information providers (Barth et al. 2009; Dong, Xu & Zhu 2009; Wallenburg et al. 2011). 
2.7.3.4 Communication and technology 
Communication is a vital component of supply chain management. It holds fundamental 
significance in the process of minimising risks of a supply chain (Primo & Amundson 2002; 
Bloom et al. 2014), and is a crucial factor behind the success and prosperity of numerous firms, 
linking the firm to clients. Communication can be made effective via the implementation of good 
sales persons, as well as by implementation of effective communication technologies. 
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Adopting supply chain strategies and operations enhances efficiency and effectiveness of supply 
chain processes and promotes extensive innovation along the value chain (Schlegel & Trent 2014). 
Attaining effective data integration in the supply chain is thought to require effective data quality 
management (Giunipero & Eltantawy 2004). 
2.7.4 Product management risk factors 
When operating in competitive environments, businesses can adopt a strategy to expand or 
diversify products to maintain and increase competitiveness (Handfield & Bechtel 2002). This has 
been particularly important for financial institutions following the global financial crisis. A variety 
of products allows financial institutions to increase market share and revenues (Hull 2012). 
2.7.4.1 Product lifecycle 
When a product is introduced in the market, suppliers should ensure that sales volume and product 
supply are low to ensure that no loss is encountered. As product demand gradually increases, sales 
volume should also increase. Then, as the product reaches maturity, supply should be high and 
correspond to demand. The sales volume of the product declines when a new product is 
introduced, providing an alternative to the initial product (Mohr & Spekman 1994). According to 
Albers, Wohlgezogen and Zajac (2016), strategic alliances among partners in the supply chain 
can reduce product management risk and enhance competitiveness. 
2.7.4.2 Delivery time 
As demand increases, delivery time may be delayed. An industry or firm should incorporate 
strategies that will assist in meeting the needs of clients (Clark 1989; Miemczyk & Holweg 2004); 
for example, offering discounts to clients who accept late or extended deliveries (Marsh & Stock 
2003). Myrelid and Jonsson (2018) argued that the delivery time of information is a determinant 
of relational quality among collaborators in the supply chain. 
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2.7.4.3 Political management 
Emerging markets and industries have continuously grown and become attractive to businesses 
seeking alternative areas and sectors for growth. Supply chains with less mature economic 
contracts, loans and assets may suffer severe adverse impacts from government actions (Dyer 
1996). Supply chains have become increasingly exposed and vulnerable to governments and 
political leaders who are exploiting the field. According to political risk indicator maps (Wu & 
Blackhurst 2009), risk has been noted to increase with political activities that disrupt the supply 
chain, such as government strikes, embargoes, riots, interference and civil commotion (Hull 2012; 
Smith 2019). 
2.7.4.4 Political risk tracker 
The political risk tracker (Ragatz, Handfield & Petersen 2002) helps in assessing the impact of 
politics on supply chain management. It provides 10-year historic prices and the current 
transaction price, entailing capacity and rating data including 100 countries. The tracker also 
assists with providing a transparent project future for risk transfer price (Ragatz, Handfield & 
Petersen 2002); for example, political instability in Syria may pose higher supply chain risks to 
an Australian bank. Banks can use risk trackers, such as Aon’s Political Risks Map (AON 2018), 
to assess and predict political risks to their supply chain operations. 
2.7.4.5 Flexible coverage 
Political risk management experts design risk transfer and mitigation programs that respond to 
various political effects and provide safeguards to protect business. Insurance can also be procured 
to mitigate against losses if uncontrollable risks effectuate (Cousins & Lawson 2007; Lawson et 
al 2009). A variety of resources could be coordinated to ensure that risk is eliminated in supply 
chain management. Various resources should be explored, such as technology, finance and 
information, which can assist organisations and firms in exploring their maximum potential for 
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combating supply chain risks (Dyer 1996). Dyer, Singh and Hesterly (2018) set out the factors 
thought to drive value creation and value capture over the supply chain interorganisational alliance 
life cycle. 
2.7.4.6 Price and cost risk 
All businesses are vulnerable to financial risk in the supply chain because of product price 
volatility. Exposure and vulnerability to risk can arise from commodity prices or indirect risks 
from other sources, such as transportation and higher energy costs. To minimise or eradicate price 
risks, firms can implement measures to manage the prices of the commodity. This will enhance 
cash flow, healthy commodity price competition and effective negotiating. Price management 
measures assist in ensuring that quoting, shipping and ordering prices are transparent (Hull 2012). 
2.7.4.7 Finance handling and practices 
The key purpose of finance handling procedures is to give transparent direction for collection of 
funds by defining the obligation and responsibilities of individuals in cash handling. Effective 
finance handling and practices ensure that there is a proper segregation of obligations, proper 
documentation and receipts, restrictive endorsement and safeguards for the handling and 
transportation of cash (Dyer 1996). 
2.7.4.8 Finance strength of supply chain partners 
Partnership in the supply chain is another potential contributing factor to product management 
risk. The type of partnership and individuals involved in the partnership play an essential role in 
determining the strength of supply chain management (Handfield & Lawson 2007; Lawson, Tyler 
& Cousins 2008; Liu 2013). A company can attain strength in the supply management process by 
choosing partners with a common interest as the company (Primo & Amundson 2002). 
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A financial institution can increase product variety by developing variants based on a common 
platform so as to establish an optimal product portfolio to increase performance (Scheuing & 
Johnson 1989). The company can use inventory management that involves partners for internal 
supply chain operations, inventory control, warehouse activities and quality assurance to manage 
and reduce risk (Monczka & Handfield 2010). 
2.8 Conceptual model of financial supply chain risks 
To assist in making sense of the large volume of supply chain risk literature (Ho et al. 2015), the 
literature on FSCR covered in this review was organised into the four major categories: demand 
risk, supply risk, product management risk and information management risk. These categories 
have also been used in previous major reviews of the literature on supply chain risk (Tang 2006; 
Ho et al. 2015).  
In this review, similar classifications are used to conceptually organise what previous 
bibliographic analysis (Ho et al. 2015) has shown is a limited amount of literature relevant to 
financial institutions specifically, and less so for FSCR relevant to banking. In Ho et al. (2015), 
in addition to supply and demand micro-factors, they use the term infrastructure, which here is 
termed information technology, and manufacturing, which in a services-orientated financial 
institution context is labelled product management. Figure 2.2 shows the conceptual model 
organising the concepts and literature on FSCR and financial institutions. As shown in Section 
2.6, there is limited research on FSCR in financial institutions. Further, previous research on 
FSCR and risks in financial institutions lacks comprehensiveness and depth (Fan & Stevenson 
2018; Gelsomino et al. 2016; Ho et al. 2015). There is also a lack of research that has application 
utility (Kim, Mabin & Davies 2008) that can assist financial institutions in Australia to more 
effectively mitigate risk. Previous researchers (Fan & Stevenson 2018; Gelsomino et al. 2016; Ho 
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et al. 2015) observe that while there is substantial research on various risk factors, these are often 
examined in isolation rather than jointly, with little indication of complex real-world applicability 
or generalisability. 
Consequently, supply chain risk researchers have called for a more holistic examination of risk 
(Fan & Stevenson 2018; Ghadge et al. 2012; Gelsomino et al. 2016; Ho et al. 2015), as research 
on the joint impact of risks can lead to better understanding and management of risk. Ho et al. 
(2015) suggested that field and applied case studies are the methodologies best able to 
accommodate research that can make sense of real-world complexity in a way that offers practical 
risk mitigation models and understanding. 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the conceptual model divides supply chain risk factors into four 
categories. These are summarised in Table 2.10, which lists what the literature has described as 
the potential risks to organisational performance arising from multiple supply chain factors. 
Collectively, these illustrate the multiplicity of supply chain risk factors that have implications for 
the examination, identification and management of risk (Harland 2019). This complexity raises 
the question for risk management practitioners of how to make sense of the multiplicity of supply 
chain risks they face and how to operate risk mitigation taking account of both intra- and 
interorganisational risk contributors (Lin & Zhou 2011). Other authors (Jereb, Cvahte & Rosi 
2012) have attempted to take a more inclusive or integrative perspective by attempting to 
conceptually classify various supply chain risks, with the aim to provide applied guidance for risk 
management practitioners. 
 54 
 
Figure 2.1 Proposed conceptual model of FSCR factor types 
 
Adding to the complexity of the nature of supply chain risk is the potential contribution of risks 
from organisational and interorganisational relationships (Primo & Amundsen 2002). Cultural 
differences with other countries can affect the relational risks facing suppliers of their industries 
(Aquilon 1997; Monczka et al. 1998). Given the international aspects of Australian banking 
operations and partnerships, together with Australian multiculturalism, cultural differences and 
diversities are also potential sources of risk in the FSC of Australian organisations (Mortimer et 
al. 2015). In the next section, literature concerning the accommodation of FSCR complexity in 
the identification, examination and management of risk is discussed. 
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Table 2.10 Summary list of potential sources of risk discussed in earlier sections 
 
 
Demand Operations Risk (Section 2.7.1) 
• Shifting demand across time (Section 2.7.1.1) 
• Shifting demand across markets (Section 2.7.1.2) 
• Demand shift against products (Section 2.7.1.3) 
Supply Operations Risk (Section 2.7.2)  
• Supply network design (Section 2.7.2.1) 
• Supplier relationships (Section 2.7.2.2) 
• Supplier order allocation (Section 2.7.2.3) 
• Supply contracts (Section 2.7.2.4) 
Information Systems Risks (Section 2.7.3) 
• Information accuracy and sharing (Section 2.7.3.1) 
• Information system security and disruption (Section 2.7.3.2) 
• Information availability and outsourcing (Section 2.7.3.3) 
• Communication (Section 2.7.3.4) 
Product Management Risks (Section 2.7.4) 
• Product lifecycle (Section 2.7.4.1) 
• Delivery time (Section 2.7.4.2) 
• Political management (Section 2.7.4.3) 
• Political risk tracker (Section 2.7.4.4) 
• Flexible coverage (Section 2.7.4.5) 
• Price and cost risk (Section 2.7.4.6) 
• Finance handling and practices (Section 2.7.4.7) 
• Finance strength of supply chain partners (Section 2.7.4.8) 
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2.9 Financial supply chain risk management and complexity accommodation 
In the previous section, the complexity of supply chain risk was identified, and the call for a more 
holistic examination of risk was noted (Fan & Stevenson 2018; Ghadge et al. 2012; Gelsomino et 
al. 2016; Ho et al. 2015). Further, the need to use methods able to accommodate real-world 
complexity in a way that offers better understanding of risk dynamics was identified (Ho et al. 
2015).  
General approaches to complexity in organisational improvement such as Total Quality 
Management, Lean or Six Sigma (Mead 2008; Naor, Bernardes & Coman, 2013) were developed 
by applied practitioners and are limited in their capacity to encompass a holistic examination of 
risk. Rather, they have a focus on process to the exclusion of other organisational factors such as 
strategic functions (Doggett 2005; Kim, Marbin & Davies 2008). Alternatively, in the only study 
to have attempted a direct comparison of systems level problems solving methods used artificial 
investigator-designed tasks (Musa et al 2005) rather than real organisational settings. 
In contrast, the capacity of the Theory of Constraints (TOC) (Goldratt 1988, 1990, 2010; Goldratt 
& Cox 1984; Goldratt & Fox 1986) and its methods has been described (see Section 2.9.1) as 
better able to meet both research and practitioner needs regarding the comprehensive 
accommodation of complexity in the examination, understanding and mitigation of supply chain 
risk (Kim, Mabin & Davies, 2008). Further, while comparisons in the literature are rare, Größler 
(2009) compared TOC to systems dynamics methods and approaches.  Größler (2009) suggested 
that TOC methods are more suited to “real world” (pp. 217) settings and has more emphasis on 
organisational settings. Furthermore, it was suggested that another difference is that TOC has 
more emphasis on its methods being linked to problem solution formulation rather than just 
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complex system description. Nonetheless, Größler (2009) suggested that TOC related methods 
have much in common with systems thinking approaches. 
2.9.1 Theory of constraints 
The TOC is a management philosophy (Watson, Blackstone & Gardiner 2006; Naor, Bernardes 
& Coman 2013) that has an emphasis on organisational problem examination and solution 
generation. It is an approach that is focused on improving organisational performance and 
competitive advantage (de Souza & Pires 2010; Goldratt 1988). TOC has been extensively 
examined in the literature with over 1009 studies identified, but with limited studies in the 
application of TOC in the area of supply chain risk (Ikeziri et al. 2018), even fewer in the area of 
FSCR, and with no identified application in supply chain risk in banking institutions. 
The TOC comprises   a problem-solving method framework established in the well-known book 
The Goal (Goldratt & Cox 1984). The methods of the TOC that were developed became more 
inclusive and accommodating of organisational supply chain complexity than those of other 
theories at the time (Kim, Marbin & Davies 2008). The TOC methods started as an adapted 
version of the optimised production timetables (OPT), known later as optimised production 
technologies in manufacturing and production line contexts (Gupta 2003; Tulasi & Rao 2012). 
TOC was later adapted and applied to a large range of organisational supply chain performance 
risk issues well beyond the initial application to production lines (Naor, Bernardes & Coman, 
2013; Kim et al. 2008; Ikeziri et al. 2018). According to Tulasi and Rao (2012), TOC-related 
methods have been applied in many functional areas of companies, ranging from production flow 
management, marketing, services and project management, to serving as a tool of logical 
reasoning.  
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According to the TOC, there is at least one factor that may cause problems within an 
organisational system (called a ‘constraint’), which may even affect the whole system of the 
business (Goldratt 2010). The theory considers every weak link within the business as significant 
and worth investigating so that issues that are subsequently found to constrain performance within 
the business can be overcome (Goldratt 2010). The effects of any weak point or link within the 
organisation were thought to radiate out to become a source of broader damage (Goldratt 2010), 
implying that these weak links should not be ignored, regardless of their size (Tulasi & Rao 2012). 
The TOC posits that all risk management should revolve around solving the identified problems 
and aim for maximum utility of resources (Goldratt 2010). The secret of any successful business 
lies in systematically and methodically identifying and assessing flaws and eradicating them 
(Goldratt 2010; Tulasi & Rao 2012).  
Many businesses were reluctant to adopt a TOC approach within their organisations because they 
were apprehensive of new methods and continued with older practices (Mabin & Balderstone 
2003). Moreover, it was misperceived that TOC only promoted the use of global or system-wide 
measures, rather than local measures (Mabin & Balderstone 2003), which was also considered an 
obstacle to adopting the TOC approach (Balderstone & Mabin 1998). According to Mabin and 
Balderstone (2003), the unorthodox practices associated with TOC and inflexible attitudes were 
the main obstacles to implementation. This highlights that the behaviour of people can operate as 
a constraint. Indeed, an inflexible attitude is perhaps the most significant attribute and constraint 
that should be considered in an organisation (Goldratt 1988). However, the methods were 
designed to change the perception and viewpoints of people managing a business, to enable them 
to become more open to change and to tolerate acceptance of mistakes, as well as to work on the 
organisation’s flaws so that any relevant issue could be addressed in the best possible manner. 
Balderstone and Mabin (1998, p. 206) explained: 
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The motivation for this is that if a system as a whole is to achieve its goal, it is best for 
the system’s individual parts to work as a team in ‘sync’ rather than at their own 
individual speeds. 
The problem-solving approach that was first proposed by Goldratt and Cox (1984) and later to be 
described as the current reality tree method (Dettmer 1997) consisted of five main steps to identify 
sources of risk, and to develop and implement a remediation plan to mitigate the risk. First is the 
identification of the constraint or issue. This first step is to find and identify anything, including 
a person, an activity, a group, an action, a machine or any other relevant factor that might be 
causing problems and imposing constraints on the productivity of the business enterprise.  
The second step in identifying a solution to a problem is exploitation of the constraint. 
Exploitation means that it may not always be   necessary that the constraint is eliminated to achieve 
the maximum profit for the company. Rather, the best possible way might be to exploit the 
constraint in such a way that it can be utilised for the benefit of the productivity of the company 
by directing it in a positive manner (Gupta & Boyd 2008). However, if there is no other way, then 
the problem should be eliminated. In another case, the negativity of the problem can be reduced 
in the best possible manner available if it cannot be entirely eliminated.  
The third step in problem resolution is the subordination of other activities to cover up the 
constraint. As discussed above, the flaws that might cause problems in the chains of connected 
items or effects that work for the betterment of the organisation are examined (Gupta & Boyd 
2008). However, if a single element of a chain is defective, then the management team should 
attempt to avoid disruption of the entire chain. Therefore, activities should be coordinated and 
subordinated in such a way that their ongoing process is not disturbed in any way and the activities 
proceed in a flawless manner.  
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According to Gupta and Boyd (2008), the fourth problem resolution step is to elevate or invest in 
the constraint. This might involve the organisation investing in the constraint, such as investing 
in old machinery so that, even as a liability, some output can be obtained, or by increasing the 
number of staff members to derive maximum output if the problem is being caused by insufficient 
staff. The final step is to go back to the first step and repeat this process in order to tackle any 
other remaining major constraints contributing to problems. 
For example, to achieve maximum profit in a production or manufacturing context through OPT, 
it is important to synchronise orders that are introduced to production that have been working with 
the whole system previously, known as the Capacity-Constrained Resource (CCR). With the 
CCR, the production rate is regarded in relation to the Drum-Buffer-Rope (DBR), where the drum 
is the way the rhythm is maintained, while the rope acts as the connection between the CCR and 
the release point of the materials to ensure that the new materials are synchronised with the 
prevalent production in a timely and systematic manner. Otherwise, disordered production may 
occur, which might lead to more losses (Rahman 1998). 
The TOC proposes that there is always a constraint that might be hindering the prosperity of an 
organisation, and that this constraint may appear in any form or medium (Mabin & Balderstone 
1999). Therefore, if one constraint is finally addressed, eliminated or invested in, the management 
team should not be complacent, but look for other issues that might still be present or arise and 
cause further issues within the organisation. Moreover, according to Mabin and Balderstone 
(1999), the definition of the goals of the organisation and performance measures should both be 
considered of potential relevance to constraint considerations. 
Goldratt and Cox (1984) presented the methods or tools of the TOC, initially called OPT, in the 
form of a novel called The Goal by illustrating and explaining them under normal daily production 
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scenarios. Later, another business novel called The Race (Goldratt & Fox 1986) showed how these 
constraints can be more effectively overcome. A system was presented that addressed all these 
problems through a logic process called DBR, and over time, the applicability of the TOC-related 
methods was extended from the production floor to include most business types and functions, 
including service provision (Rahman 1998). The application of the TOC to services is discussed 
next. 
2.9.2 The theory of constraints in the service sector 
In contrast to the product manufacturing or production sector where the methods of TOC were 
first applied, the service sector produces services such as advice, expertise and specialised labour. 
Examples of the service sector include banking, insurance, healthcare and education. By way of 
contrast, the industrial or manufacturing sectors produce tangible products, such as cars, clothes 
or equipment. The service sector is a very important part of the world economy, constituting 67% 
of the worldwide GDP, and is a major source of employment (Castaño et al. 2013). This shows 
the importance of this sector to economic prosperity. The adaption of TOC to the service sector 
has been an important area of TOC application (Ikeziri et al. 2018; Kim et al. 2008). The TOC 
methods were initially designed for the industrial sector, but have been adapted to and 
implemented in the service sector (Ikeziri et al. 2018; Kim et al. 2008). The TOC approach to risk 
has subsequently been widely applied to a variety of service areas. Examples of the type of studies, 
the nature of the application and breath of national application are shown in Table 2.11. 
Table 2.11 Studies of the application of the theory of constraints in various service sector types 
(compiled by author) 
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Type Country Sector Application 
Descriptive Portugal Banking Factors potentially involved in the 
decision to adopt the TOC approach 
by banking companies (Castaño et al. 
2013; Moreira et al. 2014) 
Case study Turkey Hospitality Analyse and improve operations at a 
hotel using TP-TOC (Dalci & Kosan 
2012) 
Case study NZ Health Services Resolving resource and service issues 
in a large public hospital (Mabin et al. 
2017) 
Case study Brazil Higher Education Integration and comparison of process 
engineering and the TP‐TOC 
(Lacerda, Cassel & Rodrigues 2010) 
Case study US Construction Improving performance in delivery 
and execution of projects (Lau & 
Kong 2006) 
Case study US Food Product risks of different food 
companies and overcoming them with 
TOC (Kohli & Gupta 2010) 
Case study US Hospitality Café operations improvement in a 
café (Reid & Cormier 2003) 
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2.9.3 Tools for identifying risk mitigation targets 
The TP methods employed in the TOC are intended to enable the user to map, identify, analyse 
and implement solutions for organisational problems, including supply chain risks (Goldratt 1990; 
Mabin & Balderstone 2003). TP methods have as their basis a process for developing cause–
effect–cause diagrams, which aim to elicit feasible explanations on why things happen, instead of 
how they happen.  
The TP provides for the establishment of a method to identify and remove observed UDEs arising 
from the constraints that together negatively affect organisational performance (Cox et al. 2012). 
Kim, Mabin and Davies (2008) reviewed studies on the organisational application of TP, but 
application to the banking sector is limited. For example, Moreira et al. (2014) discussed banking 
in Portugal in a review of TOC application to services, but did not apply TOC-related methods to 
specific bank cases. Instead, Castaño et al. (2013) and Moreira et al. (2014) provided commentary 
on how TOC might be of potential benefit if applied to banking organisations, based on findings 
from other service industry applications. 
2.9.4 The contribution potential of the TOC in the banking sector 
In the banking sector, the foremost constraint proposed is the dissatisfaction level of customers 
(Castaño et al. 2013), the group that mainly drives the banking sector towards prosperity. If people 
are not content with the services of the bank, losses may result (Chigamba 2011). This occurs 
mainly because customers choose alternatives for the provision of financial services. With 
globalisation, there has been an increase in the profitability of the banking sector. Chigamba 
(2011) noted that banks are constrained by competitive pressures and a rapidly changing 
environment and need to attract and retain customers if they want to survive and prosper. The 
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literature indicates that the TOC approach and TP methods show promise for application to 
banking service provision in Australia. 
Many constraints are caused by customer dissatisfaction and linked to risk in banking service 
provision (Castaño et al. 2013; Moreira et al. 2014). Moreover, bank lending is often constrained 
by the availability of insured deposits (Jayaratne & Morgan 1997), which can lead to reduced 
ability to meet customer demand for finance. Such customer dissatisfaction problems have been 
analysed within non-financial sectors, but still require investigation in the case of banks.  
Negative publicity about banks (e.g., Commonwealth of Australia 2018; Withers 2018) may 
influence customer dissatisfaction, which in turn, may contribute to losses for the sector if people 
begin to look for alternative financial services that they consider more trustworthy and efficient 
(Mateso 2014). Further, it has been shown (Valverde, Fernández & Udell 2008) that banking 
constraints are increased if transactions are carried out by firms that are unconstrained and that 
have not been fully checked by the banking sector or verified as appropriate before they are 
accepted by the bank as clients. Moreover, research has shown that investment is sensitive to bank 
loans for unconstrained firms but not for constrained firms, while trade credit predicts investment, 
but only for constrained firms (Valverde, Fernández & Udell 2008). According to Valverde, 
Fernández and Udell (2008), monetary shocks, such as the 2007 global financial crisis, show that 
there is a need for the banking sector to manage the problems that might be contributing to 
negative influences and losses. 
Banking efficiency is significant not only in the banking sector, but also for the development of 
the country, as the economic conditions of any nation depend largely on how appropriately banks 
are functioning (Matthews 2010). In that sense, risk reduction in the banking sector is important 
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to the extent that it can help prevent the occurrence of economic risks for the bank (Matthews 
2010, p. 2): 
The efficiency of banks, relates to the efficiency of the banking market, which in turn 
relates to the efficiency of the intermediation process and the efficiency by which 
monetary policy passes through to bank lending.  
However, despite the importance of knowledge of risk and risk reduction in the banking sector, 
there is limited application of TOC-guided risk reduction research and the application of TP 
methods in the banking sector. Despite searching for studies that might demonstrate application 
of TOC or TP methods in the banking sector, only a limited number of studies (Bramorski, Madan 
& Motwani 1997; Castaño et al. 2013; Moreira et al. 2014) were found, and these did not apply 
methods, but rather conceptually examined the hypothetical application potential of TOC to 
banking. 
Castaño et al. (2013) and Moreira et al. (2014) analysed which elements of the TOC to best apply 
to the banking sector. The preliminary research revealed that there were four elements that could 
be used within the banking sector: throughput, inventory, operating expenses and constraints. 
These elements strongly correspond to the capital gained from services provided to consumers, 
the capital needed to create profit and the money used to fund investment, as well as the constraints 
that occur within all activities of the banking sector (Castaño et al. 2013; Moreira et al. 2014). 
Moreover, Castaño et al. (2013) and Moreira et al. (2014) considered the following factors in the 
banking sector: 
 Tools or software that can enhance development; 
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 Attributes of the banking sector that differ from those of other business systems, such 
as the changing attitudes and choices for consumers; 
 The rapid changes in the banking industry; 
 The leadership required for the various changes; and, 
 The commitment of those who work within the entire organisation. 
Modern technologies, including smart phones, tablets and computers, have radically changed the 
management systems in various fields worldwide; while they bring benefits, they also bring risks 
to banking (Jalil, Talukder & Rahman 2014; Talukdar, Quazi & Sathye 2014). The banking 
system now employs these once-emerging technologies extensively, and most portable devices 
have banking-related ‘apps’ (software applications) available for consumer use.  
As shown in the literature (e.g., Ikeziri et al. 2018), manufacturing companies have successfully 
made use of TOC-related methods to assist in risk reduction and performance improvement, but 
the banking services system still needs to interpret and adapt this research for application to 
practice for it to benefit. According to Bramorski, Madan and Motwani (1997), customers who 
provide the bank with deposits that contribute to inputs often use the same bank to meet their 
needs for loans, which directly contributes to the bank’s output. Customers of a bank tend to use 
that bank for multiple financial services. For example, Bramorski, Madan and Motwani (1997) 
described a bank in the midwestern region of the US which realised that the mortgage system 
often took a long time. Hence, the bank decided to implement the TOC to identify and resolve the 
problem. It was discovered that there were two kinds of customers: one that paid 20% or more for 
their home mortgage insurance and another that paid less than 20%. Analysis of the latter group 
revealed that the bank took too long to carry out the whole process of employment, research and 
feedback survey (Bramorski, Madan & Motwani 1997). The bank then decided to follow the other 
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steps of the TOC. New techniques were developed for obtaining and verifying information, and 
applicants were asked to bring alternative documents for the validation process. This development 
was very important for the bank because it began to apply this framework to other issues as well. 
This case illustrates the potential for the application of TOC-related methods in banking to 
improve performance and reduce risks in the supply chain (Bramorski, Madan & Motwani 1997). 
While many authors have investigated the application of TOC-related methods in various service 
sectors (e.g., consultancy, education and health) (Ikeziri et al. 2018), only three investigations 
were found that considered TOC in relation to banking services. Mabin, Forgeson and Green 
(2001) illustrated the use of TOC methods in a single NZ banking case study but the focus of the 
examination was on change management rather than risk management or the supply chain. 
Castaño et al. (2013) and Moreira et al. (2014) conceptually examined factors explaining why 
banks might adopt the TOC framework in the Portuguese banking sector, and Bramorski, Madan 
and Motwani (1997) described the use of the TOC to identify a banking organisation’s goal and 
detect the constraints to achieving enhanced performance. The constraints in these banks 
examined only selected attributes such as policies and procedures, which might typically be found 
in a TOC approach to an organisation’s operation as a whole. In both instances, only selected 
attributes were examined and neither undertook a comprehensive or systems view of banking 
operations where TP methods were applied. Reid (2007) provided a fictitious conceptual example 
of a bank to illustrate the potential application of the TOC to the banking service sector. With only 
preliminary conceptual approaches tested, none of previous publications on banking used the TP 
methods to assess, analyse and create solutions in case-based applied research. 
In summary, despite widespread research in a variety of industries, research on the application of 
TOC has been comparatively limited in the financial services sector, and is non-existent in 
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Australian financial institutions. The application of TOC is demonstrated by the literature (Ikezeri 
et al. 2018) to have the potential for risk identification and reduction and to have application 
potential to identify, analyse and reduce risk in Australian financial institutions. 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the literature on financial risk from a supply chain perspective with an 
emphasis on financial institutions. The literature review found three main themes. First, a very 
large range and diversity of supply chain risks have been identified and described in the literature. 
Second, the literature showed sources of risk are complex and multifaceted and include 
organisational relationships with suppliers and customers, technology risks and product 
management risks. This literature provided the foundation for a conceptual model to organise risk 
in a financial institution context. Third, supply chain risk management and research showed that 
methods related to the TOC are useful because they can accommodate risk complexity, where 
multiple factors can be examined jointly through a holistic organisational perspective. The 
literature indicates that the application of TP methods to banking FSCR has potential to assist in 
risk identification, risk analysis and solution options.  
While the TOC has been extensively applied in a number of industries, there has been a limited 
conceptual examination of the benefits of the application of TOC or related methods in banking, 
and none in Australian financial institutions. The literature illustrated the factors that form the 
basis for a conceptual model to make sense of supply chain risk in Australian financial institutions. 
The model includes four main types of risk: demand management, supply management, product 
management and information management. The next chapter describes how the research questions 
will be addressed. The questions are what FSCR are identified as currently present in Australian 
financial institutions? (RQ1); what is the nature of the causal relationships among the FSCR that 
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adversely affect financial institution business functions? (RQ2); and what future risk control 
practices could mitigate FSCR in Australian financial institutions (RQ3)? 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methodology adopted in this research. It 
explains the research strategy used and the steps followed to meet the research aims, through the 
application of the research strategy. Section 3.2 describes the paradigm that forms the basis of the 
methodological framework and that is utilised to address the objectives of this study. The 
methodology employed is then described in Section 3.3, including how the research questions are 
to be answered. Section 3.4 gives an explanation of how the cases were sampled and the selection 
of participants. Section 3.5 describes the structure and design of participant interviews and the 
interviewing process. Finally, Section 3.6 describes reliability and validity considerations, and 
ethical considerations. 
3.2 Research paradigm 
This section describes the underlying assumptions of the research paradigm adopted for the 
present study. This makes explicit the principles of inquiry that shape the nature and approach in 
the selection of an appropriate methodology to address the research questions and the nature of 
the phenomenon under investigation. 
A research methodology is a systematic approach of inquiry to be followed in solving a specific 
research problem (Kothari & Grag 2014). It describes the series of phases through which the 
research progresses to meet its objective, such as data collection, data analysis and data 
interpretation (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011; Hall & Howard 2008). In addition, the research 
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methodology explains various methods and techniques that could be used in each phase of the 
research and which methods are most suitable for the relevant research (Kumar 2005). 
The selection of a suitable research methodology depends on the nature of the research (Srivastava 
& Thomson 2009). There are two main types of research: exploratory research and confirmatory 
research (Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub 2001). A research project of an exploratory nature generates 
insights by analysing and developing understanding about the responses to a phenomenon of 
interest (Jaeger & Halliday 1998). Such research requires data to be collected and analysed, with 
insights gained by interpreting the data. 
According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), various interpretations, by both the researcher and 
participants, are involved in a study, and differences in interpretation are further reflected through 
the viewpoint of the reader, as well as other contextual influences. The paradigm underlying the 
researcher’s choice of methodology is influenced by a range of philosophical perspectives. A 
paradigm comprises a set of assumptions regarding ontology, epistemology and methodology 
(Guba & Lincoln 1994). The paradigmatic assumptions guide the selection of the methodological 
approach that is best matched to the characteristics of the research questions and the nature of the 
phenomenon under investigation. An adopted research paradigm is ‘a set of fundamental 
assumptions and beliefs as to how the world is perceived which then serves as a thinking 
framework that guides the behaviour of the investigator’ (Wahyuni 2012, p. 69). In addition, Guba 
and Lincoln’s (1994, p. 107) description of a paradigm asserts that it is shaped by the beliefs about 
an experiential schema that the investigator brings to how the research inquiry is constructed: 
A set of basic beliefs that deals with ultimate or first principle which represents a world 
view that defines, for its holders, the nature of the ‘world’, the individual’s place in it, 
and the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts. 
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In describing the rationale for the selection of the methods, the relationship between the 
paradigmatic assumptions and the adopted methodological design are best made explicit so that 
these can be assessed for evaluating the appropriateness of the methods chosen and so that the 
limitations of the findings of the investigation can be better understood.  
Confirmatory research (Boudreau, Gefen & Straub 2001) is typically conducted in accordance 
with a positivist tradition (Popper 1959); an inferential approach is taken to test hypotheses about 
potential causal relationships between a chosen set of variables (Milam 1991). In contrast, this 
study utilises an interpretive exploratory approach, which is deemed the most appropriate 
considering the objectives of the study outlined in Chapter 1. Interpretivism suits the nature of the 
research questions posed in this study, which aim to explore how complex organisational supply 
chain risk characteristics and determinants operate in financial institutional contexts. An 
interpretive view is necessary because a detailed investigation into complex real-life social 
phenomena involves the interpretation of subtleties and ambiguities attached to the ideologies 
underpinning such practices (Graham 2010). Further, rather than decontextualising an arbitrarily 
selected subset of variables for investigation, an interpretive study may seek to make sense of 
real-life settings of phenomena, where much of the potential influences are jointly taken into 
account. A qualitative approach is considered essential in a financial institutional case study, as 
in this context actions and behaviours of different key institutional actors shape and are shaped 
by multiple factors, and these are difficult or unfeasible to quantify and measure with the precision 
of positivist-based methods (Nilphan 2005). 
Wahyuni (2012) commented that the interpretivist paradigm is based on an ontology where the 
nature of reality is assumed to be both socially constructed and subjective. Interpretivism as an 
epistemology implies the need for interaction and dialogue between the investigator and study 
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participants (Wahyuni 2012). Epistemological interpretivism requires an interpretivist 
investigator to ‘focus upon the details of the situation, the reality behind these details, subjective 
meanings and motivating actions’ (Wahyuni2012, p. 70). Interpretivism as an epistemology 
assists the researcher in interacting with study participants in a complex social science 
phenomenon (social inclusion practices), and focuses on how social interpretations and 
interactions can be influenced by their frames of reference (Denzin & Lincoln 2000). 
An interpretive paradigm assumes that participants’ construction of organisational social realities 
and how they make sense of meaning is an important task of inquiry. Therefore, an objective 
discovery of the world and how it is observably linked to underpinning theoretical causes is 
unnecessary. As a result, researchers within the interpretivist paradigm acknowledge that a total 
understanding of any particular social reality is not achievable. This is particularly so when the 
purpose is to try to make sense of a highly complex organisation and interorganisational system 
of multiple components and processes, which may, in turn, vary from applied setting to setting, 
and from time to time. 
3.3 Methodology 
Based on the paradigmatic assumptions underpinning this study described in Section 3.2, an 
inductive approach has been utilised in the study process, where participant interview data are 
iteratively shaped to make sense and derive a more developed understanding of the complex 
phenomena under investigation. Therefore, this study adopts a qualitative inquiry based on an 
interpretivist assumption with an aim to uncover contextual knowledge about the perceived 
influences on financial institution risk related phenomenon. In the case of organisational supply 
chain risks described in Chapter 2, the phenomena under investigation are complex and 
interacting, and are located in organisations with similarly complex characteristics. This requires 
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a methodology that can examine multiple supply chain risk determinants jointly, and which can 
accommodate causal complexity.  
The next section provides a description of the methodology and its design. It provides further 
justification for the selection of a qualitative study as the methodology to address the study 
questions. This is followed by an explanation of the appropriateness of selection of case studies 
as the study design (Scotland 2012). 
3.3.1 Qualitative multi-case studies 
To enable an understanding of risk-related phenomena in financial institutions, a qualitative case 
study methodology was chosen for this study because of the match between the exploratory nature 
of the inquiry posed by the research questions and the nature of the answers that a qualitative 
method seeks to discover.  
Real-world risk-related phenomena, as they occur in complex organisations, can be understood, 
explored, described and interpreted by applying a qualitative case study method because this 
enables a holistic understanding and explanation (Al-Busaidi 2008) where multiple variables are 
considered jointly rather than in isolation. In addition, a qualitative case study permits an in-depth 
investigation into how people interpret and make a case of specific circumstances, and this assists 
the investigator in probing the underlying complexity, which cannot be as well accomplished with 
quantitative methods of inquiry (Matveev 2002). Therefore, a qualitative case study inquiry 
employs tools and strategies (such as interviews and observations) to enable making sense of the 
inherent complexity of supply chains related to service-orientated financial institutions. These 
tools and strategies are deemed relevant where the study questions are exploratory in nature, such 
as those accessed by how and why questions (Yin 2017).  
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Yin (2014, p. 13) argued that the use of case study inquiry ‘copes with the technically distinctive 
situation where there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, 
and as another result benefit from the prior development of theoretical positions to guide data 
collection and analysis’. The advantage of adopting a case study approach is that there is no 
specific data collection or analysis method; rather, a variety of methods can be used in conjunction 
to provide triangulation and rigour (Patton 1999; Yin 2014). This makes the case study approach 
a comprehensive research strategy (Yin 2017). 
Although there are many advantages associated with the adoption of case studies as a research 
method, there are also many criticisms. Case studies typically make use of only a few examples 
to represent a wider range of examples being investigated, and the credibility of these 
generalisations is often criticised (Yin 2014, 2017). Further arguments suggest that case studies 
should not be limited to just one case, but instead generalised to similar cases because there are 
similar influences operating on the same case types, as even though each case may be a separate 
entity, it may share common contexts (Yin 2014, 2017). For example, different banks and risk 
management practitioners have certain contexts in common, such as shared business types, 
strategic objectives and regulatory contexts, as well operating from a shared risk management 
knowledge base. 
Eisenhardt (1989) defined the case study approach as a study strategy that seeks to develop an 
understanding of the complex dynamics present in real-life settings. The application of a case 
study design is suited when employing questions such as ‘how?’ and ‘why?’. The case study 
design is suited to this type of understanding and, accordingly, is also suitable when an in-depth 
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and comprehensive investigation is required to comprehend a complex issue (Yin 2014). Section 
3.3.3 describes the nature of the how and why questions used in the current study. 
A multiple case study approach is used in this research, because it is useful to explore multiple 
cases in natural settings for the purpose of obtaining in-depth knowledge, where what is found 
may be applied collectively. A multiple case study design allows for validation of understanding, 
on the assumption that the different cases selected exhibit differences in resolution (Yin 2014, 
2017). A case, in the context of a method of inquiry, can be defined as ‘a phenomenon of some 
sort occurring in a bounded context’ (Punch 1998, p. 119). Further, the trade-off in case study 
methodologies between depth and generalisability is mitigated to some extent where multiple 
cases are used rather than a single case. 
Case studies can be grouped into three main categories: the intrinsic case study, the instrumental 
case study and the collective case study (Stake 1995). An intrinsic case study aims to enhance an 
investigator’s understanding of a specific case undertaken or when ‘we have an intrinsic interest 
in the case’ (Stake 1995, p. 3). The instrumental case study, conversely, aims to enhance a 
researcher’s understanding of a particular issue by using a specific case as a medium. Stake (1995, 
p. 3) claims that an instrumental case study as a method of inquiry is necessary when there is ‘a 
need for general understanding, and [we] feel that we may get insight into the question by studying 
a particular case’. Last, a collective case study is an extension of the instrumental case study, 
where the main objective is to include multiple cases for better insight into a certain phenomenon 
or population (Punch 1998). Therefore, a collective case study implies ‘important coordination 
between the individual studies’ (Stake 1995, p. 3). This allows for the development of a common 
understanding applicable or generalisable to each of the participating cases. While Stake’s (1995) 
may not be mutually exclusive, this research best fits the collective case study category as it 
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involves studying multiple cases simultaneously in an attempt to generate a consensus 
appreciation of the risk-related issues under investigation. 
A multi-case study approach is also justified on the basis of its aim of exploring the strategic 
approach of financial institutions to enable potential adaption arising from the common 
understanding so developed, to further understand what changes are required to transition from 
the current state to a more desired future state. The strategy that guides this adaptive change is 
similarly developed from the multi-cases to develop a shared understanding through iterative 
cross-case validation. Further, in the banking sector, a case study approach is considered 
beneficial because it allows the investigator to examine both the micro and macro issues affecting 
the decision-making aspects of the key policy participants of the respective institutions (Ruddy 
2008). Leisyte (2007) claimed that the case study method is best used when aiming to include 
consideration of contextual conditions that might be highly pertinent to the phenomenon of study.  
According to De Vaus (2008, p. 252), a comparative cross-national study design, structured on a 
multi-case basis, utilises a ‘cultural and interpretive model in that it is taken for granted that any 
behaviour, attitude, indicator or effect can only be understood within its historical, cultural and 
social context’. This implies that a specific understanding of organisational practices can be 
appreciated in accordance with a specific set of historical, cultural and social contexts. Further, it 
was argued that a study of an organisation should be comparative as a result of factors, such as 
institutional dynamics, that shape the nature of industry sectors across different regions and 
countries under investigation (March & Olsen 1998; Ruddy 2008; Välimaa 2008).  
Bryman (2004) presented a comparative inquiry that employed multiple methods of probing 
conflicting cases. In a collective, multi-case study design, a comparative inquiry enables a more 
diverse and richer understanding of a social phenomenon when it is conducted with two or more 
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conflicting cases (Bryman 2004; Pauwels & Matthyssens 2004). A comparative inquiry has been 
undertaken in a previous study focusing on the policy issue of equity and widening participation 
practices of selected public higher-education institutions (Graham 2010). In the context of this 
study, policy frameworks are thought to be able to shape the social inclusion practices of the 
selected group of financial institutions in Australia. 
3.3.2 Analysis method: thinking process of the theory of constraints 
The procedural and analytic approach usually adopted for the analysis of case study interview 
data is often some variant on thematic content analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006; King, Horrocks & 
Brooks 2018; Vaismoradi et al. 2016). The methods of thematic content analysis usually comprise 
the interview process and transcription, interview content coding, content categorisation and 
thematic analysis, all of which are largely atheoretical. Theory or a researcher’s conceptual frame 
of reference may influence the specific interview question content formulation, the type of 
interview data coding adopted, and the selection of theme content construction and interpretation 
(Braun & Clarke 2006; King, Horrocks & Brooks 2018). Instead of thematic content analysis as 
it is usually applied (King, Horrocks & Brooks 2018; Vaismordi et al. 2016), this research elicited 
and analysed participant interview data using TOC methods such as the TP (Goldratt 1988, 1990, 
2010; Goldratt & Cox 1984; Goldratt & Fox 1986). This differs from a thematic content analysis 
in a number of ways. First, it was developed specifically in the context of organisational problem 
solving where the aim is not simply to identify, describe and interpret themes, but to identify 
underlying causes of organisational problems and develop solutions (Mabin & Balderstone 2003; 
Rahman 1998). Second, it adopts a method of participant inquiry characterised by a more 
interrogative or investigative dialogue rather than passive recording and coding of participant 
responses to questions methods (Goldratt 1990; Kim, Mabin & Davies 2008; Mabin & 
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Balderstone 2003). Third, how interview data is formulated to construct the examination of 
problems and solutions is largely theoretically pre-defined rather varying on a study-by-study 
basis (Naor, Bernardes & Coman 2013). As described in Section 2.9, Goldratt (1999) developed 
the TP specifically as an organisational problem diagnosis, management and mitigation approach. 
Fourth, commentators (Mabin & Balderstone 2003; Ikezeri et al. 2018; Rahman 1998) have 
argued that the TP of the TOC is a promising approach that can ultimately lead to more effective, 
successful and long-lasting organisational objective attainment. This section describes the 
approach, its suitability and proposed application to the case studies under investigation. 
The use of TP in this research offers more than issue or theme identification or risk assessment; it 
offers a way to develop a remediation and solution implementation approach that provides a basis 
to formulate remedial financial institution risk reduction strategy to change outcomes. This 
approach was novel in it application to financial institutions in that it uses complex process 
mapping rather than simple theme description typical of case study approaches more generally. 
Furthermore, the process mapping was illustrated though whole organisation visualisations. 
The TOC posits (Goldratt 1988, 1990, 2010; Goldratt & Cox 1984; Goldratt & Fox 1986) that 
organisations can be assessed and controlled by variations on three measures: throughput, 
operational expense and inventory, where the latter refers to all the money that the system has 
invested in purchasing items that it intends to sell (anything from equipment to people and 
policies). As described in Section 2.9, reviews of TP aspects of the TOC have described its history 
and development and the major components of the TP (e.g., Mabin & Balderstone 1999; Ikeziri 
et al. 2018). 
The financial industry is typically involved in scenarios where systemic or external risks affect 
the whole sector, such as the global financial crisis or other economic shocks. Although the effect 
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of systemic risks cannot be ignored, this research study examines the effectiveness of the TP in 
solving the controllable internal risks that affect operations internally and the interfaces with its 
customers and suppliers in the financial supply chain. As described in Chapters 1 and 2, most 
supply chain risks in financial institutions lend themselves to being defined as FSCR, as all supply 
chain risks in these types of financial service organisations either directly or indirectly have 
financial-related characteristics. 
3.3.3 Description of the application of TP methods to the case studies 
The TP (Goldratt 1988, 1990, 2010; Goldratt & Cox 1984; Goldratt & Fox 1986) typically focuses 
on solving the current problems facing companies in the financial sector. The senior risk manager 
participants in the case study interviews considered the questions posed by the investigator, which 
were based on the TP methods, to describe the nature of the current situation.  
The first TP (Goldratt 1990; Kim, Mabin & Davies 2008; Mabin & Balderstone 2003) technique 
question used in the application of the methodology is ‘What to change?’ This question prompts 
the participants to rethink and dissect the operations to identify the problem at hand. For instance, 
the participant is asked to determine the weaknesses that may lead to decreased customer 
satisfaction by asking themselves what has to change. The second question is ‘What to change 
to?’ This question helps to define the desired situation. Most banking companies have an objective 
of reaching as many customers as possible. The final question is ‘What causes the change?’ This 
means that the company has to determine the specific measures needed to achieve the desired 
effects. The TOC thus encourages a perceived cause-and-effect analysis of the situation, from the 
current state to a desired future state. 
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In summary, the TP is a method that seeks to answer three main questions relating to the overall 
purposes, which is to identify, examine and remove ‘constraints’ (Goldratt 1990) that inhibit the 
attainment of organisational objectives. These core questions, their purpose and the matching TP 
tools designed to answer them are shown in Table 3.1. Next, further detail of the TP methods are 
described. 
Table 3.1 Summary of the thinking process core questions, purposes and analysis tools 
Question Purpose Tool 
What to change? Identify core issues Current reality tree 
What to change to? Develop practical 
recommendations
Evaporative cloud 
How to cause the change? Implement solutions Future reality tree 
3.3.3.1 The thinking process as an analytic tool 
The TP is a method where the objective in application to cases is to solve organisational problems. 
The TP is used to examine the situation and develop a map for the process needed to achieve the 
objectives of problem remediation (Kohli & Gupta 2010). The aim is to solve unstructured or ill-
defined problems and to identify cause-and-effect relationships that may generate constraints 
(Mabin & Davies 2010). 
Through application of the TP method, the participants, in collaboration with the investigator, 
validate successive iterations of inquiry and develop an aggregated participant consensus view 
about how organisational strategic objectives are pursued and better achieved. The TP is applied 
to develop a view about the determinants of the problem and the possible solutions. The problem 
resolution alternatives are listed and the resources to achieve the objectives are itemised. Through 
the TP methods, the participants select the best alternative. The most common TP method used to 
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identify the alternatives is a cost–benefit inquiry. The final step is the application of the 
determined alternative, followed by examination of the processes of risk monitoring and control.  
3.3.3.2 Identification of the undesirable effects 
UDEs refer to those issues in an organisation that lead to loss or failure within the business. This 
TP terminology points towards the effects that are undesirable in an organisational system, a 
process or its stakeholders and clients (Hohmann 2015). UDEs are thought to limit the 
performance of an organisation and often reduce the prosperity of a company to a marked extent. 
According to the TP, UDEs include issues that are obvious to people and therefore easily 
identifiable as detrimental. What is noteworthy about this notion is the fact that the effects are 
easily seen by everyone; however, the root cause of these effects may not be obvious to 
management. Therefore, while UDEs are often clearly visible, the underlying or root causes may 
not be visible. The TP methods are designed to reveal these root causes and to identify which are 
most important or have the most causal influence on the problem. If the underlying or root causes 
or issues or constraints can be eliminated, the UDEs should be resolved. Therefore, it is important 
to first identify the UDEs. If all the issues that influence the chain of smooth effects resulting in 
success are identified, their influence can be controlled to a greater extent (Taylor & Ortega 2003). 
Figure 3.1 illustrates how UDEs are mapped in the methodology to create a diagram that depicts 
a model of risk causality called a CRT. 
This diagrammatic representation of causal pathways forms the basis of CRT and was devised in 
the TP as a tool to assist to visualise and solve problems in organisations. For instance, 
institutional managers who face a competitive disadvantage in the market may employ the CRT 
to dissect the present limiting conditions as stipulated by the TP, followed by examination of 
possible solutions, such as advertising their products more aggressively. 
 83 
 
Figure 3.1 Illustration of the identification and perceived causes of undesirable effects and 
identifying the ‘what to change’ part of the TP method 
 
Legend: 
UDE Undesired Effect
Core Problem Underlying core problem that causes the undesired effects that arise from it. 
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Notes: Starting with the UDEs and available knowledge, the TP enables an analysis where case 
study participants through integratory dialogue pinpoint the core problem. The green circles 
signify combined effects of more than one influence. 
 
3.3.3.3 Current reality tree construction process method 
The CRT is a TP diagnostic method that identifies factors in the current state of business functions 
thought to contribute to the problems of concern (Goldratt 1990). The application of this method 
reveals the current situation of the organisational system; it was defined as the logical structure 
planned to depict that state of reality as it currently exists in a given system (Goldratt 1990). The 
CRT shows perceived causes and effects, given a specific set of circumstances. It is constructed 
by the participants top-down, from observed UDEs (see Section 3.3.3.2) to postulate likely causes 
of those effects (hence the term effect-cause-effect). Figure 3.2 shows an example of a CRT 
showing the UDEs collectively caused by a core problem. TP assumes that there are 
interdependencies between the UDEs, and that there must be a common cause or core problem 
underlying all of these (Ikezeri et al. 2018). 
The process of preparing a CRT uses the logic of cause-and-effect relationships through the 
application of the TP. Goldratt (1994) explained the following six steps in the formation of a CRT: 
First. The management team determines the extent to which the problem affects the 
company operations and identifies all the participants who will be involved in finding a 
solution to the problem. The company might be experiencing a low customer base that 
affects the company’s profitability. Management lists all the affected parties, such as the 
marketing department, the human resource department and the top management, who might 
be using obsolete strategies. 
Second. Identify and listing all the relevant UDEs. An ideal list consists of no more than 5–
10 undesirable effects—more than that implies too much detail at this early stage. The 
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greater the number of UDEs listed, the more the problem needs to be simplified. Complex 
problems are relatively hard to solve; management must simplify the problem to solve it 
without ignoring any details. For example, a banking service provider with a low customer 
base will list all UDEs, which might include the following: low profitability of the banking 
business, unsatisfied customers after being served and low numbers of loyal customers. 
Third. Mapping all the UDEs in a diagram showing the cause-and-effect relationships 
between the entities. A low customer base is known to cause low profitability but is caused 
by other factors such as low customer satisfaction or a highly competitive market. The 
company analyses each and every UDE listed to link it with a possible cause-and-effect 
relationship to ensure that the complexity of the problem is simplified. 
Fourth. Review and revision of the mapped UDEs to ensure that there is clarity and 
completeness in the cause-and-effect relationships. The diagram has to be clear and 
complete to ensure that every aspect is included. The clearer the CRT, the simpler it is, 
facilitating determination of a solution (Mateso 2014). 
Fifth. Determination of the cause of the UDEs and what is affected by the UDEs. In the 
case of a low customer base, the management determines what UDEs the low customer base 
causes and what might have caused this. 
Sixth. Identification of the core causes. Management analyses all the UDEs and 
determines the root cause of these effects. The company will be able to solve the problems 
by eliminating the core causes. For instance, management might reveal that a low customer 
base is caused by poor customer service provided by the human resource department and 
that all the other UDEs arise from that particular root cause. Management will therefore take 
the necessary steps to improve the services provided to customers, thereby resolving all the 
UDEs. 
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Application of the CRT facilitates recognition of cause-and-effect relationships in the current 
structure of a business to solve the problems at hand (Goldratt 1994). According to Dettmer 
(1997), and illustrated by the arrow connectivity in Figure 3.2, the CRT also provides for the 
visualisation of the effects of potential feedback loops—the loops can open up more possibilities 
for the location of remedial action within the functional map provided by the CRT.  Using a human 
resource example, the proposition of improving the human resource department may affect 
various departments, with both desirable and undesirable effects, including feedback loops. The 
use of the CRT tool enables formulation of alternatives and correcting methods when such 
incidences are identified and enable a complex systems-orientated view (Dettmer 1997). 
3.3.3.4 Future reality tree construction process method 
The TP FRT technique is intended to assist in overcoming the challenges facing participants 
regarding how to identify barriers that prevent addressing the cause of a problem. The FRT 
method seeks to create awareness of solutions to a problem by utilising the logic previously 
developed in the CRT. The FRT is similar to the CRT, but the hypothetical solutions or actions 
with potential to transform an undesired effect into a desired effect are identified and placed within 
the tree diagram to illustrate possible future solutions for the issue and to describe a desired future 
state (Balderstone 1999 Dettmer 1997; Hohmann 2015; Kim, Mabin & Davies 2008). It helps in 
solving the ‘What if?’ questions that arise when a new operation with a remedial purpose is 
introduced into a system. For instance, if excessive operational costs are identified by the TP CRT, 
management may take various steps to reduce costs, which will affect the current reality structure 
and also have future effects.  
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Figure 3.2 Example of a CRT showing the undesirable effects that collectively cause a core 
problem 
 
The FRT identifies possible steps to eliminate the effects caused by the introduction of new 
processes in the future (Hohmann 2015). The cause of the new challenge is an effect of the new 
process introduced in the company structure. In short, the FRT proposes a process for management 
to consider how to deal with future problems that may arise as a result of new processes introduced 
into the organisational system. 
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3.3.3.5 Steps in preparing the future reality tree 
The FRT is constructed from the CRT (Balderstone 1999; Dettmer 1997; Hohmann 2015; Kim, 
Mabin & Davies 2008). The CRT helps in identifying the root cause of the problem from the 
UDEs. The CRT example used above identified poor service provision by the human resource 
department as the root cause of the low customer base. Construction of the FRT begins at this 
stage. The FRT portrays the use of ‘injections’—items or actions that are new or done differently 
to neutralise the effects of the UDEs and convert them into desirable effects (Balderstone 1999; 
Dettmer 1997; Hohmann 2015; Kim, Mabin & Davies 2008). The UDEs are exchanged with 
desirable effects (DEs) through the application of injections. 
Figure 3.3 shows how injection solutions are used in FRTs to change the UDEs to DEs. The 
scenario of the poor service provided by a human resource department can be changed through a 
variety of solutions (e.g., good remuneration, job training and good supervision) to high-quality 
service provision. The first step is to identify a list of possible solutions or injections. The second 
step is solving the problems by finding the best possible solutions to the core problem 
(Balderstone 1999) and testing solution options to determine the best potential solution 
effectiveness (Dettmer 1997). 
The third step involves a combination of injections and providing the solution for the problems 
and mapping them into a single diagram (Balderstone 1999; Dettmer 1997; Hohmann 2015; Kim, 
Mabin & Davies 2008). Figure 3.4 is an illustration of a FRT that shows the future state that the 
company desires to achieve. For example, the FRT shows the possible ways in which the company 
can deal with the problem of low customer satisfaction and the desired future state of a highly 
competent human resource department. The injections that transform UDEs (shown in a CRT) to 
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DEs (shown in a FRT) are conditions or processes that do not yet exist, but are intended to be 
implemented in the future to achieve the desired future state.  
Figure 3.3 Use of an injection or solution in future reality trees to convert causes of undesirable 
effects into desirable effects 
 
Goldratt’s (Dettmer 1997) categories of legitimate reservation provide guidelines for 
communicating reservations about the validity of the elements and connections within the trees 
(Balderstone 1999; Dettmer 1997). The FRT serves the following purposes (Dettmer 1997): 
1. Enables effectiveness testing of new ideas before committing resources to implementation; 
2. Determines whether proposed system changes will produce the desired effects without 
creating negative side effects;  reveals through negative branches whether (and where) 
proposed changes will create new or collateral problems as they solve old problems, and 
what additional actions are necessary to prevent any such negative side effects from 
occurring; 
4. Provides a means of making beneficial effects self-sustaining through deliberate 
incorporation of positive reinforcing loops; 
5. Provides a means of assessing the impacts of localised decisions on the entire system; 
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6. Provides an effective tool for persuading decision-makers to support a desired course of 
action; and, 
7. Serves as an initial planning tool. 
Figure 3.5 shows a summary of the research analysis process involving three phases of the TOC 
TP methods. First, a CRT is constructed showing the current undesirable outcome arising from 
the UDEs. Second, from the CRT data, and devising and testing injection solutions with the 
participants, a FRT is constructed where the proposed injections convert UDEs into DEs. The 
undesired outcomes shown in Figure 3.5 represent the cumulative effect of multiple UDE’s have 
on posing risk or attenuating the achievement of organisational corporate objectives or the 
capability to attain the mission of the organisation. An intermediate objection may relate to the 
objective of an organisational division or sub-business of the broader business. Desired outcomes 
represent the cumulative effect of injections applied to created multiple DE’s that improve the 
achievement of organisational objectives and the attainment of the organisational mission. Both 
of these effects on organisational outcomes relate to an entire perspective of the organisation. 
Last, to illustrate how the finding might be translated into risk management practice, plans for 
how the injection might be implemented in practice are discussed. 
In summary, the process of inquiry with the participants uses TOC TP methodologies to construct 
current reality trees that represent a consensus view informed by the characteristics of the case 
study financial institutions, and representative of banking institutions more generally. These then 
form the basis for future reality tree construction and the generation of solutions to risk and the 
formulation of risk mitigation approaches suited to Australian financial institutions. 
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Figure 3.4 Illustration of the future reality tree (FRT) showing locations of injections (solutions) 
to create desirable effects (DEs) 
 
.  
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Figure 3.5 The research analysis process summarised as first CRT construction, followed by FRT construction and the use of the FRT and 
injections in risk management plan implementation 
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3.4 Data collection procedures 
The procedures are informed by the literature regarding TP methods, the FSCR conceptual 
model and participant data respectively. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, having corroborating 
sources of data is pertinent to obtain a robust understanding of the risk phenomenon 
investigated. As described in Section 3.2, the data collection methods used to frame the focus 
of the study are in accordance with the selected paradigm, the objective and the research 
questions. 
3.4.1 Data collection sample 
According to the register of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) (2018), 
there are currently 147 authorised deposit-taking institutions in Australia. These institutions 
are categorised by market capitalisation into three tiers: Tier 1, 2 and 3 (Gorajek & Turner 
2010). Tier 1 represents financial institutions with the largest capitalisation, Tier 2 represents 
medium-sized institutions, and Tier 3 represents small institutions. 
It was decided to stratify the sample through a selection of different-sized financial institutions, 
one from each of the three tiers, as the research questions related to understanding FSCR in 
Australian financial institutions rather than in any particular institution with limited 
generalisability. To this end, all the case data would be aggregated into a combined generic 
case based on the data from the three institutional cases. Further, the nature of the institutional 
cases is such that they are from the same industry sector rather than from different sectors. 
Also, all the participants have roles related to the management of organisational risk. A multi-
case study design comprising three financial institutional cases was then stratified with three 
participants each to make a sample of nine participants; this was thought to be a reasonable 
 94 
 
sample size to allow for retention of the benefits of a case study design (Eisenhardt 1991). It 
also provides a design benefit from the ability to cross-case triangulate and aggregate 
participant information providing for replicability across cases that gives increased 
generalisability over a single case (Patton 1999; Yin 2014). In addition, data volume is 
balanced with complexity to both provide an in-depth analysis typical of qualitative case 
methods and the facility to suggest generalisability beyond a single instance. These features of 
the design of the sampling aim to provide a foundation to make valid observations about 
Australian financial institutions without the loss of depth inherent in larger samples using 
quantitative methods (Dubois & Araujo 2007); this was the reason why three participants from 
each of three financial institutional cases were selected. 
The multi-case sampling design above is based on a case replication logic rather than statistical 
logic. The latter is where the sample cases are randomly selected from the population of all 
147 authorised deposit-taking institutions (APRA 2018) in Australia with equal probability, 
but with a large sample size to allow for statistical inferences to be made from standardised 
measures that lack depth. In contrast, replication logic concerns similar cases where similar 
depth data are expected to support generalisability but without the vulnerability of data 
distortion risk of a single case. In this multi-case study, based on replication logic, a chain 
referring sampling method (Alvi 2016) was used, geographically based in Melbourne, 
Australia. This is where the sample was selected non-probabilistically through referral initiated 
through both an industry network and through an institutional network following contact with 
the more senior participants.  
The advantage of these case and participant selection methods is that they are also more suited 
to participants where there is some time and effort commitment required as a part of 
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participation (e.g., repeated interviews over time to develop in-depth data rather than short-
term single instance interviews or a single questionnaire). Chain referring sampling methods 
(Alvi 2016) are also useful when the participants may be otherwise hard to reach or are few in 
number because of the specialised nature of their work. 
Of the 147 deposit-taking institutions in Australia (APRA 2018) approximately 80% of 
capitalisation is held by the Tier 1 large banks, with Tier 2 medium sized and Tier 3 smaller 
banks holding the balance (APRA 2018). Three Australian owned financial institutions, one 
from each deposit-taking institutional capitalisation tier (large, medium and small), were 
selection for inclusion in this research. The selected banks subsequently invited the researcher 
to conduct interviews at the institution premises. An overview of the three banks are described 
next.  
3.4.1.1 Bank X 
The large Tier 1 Bank X is an international financial services organisation that provides a 
comprehensive range of financial products and services. Bank X is structured according to 
banking and wealth management operations, with international capital markets and an 
institutional banking business that operates in several global geographic regions.  
Key businesses within Australia include personal banking, business banking, wholesale 
banking and wealth management, as well as group business services. The Bank X employs 
over 30,000 full-time equivalent employees and has over A$500 billion total assets; Bank X 
Retail includes over 500 branches and Bank X includes over 2,000 ATMs. 
3.4.1.2 Bank Y 
The medium sized Tier 2 Bank Y, an Australian-owned ASX listed company, has more than 
80,000 shareholders; over 5,000 employees serve about 1.5 million customers in more than 
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500 communities Australia-wide. Assets are valued at more than $60 billion and market 
capitalisation at around $5 billion. 
3.4.1.3 Bank Z 
The small Tier 3 Bank Z employs over 500 full-time equivalent employees and has over $4000 
million total assets. 
3.4.1.4 Sample selection 
The nine participants in the sample comprised three senior risk management professionals from 
each of the three financial institution cases selected. Senior risk managers were selected as 
they provided the point of contact between the researcher and the organisation.  The risk 
managers were authoritative in relation to issues of risk and current risk management practices 
as they pertained to multiple organisation functions and divisional areas.  They were selected 
following initial contact with the bank’s senior management by the researcher. This contact 
was made either through industry contacts or referral recommendations by industry contacts. 
The initial interviews revealed that the participants were keen to share knowledge on FSCR 
issues. Table 3.2 shows the participants’ characteristics, including institutional location, role, 
years of experience, education level and gender. 
In each of the banks in the sample, bank board members sit on a risk management and 
compliance oversight committee. By and large, this committee oversees organisational 
performance on a number of risk-associated matters such as credit quality, risk related to the 
regulatory environment, monitoring risk appetite appropriateness and other perceived risks, 
such as sustainability. The more senior participants’ role-related activities variously involve 
ensuring the provision of risk-related information, which forms part of the periodic 
organisational risk report to the risk committee and subordinate committees within the 
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organisation. Participants 1, 5 and 7, being in more senior risk manager roles and delivering a 
wider span of the organisational division’s risk reporting responsibilities, ensure risk report 
information is routinely collected, centralised and reported to various divisional or functional 
area risk committees or councils, and may effectually be reported to the board-level risk 
committee. The organisational location of these senior risk roles tends to be in corporate 
divisions with a whole-of-institution focus on reputation, governance and corporate affairs. 
They may also have a cross-functional influencing or leadership role to support the disparate 
risk-related staff located in other divisions and geographies. 
The remaining participants’ (2, 3, 5, 6, 8 & 9) roles tend to have narrower and a more 
operational scope of focus in their risk-associated roles. The location of their roles may be 
either in a corporate division or business unit based, but all have a focus on specific operational 
areas of risk such as audit, liquidity, business banking, products and markets, wealth finance, 
group development, financial crime, workplace performance or enterprise services and 
technology. Further, in addition to routine reporting, their roles involve a discrete risk issue 
investigation and analysis function as a response to discrete risk effects as they arise. Their 
role investigates what occurred and makes recommendations for remedial action in relation to 
the specific risk effect. 
3.4.3 Interview protocol 
The semi-structured interview schedule, shown in Appendix A, is described in the next section. 
The following interview protocol (adapted from Yin 2014) was followed before, during and 
after the interviews: 
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Table 3.2 Description of participants 
Participant 
Number 
Financial 
Institution 
Participant 
Role 
Years of 
Experience 
Education 
Level 
Gender Size 
1 Bank X Senior risk 
manager  
13 Bachelor  M Tier 
1 
2 Bank X Senior risk 
analyst  
10 Master M Tier 
1 
3 Bank X Senior risk 
consultant  
15 Diploma  M Tier 
1 
4 Bank Y Senior risk 
analyst 
17 Master F Tier 
2 
5 Bank Y Senior risk 
manager 
13 Bachelor F Tier 
2 
6 Bank Y Senior risk 
analyst 
11 Bachelor M Tier 
2 
7 Bank Z  Chief risk 
officer  
19 Master F Tier 
3 
8 Bank Z General 
manager risk 
21 Bachelor F Tier 
3 
9 Bank Z Senior risk 
manager 
11 Bachelor M Tier 
3 
 
Before the interview: 
a. Greet the participant; 
b. Introduce the researcher; 
c. The researcher provides brief information about the research (e.g., CRT, questions); 
d. Explain privacy laws and RMIT University ethical standards; 
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e. Invite the participant to sign the privacy document; and, 
f. Researcher sends by email brief information, objectives and what the interview 
expects to achieve. 
During the interview: 
a. Welcome the participant; 
b. The researcher confirms and checks that the privacy document previously provided is 
signed; 
c. The researcher seeks participant approval to record the interview; 
d. Researcher describes the objectives of the interview; and, 
e. The interview takes place and feedback from the participant is requested and noted. 
After the interview: 
a. Phone calls or send letters to thank the participant; and, 
b. Review and create a transcript of the interview. 
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3.4.4 Interview procedures and schedule 
The researcher collected the contact information of each participant from each of the respective 
financial institutions. During the phone discussion, the researcher invited the participant to 
take part in a group interview at RMIT University—some of the participants accepted the 
invitation, while others invited the researcher to visit the premises of their financial institution. 
Two participants confirmed that they would attend the RMIT University interview, while six 
confirmed that they would have the interview at their office. One interview was conducted 
through video conferencing. Interviews comprised a combination of individual interviews and 
group interviews. Three group interviews, one for each financial institution, were held as part 
of the reflecting back validation and included each of the three participants of the respective 
institutions. Most interviews had a duration of approximately 45 minutes. 
The use of the telephone as a medium of data collection in this study was essential, because 
most of the participants involved were geographically dispersed across Australia and thus far 
from the researcher. Also, participants were re-contacted, with their consent, to reflect back 
the development of inquiry and to seek validation. The use of the telephone in qualitative data 
collection is endorsed by Cachia and Millward (2011, p. 266), who claimed that ‘this method 
provides good quality textual data on par with that obtained using face-to-face interview media, 
which can be examined using qualitative data analysis’. Together, with informal interviews, 
15 formal, semi-structured in-depth telephone interviews were conducted with the participants 
between June and August 2016. Informal interviews were often used for clarification arising 
from previous interviews or to gain further insight through investigative inquiry. Formal 
interviews were digitally audio recorded, with consent obtained beforehand from the 
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participants. Further, handwritten notes were made during the interviews to complement the 
audio recording.  
Semi-structured interviews were employed to serve as primary sources of data. The 
advantage of this interview methodology is that it allows richer descriptions of the 
phenomena under investigation, so that sense can be made (McMillan & Schumacher 2001; 
Punch 1998), and it is suited to the TOC method of inquiry. Informed by the TOC TP 
methods, which are integrative and interactive in nature (Goldratt 1990; Kim, Mabin & 
Davies 2008; Mabin & Balderstone 2003), semi-structured interview questions were utilised 
as part of the interviewing process. Based on the TP of TOC, the list of guiding questions 
shown in the semi-structured interview schedule (see Appendix A) was flexible and ‘not a 
tightly structured set of questions to be asked verbatim as written ... it is a list of things to be 
sure to ask about when talking to the person being interviewed’ (Lofland & Lofland 1995, p. 
85). This enables considerable freedom for the interviewee in answering while, at the same 
time, focusing on the topics of the proposed study (Bryman 2004). 
The semi-structured interviews comprised several steps and feedback, reflection and revision 
of the initial interview data through triangulation and validation. The semi-structured interview 
schedule comprising the guiding questions used in this process is shown in Appendix A. As 
the financial institution cases are large organisations, the interview inquiry process was broken 
into stages, with each part of each organisation inquired about successively, to build to a view 
of the entire organisation. Research about enterprise risk suggests that organisations can be 
conceptually viewed from different levels, from a lower or an operational level to higher 
corporate or strategic levels (Bromiley et al. 2015). This kind of organisational segmentation 
was intended to give a guiding structure to the inquiry process, and was subsequently validated 
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with the participants regarding a shared view of the financial institution’s organisational 
characteristics. With indicative guiding questions shown in Appendix A at each step, the semi-
structured interview steps were: 
1. Participant role description questions 
2. Organisational characteristic questions 
3. Organisational structure validation/triangulation 
4. Current state inquiry (CRT TOC TP – What to change?)   
a. Organisation’s functional operational level UDE questions 
b. Organisation’s functional business strategy level UDE questions 
c. Organisation’s functional corporate strategy level UDE questions 
5. Current state validation/triangulation 
6. Future state inquiry (FRT TOC TP – How to remediate risk?) 
a. Organisation’s functional operational level UDE transformation questions 
b. Organisation’s functional business strategy level UDE transformation 
questions 
c. Organisation’s functional corporate strategy level UDE transformation 
questions 
7. Future state validation/triangulation 
Each participant was interviewed on several occasions, to generate data initially and to verify 
cross-participant and cross-institutional synthesis. A sample of the interview transcripts is 
shown in Appendix B. From the interview inquiries, an initial list of risks identified and 
reported by the participants were extracted, collated and classified (see Appendix C) from the 
interview data. The list from the interviews was further developed and diagrammatic 
representations (see Appendix D) were used in subsequent interviews to elicit participant 
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feedback on causes of risk as part of the TOP-TP process of inquiry, as described in the next 
section. 
3.5 Interview inquiry and the research process 
Based on the TOC TP approach described in Section 3.3, CRT and FRT techniques and 
methods were used to identify and map issues from the operations level to the corporate level 
of the financial institutions (see Appendix E). During this process, the CRT and FRT maps 
were intended to be modified and updated on the basis of the industry participant 
recommendations, academic literature alignment and industry reports (e.g., Australian 
Payments Network 2019; Australian Banking Association 2019; Commonwealth of Australia 
AUSTRAC 2019). In short, the CRT and FRT maps represent a diagrammatic depiction of the 
summary or end-point of aggregated information elicited throughout the interview inquiry with 
the participants. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.6 and compromises several stages. The 
conceptual model (see Figure 2.1) derived from the literature informed a guiding synthesis of 
what was known about financial supply chain risk factors that was conveyed by the researcher 
to the participants with the objectives of both minimising the gaps in theory specific to the 
literature that the participant data might reveal, and to provide prompts and a shared 
terminology about the risks discussed. For example, when a participant identified an issue, the 
researcher would check whether this aligned with descriptions from the literature and identify 
a shared terminology. 
In the TP process for the development of the CRTs that depict the current state of the financial 
institutions, there were four stages in the research process (see Figure 3.6). The first stage 
comprised questions about the organisational structure of the financial institutions. This was 
to develop a generalised organisational structure model that would find consensus among the 
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participants, and provide the conceptual scaffolding with which to portray the organisational 
location of risk and UDEs, and act as an interview question prompt to systematically work 
through UDEs and risks in the financial institutions. The second stage comprised questions 
(see Appendix A) concerning the examination of the UDEs and risks at the operational level 
of the financial institution cases. The third stage also comprised questions (see Appendix A) 
about UDEs and risks, but at the business strategy level of the financial institution cases. 
Similarly, the fourth stage comprised the same questions but directed at the corporate strategy 
level of the financial institution cases. 
This process was repeated for the TP on the desired future states (the FRT shown in Figure 
3.6), except that having already established the organisational structure, the questions 
concerning the development of the FRT (see Appendix A) first inquired about the operational 
level risk remediation in the first stage, then the second stage examined business strategy level 
remediation, and in the third stage, corporate strategy level risk remediation was the subject of 
the interview inquiry. 
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Figure 3.6 Overview of the research process 
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Following working through identification and examination of risk at each of these functional 
levels of the organisational structure that was agreed early in the interview process, Figure 3.6 
shows that both the CRT and FRT findings were iteratively developed through reflecting back 
to the participants through an interactive validation interview and inquiry process. The 
diagrammatic representations of the aggregated inquiry findings were used as exhibits in the 
later stages of the interview process to validate and develop the findings. Appendices D and E 
show examples that were used in developing the CRT and FRT diagrammatic representations 
of the findings. Last, the participants also were asked to describe how the results of the FRT 
analysis might be implemented and translated into organisation change management strategies 
using language and strategic management concepts familiar to contemporary financial 
institutions in Australia. 
3.5.1 Reliability and validity 
With case study methods, interview data reliability and validity should be appraised. As this 
study used qualitative research methods, it is important to ensure high-quality data (Neuman 
2014). With qualitative interview data, participants describe their own experiences and views 
within a context. These data are therefore subjective and a researcher cannot remove the 
participants’ views to collect quality data. Instead, the participants’ descriptions are required 
to assist researchers to make sense of the participants’ descriptions of their experiences in the 
real world. Within case study research, there are two main types of validity: external or 
concurrent validity and internal validity. Internal validity relates to the questioning of the 
findings or conclusions and whether they are correctly aligned to the experiences described. 
According to Trochim (2000), internal validity is only relevant to studies, such as this one, that 
try to establish causal relationships and is suited to studies that assess the effects of 
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interventions. On the other hand, external validity questions the degree to which findings are 
credible and can be generalised to other similar settings to that in which the study occurred. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), Kvale (1996) and Neuman (2014) suggested a number of validity 
improvement techniques. One is prolonged engagement, which involves taking the time to 
understand the context of the participants, to assess the presence of misinformation and to 
establish trust. In this study, the researcher developed a collaborative relationship with the nine 
participants through multiple contacts both in person and by phone over an extended period of 
time. It was during these sessions that the researcher and participants were able to have 
conversations about their roles, their organisational cultures and so on, to assist the researcher 
to gain an understanding of the commonalities and differences among the three banking 
organisations. This was facilitated through synthesis of information about risks and other 
organisational characteristics across multiple participants and multiple cases. 
More formal interviews were conducted at a time that was suitable for the participants, and in 
a familiar environment, typically their offices, where the locations were chosen by the 
participants. This made the participants feel comfortable and encouraged them to discuss their 
risk management role in the context of financial institutions. 
According to Neuman (2014), validity can be improved through the use of participant checks; 
a process whereby the data collected by the researcher are validated against the participants’ 
understanding of the phenomenon being investigated. These validation interviews ensure that 
participants can reflect on the synthesis of information collated by the researcher from the other 
participants so as to develop a consensus description or view of the phenomenon under 
investigation through both validating and integrating procedures using an iterative feedback, 
reflection and adaption process with the participants.  
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Within the context of this study, there were multiple iterations of initial information elicitation, 
followed by reflecting back validation, and again followed by the researchers’ development of 
a consensus view of the information cross-validated with all participants, with some 
moderation in terminologies through reflecting back participant shared understandings and 
experiences as well as the researcher’s input from the synthesis of the literature. In so doing, 
any initial perceived differences between the participants were resolved by iteratively 
developing a shared view of a generic financial institution perspective.  The intent was to 
develop, on each topic area covered, a generic consensus view using common terminology, 
but for which all the participants agreed reflected the shared meaning sitting behind whatever 
words they may have used initially through triangulation (Patton 1999; Yin 2014).  
Reliability refers to whether the data are internally or externally consistent (Kvale 1996; 
Neuman 2014). Internal consistency questioned if the data provided were plausible, eliminated 
deception and ensured that the descriptions about organisational risk characteristics made 
sense. Through the observations and views of participants, the researcher believed that an 
accurate account was provided by all participants as they were all able to provide similar 
accounts of risk issues despite being located in different banks and in different roles, albeit all 
related to risk management. By the time the researcher had interviewed the final participant, 
the researcher was able to describe and depict financial institution risk characteristics, because 
of the consistency of information provided by the participants involved in this study. 
External consistency refers to the ability to crosscheck the information provided by participants 
interviewed against each other through the use of triangulated data from different sources 
(Kvale 1996; Neuman 2014). In this study, the multi-case study design, comprising three banks 
of varying sizes and three participants from each bank, aimed to increase the likelihood of the 
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validity and generalisability of the findings to other banks and other types of financial 
institutions. This multi-case and multiple participant approach increased the triangulation of 
the data, ensuring that the information provided by the participants interviewed was accurate, 
and in turn, minimising the effects of individual distortion through misinformation, evasions, 
lies and fronts (Kvale 1996; Neuman 2014). Further, the participants drew on industry and 
internal papers in their operational industry views on risk (e.g., Australian Payments Network 
2019; Australian Banking Association 2019; Commonwealth of Australia AUSTRAC 2019). 
3.5.2 Ethical and critical reflections 
Regarding the pre- and post-interviewing experiences of the researcher, the interviewing 
process was generally conducted smoothly. On receiving the necessary approval from the 
Ethics Committee, the researcher started engaging lists of participants and sending out 
invitation letters by mail. Once confirmation was obtained, an interview date and time were 
allocated, at each participant’s convenience. The interviewing process began with the 
participant being provided with the study consent form, to ensure voluntary participation. 
Further, all participants were given a guarantee that their identity would not be revealed and 
valuable information gained would be treated as confidential. 
Approval from RMIT University Ethics Committee was obtained (RMIT Project Number 
19204), and this study was classified as a low-risk study project (see Appendix F). In addition, 
certain procedures were undertaken to ensure overall study integrity. First, all participants were 
provided with a plain language statement of the overview of the study project and their rights 
as a participant (see Appendix G). Second, an informed consent form was provided prior to 
the interviewing process to ensure voluntary participation (see Appendix G). Finally, all nine 
participants agreed to be audio recorded. The participants were also assured that the data 
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collected would not be used for other purposes and their identities would not be disclosed. All 
recorded audio from the interviews are to be kept in a secure location for a period of five years. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter provided an account of the study design and the approaches taken for data 
collection. The nature and purpose of the study have been explained in accordance with the 
chosen paradigm. Sample cases, the analysis approach and the organisations involved were 
described. The data collection techniques and method of analysis have been defined on the 
basis of the relevant protocols. The researcher’s position in relation to the philosophy 
underpinning this study was described. Next, Chapters 4 and 5 describe the findings of the 
analyses and present a participant validated aggregation of the data from the three institutional 
cases. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS:  
CURRENT STATE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the findings of the application of the TOC TP approach comprising the 
construction of CRT. These depict what the application of the TOC TP methods to the case 
study data show as the current state of the underlying causes of the risks facing the participating 
financial institutions. The CRT method was applied to identify and portray the nature of 
financial institution risk. As described in Section 3.3.3.3, CRT comprises an iterative method 
of interactive inquiry where the participant semi-structured interview questions (Appendix A) 
aimed to reveal underlying causes, which were subsequently mapped to illustrate causal 
pathways.  
The financial institution core risk effects or activities were identified by the participants (see 
Appendix C), which resulted from a failure to control the risk effects (see Appendices D and 
E). Specific functional areas contribute to various risks, such as card failures, which are 
business unit specific; other risks that are cross-organisational and not linked to particular 
business units were also identified by the participants. These risks were then aligned and 
arranged according to understanding their contribution and pathways regarding failing to meet 
or constraining attainment of the service objectives of the financial institution. 
The CRT method of inquiry was applied to the aggregated participant interview data (see 
Appendix A) from nine senior risk management participants from three participating financial 
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institutions in three phases of analysis. First, to provide an organisational context for the 
presentation of the analysis, Section 4.2 describes the nature of the organisational functions 
and structures regarding what the participants thought was typical of financial institutions in 
Australia. The purpose of this was to provide a conceptual scaffolding with which to 
contextualise the CRT findings to the ecology of the financial institutions. Section 4.3 
describes the findings of the CRT TP method mapped to the organisational structures described 
in Section 4.2. The CRT describes the contributions to risk and the proposed causal pathways 
among the risk-contributing characteristics at each organisational level.  
4.2 Financial institutions in Australia 
The case study financial institutions described in Section 3.4.1 were selected from each of 
three capitalisation tiers comprising large, medium and small. As a result, the sample of cases 
is thought to be broadly representative of financial institutions in Australia that include banking 
as part of their service offerings. From the participant interviews, the participating banks, 
despite capitalisation size differences, were confirmed to offer similar kinds of products and 
services, including transaction processing, payment risk management and liquidity in working 
capital finance. The institutions also offered advisory services to clients, for example, to 
navigate international payment methods for export and import risk management and ensure 
cost-effective financing. 
An organisational structure shows how responsibilities for undertaking activities are directed 
through divisional business units or their equivalents towards the achievement of 
organisational objectives. An organisational structure is the perspective through which an 
organisation views its internal environment. Based on participant interviews with the senior 
risk management leaders from each of the three bank cases, a conceptual depiction of a 
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generalised financial institution functional structure was developed in the first stage of the 
research process (see Figure 3.6), from the questions from the second and third participant 
interview steps shown in Appendix A. As described in Section 3.4.4, the semi-structured 
interviews that preceded the application of CRT methods asked participants about the main 
divisions or business areas of their organisations. They were asked to adjust and validate drafts 
of an organisational structure that would be generally applicable to the financial institution 
cases. This comprises the main business divisions and the business units generally located 
within the divisions. It was agreed with the participants that this would be a consensus 
developed representation of generalised banking services. In response to questions about the 
validity of the structure developed, Participant 1 commented that despite the different tier sizes 
of deposit-taking institutions in Australia, the structure and functions ‘are often very similar, 
in my experience of the sector, despite volume differences in retail or wholesale banking, or 
the range or mixture of other financial products offered’. Figure 4.1 shows the generalised 
representation of the financial institution organisational structure developed with the 
participants and generally applicable to each of the case studies. The specific organisational 
structure charts internal to each of the three institutional cases were commercial-in-confidence 
and not able to be reproduced. However, the generalised depiction shown in Figure 4.1 was 
thought suitable for public domain research purposes by the participants.  
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Figure 4.1 Generalised financial institution structure 
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The institutional structure provides a point of reference for the interviews about risk and offers 
a staged approach to the participant inquiries building successively from each functional level 
and business area to develop a view of the entire institution. The institutional structure also 
describes how the case study data from the interviews on risk would be organised and 
portrayed in the CRT depictions. As shown in Figure 4.1, the financial institutional structure 
was validated as generally comprising three functional levels: the operations level, the business 
strategy level and the corporate strategy level. These are described in the next sections. 
4.2.1 Operations level 
The operations level of the financial institution shown in Figure 4.1. The functions are 
consistent with those described by Handfield (2013) in consideration of enterprise level 
consideration of risk where operational risks are distinguished from strategy risks. The 
operations level comprises those business operations that interface with both retail and 
business customers. It includes retail banking including customer-facing ATMs, internet 
banking and bank branch services. It also includes wholesale and business-to-business 
banking, financial products and marketing, and frontline operational technology services. 
Across all these business areas, it was agreed with participants to include people-centred 
services, external service provider management, regulatory compliance and technology 
functions.  
4.2.2 Business strategy level 
The business strategy level includes the organisational functions of business decision-making, 
operational strategy formulation and guidance for implementation into operations. This level 
provides the strategies that guide and shape the characteristics of retail operations, business 
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and wholesale banking business operations and enabling technology services. Figure 4.1 shows 
how business strategy units are aligned to divisional structures and guide banking operations. 
The business units at this level include the backroom functions that drive operational policies 
and sit behind the frontline, and customer-facing services that are located at the operational 
level.  
4.2.3 Corporate strategy level 
The corporate level functions shown in Figure 4.1 focus on corporate vision and mission, and 
provides for medium-to-longer-term strategic guidance of the organisation. The function of 
this level is to shape the nature and formulation of business strategy and the business as a 
whole. It takes account of environmental threats and opportunities, with the goal of maximising 
achievement of the corporate vision or mission. The corporate strategy level sets the policies 
that govern the organisation as a whole, and represents the organisation externally by ensuring 
policies are aligned with the requirements of the regulatory environment. 
The corporate strategy covers four main areas, including the consumer businesses (aligned 
with retail banking), corporate, small and medium business customers (aligned to business 
banking), product and market business functions (aligned with the wholesale business), and 
enterprise services guiding all technology-related functions. Figure 4.1 shows how these 
corporate level functions are aligned and guide banking organisational divisions and business 
units. 
In summary, according to the participants, from the questions shown in Appendix A, Figure 
4.1 is the cumulative outcome of the stage of the interview inquiries regarding organisational 
characteristics and represents a consensus view developed with the participants. According to 
 117 
 
the participants, this representation of structural and functional organisation is generally 
typical of most banking and financial institutions operating in Australia. For example, in 
response to the validation interview inquiry stage questions on organisational characteristics, 
Participant 7 reported of the organisational structure representation: 
It might vary in the very specific details and in the names given to a function in a 
particular organisation, but overall it is a reasonable representation of the 
generalised structure of Australian banks. 
In the next section, detailed CRTs, which were iteratively developed with the participants, are 
presented and described (see Section 3.5 and Figure 3.6 for a description of the participant 
inquiry process). The CRT maps the dynamic relationships that occur between core risk 
effects, and the financial institution functions and structures. This provides a basis for making 
sense of the nature of risk causality in large and complex financial institutions. 
4.3 Current state analysis 
This section describes the results of the CRT method that was applied to identify and portray 
the current state of the nature of financial institution risk developed with the participants. To 
show the organisational location and dynamics of the risk attributes, the CRTs are organised 
according to the functional structure characteristics described in Section 4.1, comprising an 
operations level (Stage 2 of the research process shown in Figure 3.6), business strategy level 
(Stage 3 of the research process shown in Figure 3.6) and corporate strategy level (Stage 4 of 
the research process shown in Figure 3.6). Figure 4.1 provides the context for the detailed CRT 
results that are described below and in Sections 4.3.1–4.3.5 
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The CRT method described in Section 3.3.3.3 was developed with questions from a participant 
interview inquiry process (Appendix A) that was iterative and interactive in nature (see Figure 
3.6), where the purpose was to reveal the causes and effects of UDEs that affect the attainment 
of organisational objectives. Following the development of a participant consensus view of 
generalised organisational structure described in Section 4.2, the interview process inquired 
successively about the causes and effects of UDEs occurring at three stages, representing each 
of the institutional functional levels (the operations level, the business strategy level and the 
corporate strategy level). This was repeated for each of the four main UDE types aligned with 
each major financial institution divisions (see Figure 4.1). Appendix C shows an example of 
the list of risk effects derived and classified from the interview data. Appendix D shows a 
diagrammatic representation of these data summarised and aligned with the business units that 
were used as a prompt at subsequent participant interviews. The diagrammatic representations 
were used in the participant inquiry process to elicit dynamic risk effect cause-and-effect 
relationships from the participants. Appendix E shows the initial risk process map derived from 
Appendix D participant provided information, which was used in further interviews to finally 
develop and then validate the CRTs shown in Figures 4.2–4.7. The interview process (see 
Section 3.3.3.3) identified, examined and interrogated to reveal a shared view of the root causes 
behind the major sources and nature of the risks facing the financial institutions, taking account 
of the entire organisational context.  
For ease of understanding, the CRT analysis is divided into four subtrees representing each of 
the four main organisational business functions corresponding to divisional organisational 
structures (see Figure 4.1). First, the area of demand-related risk where retail banking fails to 
meet customer needs is described in Section 4.3.1. Second, Section 4.3.2 describes the supply 
operations related risk area where banking fails to meet business-to-business targets. Third, 
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Section 4.3.3 describes product management failure, and Section 4.3.4 describes IT-related 
business disruption.  
For each of these four business areas of the institutions, the four CRTs present the end result 
of the iterative and validated CRT development research process with the participants 
illustrated by Figure 3.6. The first part of the results description for each of the four CRTs 
(Sections 4.3.1–4.3.4) refers to the findings at the organisational operations level (see Section 
4.2.1), followed by a description of findings at the business strategy level (see Section 4.2.2). 
Last, the four subtrees are combined into an entire institution CRT view in Section 4.3.5, 
including their interacting effects and the contribution of the corporate strategy level (see 
Section 4.2.3) to financial institution risk. 
4.3.1 Current reality tree for demand in retail banking 
This section discusses the reasons identified from inquiries with participants why retail 
banking fails to meet customer needs. The findings of the interview process are illustrated in 
Figure 4.2, which shows the retail banking CRT results. First, the validated participant 
observations in response to questions (see Appendix A) on the causes and effects of undesired 
risk effects occurring at the operational functional level of the organisation are described. 
Figure 4.2 shows that the core reasons why retail banking fails to meet customer needs (1.0) 
are hardware/software issues (coding, security, privacy) (1.4), limited capacity and capability 
of people-centred services (HR) (1.14) and limited adequate specification of policy and 
inflexible procedures (HR policy, operational procedures) (1.22). In response to questions (see 
Appendix A) about operational level UDEs, Participant 8 observed:  
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through this process I have become more aware that for each of the core reasons, 
they were manifested by several specific unwanted risks that were related to each 
other, when they are not always seen that way in practice.
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Figure 4.2 Current reality tree for demand in retail banking 
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Hardware/software issues (1.4) arise from EFP machine breakdown (system support failure, 
limited cash delivery) (1.6), the limited number of technicians to cope with ATM malfunction 
(1.5) resulting in customer transaction failures (1.24), lack of ATM cash (1.26) and transaction 
errors such as incorrect deposit amounts (1.25). These technology disruptions result in online 
(1.3, 1.8) and phone banking (1.7) service failures and data processing errors (1.17). The flow-
on effects of these electronic service failures lead to increased customer visits to branches 
(1.18), where the institutions are not adequately prepared for dealing with the consequences 
arising from the technology disruptions. In the branches, retail capacity is limited (1.9) and 
there is increased pressure on staff to process customer needs (1.11). Combined with limited 
resources (1.3), and magnified by internal political problems (1.12) and ineffective policies 
and governance (1.13, 1.22), these serve to compound the issues and the system copes poorly 
with disruptions to operational service delivery. This shows that risks from one set of effects 
move through the system, elevating and creating risk in functionally connected areas. 
Participant 3 observed that the risk movement ‘is like a snow ball picking up momentum and 
increasing in size as it rolls along’. 
The operational level issues of limited capacity (1.10), lack of training preparation (1.21) and 
poor recruitment (1.23) are further compounded by inadequate staff training and induction 
(1.1), which, when combined with the limited capacity and capability of HR (1.14), creates 
limited policy and procedures (1.22). The combination of these undesired/risk effects 
contributes to poor fulfilment of regulatory requirements (1.20) and resource allocation issues 
(1.15). The ongoing limited capacity and capability of HR (1.14) also results from a failure of 
adequate business monitoring and evaluation (1.19), which also fails to detect, respond and 
remediate the other interacting effects described above (1.4, 1.9, 1.18, 1.22).  
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The demand in retail banking CRT (see Figure 4.2) shows that failing to meet customer needs 
is multidetermined by a complex interacting system of causes, most of which are interrelated 
and can be both determinants and effects, and which, in turn, can have other effects. For 
example, Participant 5 reported that:  
One of the problems that you've got in major financial institutions is people in 
divisions like IT don't see a full vantage of it. That's the operating effect that's 
occurring within the value chain, if you like, because one of the problems that 
you've got, for example, usually ATM failure. You may have been able to avert that 
if you had sufficient capacity to apply controls over that to actually identify the 
problem earlier or even before it occurred. The actual underpinning cause was not 
having a control, but the reason why it didn't have a control over it was I didn't 
have enough capacity in my HR to build a control. 
Other contributing operations level issues compounding retail banking failing to meet 
customer needs include non-fulfilment of auditing requirements and poor governance of 
regulatory requirements (APRA) (1.20), insufficient continual professional development 
(training, leadership, communication) (1.21), limited policy and inflexible procedures (HR 
policy, operational procedures) (1.22) and business monitoring and evaluation failure (1.19). 
The chain of interacting effects results in UDEs, contributing to why retail banking fails to 
meet customer need. Next, aggregated participant observations in response to inquiry (see 
Appendix A) about the causes and effects of undesired risk effects occurring at the business 
strategy level of the organisation are described. 
The operational level risks, comprising limited policies (1.22), insufficient professional 
development (1.21), poor governance of regulatory requirements (1.20) and business 
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monitoring failures (1.19), all contribute to business strategy level failures, including a lack of 
strategic management understanding of retail compliance issues (2.0), poor handling of credit 
operations (2.1) and poor organisational culture factors such as poor business advice and audit 
critical employee attitudes (2.2). Lack of strategic management understanding of retail 
compliance issues (2.0) contributes to negative consumer credit retail and co-branded credit 
card performance by Australasian retail credit associations (2.9), which, in turn, contributes to 
retail and small business disruption from emerging generations of consumers responding to 
innovative new businesses (2.10), together with the underperformance of digital and direct 
growth in the retail division due to digital disruption (2.11). Poor organisational culture (2.2) 
contributes to a decline in investment and corporate performance for both debt and equity (2.6), 
insurance and superannuation declines are driven by lower investment yields (2.8), as well as 
negative feedback from inaccurate balance sheets and liquidity, and balance sheet fluctuations, 
such that banks must manage the risks of asset–liability mismatches (2.5). These, in turn, are 
influenced by an environment where there are high credit risks because borrowers fail to make 
payments, combined with the loss of principal and interest, disruption to cash flows and 
increased collection costs (2.12). Also affected are potential financial market declines because 
of major effects with negative effects (2.13). Declines in customer service satisfaction (2.4) 
arise from a range of customer-facing operational failures (1.4, 1.6, 1.24, 1.26), and with no 
apparent or effectively implemented risk control to counter the decline, such as via operational 
improvements, lead to falling customer service quality (2.14). In commenting on the CRT 
findings illustrated in Figure 4.2, Participant 2 reported that risk to customer satisfaction is 
influenced by multiple factors: 
The common denominator across credit risk, operational risk, all these types of 
risk, is the risk management framework that sits in its own bubble and that drives 
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issue management, change management, obligation adherence, compliance 
adherence, operational risk business environment, definition, and how I said what 
the most important thing is would be risk appetite settings at the very top. That 
framework should ideally drive all this interaction and provide input into process 
improvement after the fact. 
Similarly, technology issues and their impacts (1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.25, 1.26, 1.27) also account for 
disruptions in service delivery across all areas of banking operations. A cause is that increasing 
complexity makes it difficult to integrate new financial technologies (fintech) with old legacy 
systems (2.3) and enterprise development declines due to decline in screen and assessment 
platforms (2.7). Also contributing to customer satisfaction decline (2.4) is technology-related 
failure to meet customer service levels, quality and needs (2.14). For example, Participant 2 
reported: 
The challenge is that banks historically have had large, big, monolithic, centrally 
run technology systems which are incredibly hard to maintain, incredibly hard to 
update large amounts of investment that require multiple years of delivery to do. 
That's not the customer's experience when they can get a new app in three seconds 
right now and if they don't like that app they'll go and try another one. So part of 
the challenge we're facing is that we have a business model that's based around 
having central, everyone access to the data and customers are used to providing 
their data to 25 different apps, but that each of those apps is something very unique, 
very specific, and very value adding for the customer, and that's the challenge we’re 
facing. 
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In summary, Table 4.1 shows the main or underlying demand in retail core risk effects that the 
CRT (Figure 4.2) analysis found, which contribute to retail banking failing to meet customer 
needs (UDEs). The most influential types of core risks that contributed to this failure were 
people-centred failures in the retail platform, external service provider disruptions, retail 
policies and regulatory limitations, and retail technology hub failures. These were interpreted 
as the underlying or most influential types of risk in that they were the types of effects that 
were most commonly reported by most of the participants. Further, when mapped onto the 
CRT and validated with the participants, these risk types either tended to form a shared junction 
point through which a number of other risk effect pathways would flow or they had influence 
on a range of other effects as shown by the interconnectivity in the CRT (see Figure 4.2). 
The main or underlying core risk effect types are a summary type or categorisation name for 
groups of related undesired risk effects. For example, all people-centred failure core risk 
effects comprise some aspect of people-centred functions such as failures in recruitment, 
training, people policies and HR procedures. All of these retail demand failure related issues, 
which occur at the operations functional level of financial institutions, are both causes and also 
reflect inadequacies at the business strategy level. The corporate strategy level contributing 
causes are discussed in Section 4.2.5. Supply operations risk and business strategy level risk 
features of business banking is discussed next. 
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Table 4.1 Contributing CRT elements to demand in retail banking core risk effects 
 
Core risk 
domain Retail demand core risk effects 
Core problem Retail banking fails to meet customer needs 
Main 
underlying core 
risk effect types 
(UDEs) 
People-centred 
(HR) failures in 
the retail 
platform 
External service 
provider 
disruptions 
Retail policies 
and regulatory 
limitations 
Retail 
technology 
hub failure 
Risk effects 
(UDEs) 
Inadequate staff 
training (e.g., 
recruitment process, 
inductions) 
Unfulfilled audit 
requirements (e.g., 
complaints) 
Limited HR 
processes & policies 
Outsourcing issues 
Business support 
disruptions 
Limited 
professional 
development and 
experience 
Human error in 
database entries 
Auditing issues 
(e.g., regulatory 
compliance) 
IT system 
disruptions 
Cyber security 
threats 
EFTPOS & 
ATM outages 
4.3.2 Current reality tree for supply in business banking 
This section describes the results of the CRT method applied to identify the reasons why 
participants thought business banking failed to meet business-to business targets (see Figure 
4.3). The validated participant observations in response to questions (see Appendix A) about 
undesired risk effects occurring at the operational functional level of the organisation are first 
described, followed by a description of risk effects at the business strategy level of the 
organisational structure. Figure 4.3 shows the core reasons for supply/business banking 
failures. These include various hardware or software issues (e.g., programming or phone and 
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online banking disruptions) (1.2), limited capacity of people-centred services (HR) (1.14), and 
lack of operational policy guidance with an overreliance on inflexible procedures (1.17) unable 
to be adapted to meet situational needs including the adequate control of risks when they arise. 
Hardware or software issues (1.2) contribute to a lack of adequate business monitoring and 
evaluation (1.20) and, together with the consequences of limited HR (1.14), contribute to 
online (1.1) and phone banking (1.5) issues and other technical failures (1.7) and lack of 
responding technicians (1.6). Failures in these areas cause more customers to both go online 
(1.4) and visit branches (1.8), placing pressure on limited retail capacity (1.3) and resources 
(1.13). All these issues contribute to internal political problems (1.15), which exacerbate 
ineffective policy and governance (1.16) and procedural policies (1.17), and contribute to 
lending operation discrepancies (1.22) and lack governance regarding the fulfilment of 
regulatory requirements (1.19). For example, Participant 1 reported: 
Certain issues which I can put down to lack of IT knowledge, which I can put as a 
supply chain system failure, which I can put in human errors and all that. I know 
the impacts to the business in terms of tests happen that we are approving loans 
by–there's a service agreement complement, like where the person can service that 
loan amount so an error is causing the customer's income to be calculated 
incorrectly which means you'll get a loan, even if you are not earning that much. 
So that's a major impact and that's happening in some loans. Capacity and 
capability are what comes to mind. Where you've got here–staff capability–it's part 
of that and I do see it coming from supply issues. We're also talking about 
resources. Across our point of view, I see those are the main drivers for HR issues. 
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From a capability and a capacity. You manage those two things in HR, usually that 
translates to a bit of a cross, which is what you've got here. 
Limited people-centred services (1.14) contribute to poor professional and leadership 
development (1.18), lack of flexible policies (1.17) and monitoring and evaluation failures 
(1.20), and have multiple effects on failing to meet business-to-business targets when 
combined with the effects of business customer-facing services above (1.3, 1.9, 1.10, 1.13). 
Technical and other capacities are also affected by poor recruitment (1.21). 
Business-to-business operational technical financial capacities can also affect adequate 
understanding of fluctuations in commodity and shares prices as well as interest rate issues 
(1.11), and lead to value at risk (VAR) (another company that adds features or services to an 
existing product, then resells it) miscalculations (1.12).  
Next, the validated participant observations in response to inquiry (see Appendix A) about the 
causes and effects of undesired risk effects occurring at the business strategy level of the 
organisation are described. Operations level causes, non-fulfilment of auditing requirements 
and poor governance of regulatory requirements (APRA) (1.19), insufficient continual 
professional development (training, leadership, communication) (1.18), limited policy and 
inflexible procedures (HR policy, operational procedures) (1.17) and business monitoring and 
evaluation failure (1.20) contribute to business strategy level failures, including a lack of 
strategic management understanding of retail compliance issues (2.0), poor handling of credit 
operations (2.1) and poor organisational culture factors such as poor advice, lack of trust and 
behavioural issues (2.2). 
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Figure 4.3 Current reality tree for supply in business banking 
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Lack of strategic management understanding of retail compliance issues (2.0) causes negative 
consumer credit retail and co-branded credit card performance (2.3) which, in turn, causes 
retail and small business disruption from emerging generations of consumers responding to 
innovative new businesses (2.4), together with the underperformance of digital and direct 
growth in the retail division with digital disruption (2.6). Poor handling of credit operations 
(2.1) also co-contributes to negative consumer credit (2.3) and business disruptions (2.6). 
Poor organisational culture and advice (2.2) contribute to a decline in investment and corporate 
performance for both debt and equity (2.8) and insurance and superannuation declines driven 
by lower investment yields (2.5). Poor organisational culture and advice (2.2) also contributes 
to inaccurate balance sheets and liquidity, balance sheet fluctuations, and bank management 
of the risks of asset–liability mismatches (2.14). These, in turn, contribute to an environment 
where there are high credit risks because borrowers fail to make payments, combined with the 
loss of principal and interest, disruption to cash flows and increased collection costs (2.7). Also 
affected are potential financial market declines because of major effects with negative effects 
(2.9). 
As described in the previous section, customer service satisfaction was identified as in decline 
(2.13), arising from a range of customer-facing operational failures, but with no apparent 
business strategy to counter the decline through operational improvements. Similarly, 
technology issues and their impacts (1.2, 1.6, 1.7, 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, 1.25) also account for 
disruptions in service delivery across all areas of banking operations. An effect is that 
increasing complexity makes it difficult to integrate new financial technologies (fintech) with 
old legacy systems (2.11) and enterprise development declines due to declines in screen and 
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assessment platforms (2.12). Also contributing to customer satisfaction decline (2.10) is 
technology-related failure to meet customer service levels, quality and needs (2.13). 
Similar to retail issues, the business banking CRT shows that failing to meet business-to-
business targets is multidetermined by a complex interacting system of causes, most of which 
are related and can operate as both determinants and effects, and which, in turn, have other 
effects. When supply in business banking failure occurs, customer needs are not met and 
overall banking service delivery underperforms. For example, Participant 2 observed: 
Technology, absolutely. We are increasingly reliant on outsourced or third-party 
providers. I'm interested in HR and the payments process. This is a consequence of 
that. We're saying there's also a driver there that relates to the impact that 
regulations and policies have on how the business can do–what activities they can 
do and how it can do them. On top of that, if the staff aren't trained well, then there 
will be errors leading to compliance risks and other impacts. Not enough people, 
capacity, capability–all those sorts of things related to people skills So it is a 
cultural issue and an HR issue. In operational risk, we talk about people, processes, 
and systems. You're aligned.  
In summary, Table 4.2 shows the main or underlying supply in business banking core risk 
effects that the CRT (Figure 4.3) analysis identified as contributing to business banking failing 
to meet business-to-business targets (the UDE). The most common types of core risks found 
that contributed to this failure in supply in business banking were people-centred failures in 
business operations, external service provider disruptions, policies and regulatory limitations, 
and technology hub failures. These are shown in the CRT (see Figure 4.3), where they form 
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junctions where multiple effect pathways pass through or are interconnected with multiple 
other effects. 
All of these supply in business banking failures that occurred at the operations functional level 
are both causes and also reflect inadequacies at the business strategy level of the financial 
institutions. The corporate strategy level contributing causes and effects are discussed in 
Section 4.3.5. Product management failure is discussed next. 
 
Table 4.2 Contributing CRT elements to supply in business banking core risk effects 
 
Core risk 
domain Supply in business banking risk effects 
Core problem Business banking fails to meet business-to-business targets 
Main 
underlying core 
risk effect types 
(UDEs) 
People-centred 
(HR) failures in 
business 
operations 
External 
service 
provider 
disruptions 
Policies and 
regulatory 
limitations 
Technology 
hub failures 
Risk effects 
(UDEs) 
Poor recruitment 
process 
Insufficient 
professional 
development 
Limited HR 
processes & 
policies 
Frequent 
internal and 
external fraud 
Outsourcing 
issues 
Government 
interventions 
Regulatory non-
compliance 
(APRA) 
System 
failures  
Online 
banking 
outages 
Business 
transaction 
disruptions 
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4.3.3 Current reality tree for product management 
This section describes the findings of the CRT analysis for product management failure. First, 
the validated participant observations in response to questions (see Appendix A) about the 
causes and effects of undesired risk effects occurring at the operational functional level of the 
organisation are described. Such failure mostly occurs in wholesale banking, where funds are 
borrowed and lent between local and international banks, and with exchanges made at either 
dollar value or with an interest rate. Major external effects such as natural disasters, political 
upheaval and public ethical and legal issues all also have significant impacts on product 
management risk but are outside the scope of this research. 
Routine or ongoing wholesale-related operational causes of product management failure are 
illustrated in Figure 4.4, which shows the core reasons given by the participants for product 
management failure. These include various hardware or software issues (e.g., programming or 
phone and online banking disruptions) (1.1), limited capacity of HR (1.15), and lack of 
operational policy guidance with an overreliance on inflexible operational procedures (1.16) 
unable to be adapted to meet situational needs. Participant 9 highlighted multiple factors 
affecting product risk: 
A lot of the things that will hurt a product's success are not the things that the 
product manager thinks of at the very first instance. They will be things like the 
ability of the supply chain to actually meet the requirements of the products. So 
that's a live example of something going on at the moment. So, you think, we’ll base 
a product on XYZ, but if the vendor can’t meet those timeframes, the cost of leaving 
them is carving into the benefit. There is innovation disruption happening in that 
space. There are compliance complexities to that which we are not mature enough 
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to manage so you've created a product which is beyond our compliance 
capabilities. 
Hardware or software issues (1.1) contribute to a lack of adequate business monitoring and 
evaluation (1.12) and to limited people-centred services (1.15). Online (1.7, 1.9) and phone 
banking (1.8) issues and other technical failures (1.2, 1.19, 1.20, 1.21) are directly or indirectly 
caused by hardware or software issues (1.1). Failures in these areas cause more customers to 
go online (1.9) and visit branches (1.10, 1.11), placing pressure on limited resources (1.17). 
All these issues exacerbate inflexible procedures (1.16), poor professional and leadership 
development (1.14), and monitoring and evaluation failures (1.12), and have multiple effects. 
Technical and other capacities are also affected by poor recruitment (1.21). Product 
management failures collectively cause lending operation discrepancies (1.3). 
Different product management effects exist for different products at financial institutions, with 
many problems originating from lending operational discrepancies (1.3). Financial institutions 
are subject to annual fluctuations in commodity pricing, shares and interest rates, while 
operational technical financial capacities can also affect adequate understanding of 
fluctuations in commodity and shares prices as well as interest rate issues (1.6), leading to 
VAR miscalculations (1.5). For example, Participant 9 reported that: 
In foreign currency options, part of the reason for the failures was that the 
managing office was under resourced, which in turn was because of human error 
and HR capacity and capability. 
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Figure 4.4 Current reality tree for product management 
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Next, the validated and aggregated participant observations in response to inquiry (see 
Appendix A) about the causes and effects of undesired risk effects occurring at the business 
strategy level of the organisation are described. Operations level causes, non-fulfilment of 
auditing requirements and poor governance of regulatory requirements (APRA) (1.13), 
insufficient continual professional development (training, leadership, communication) (1.14), 
limited policy and inflexible procedures (HR policy, operational procedures) (1.16) and 
business monitoring and evaluation failure (1.12) were caused by a chain of effects from 
operational level UDEs. These UDEs (1.12, 1.13, 1.14, 1.16) contributed to business strategy 
failures, including a lack of strategic management understanding of retail compliance issues 
(2.0), poor handling of credit operations (2.1) and poor organisational culture factors such as 
poor advice, lack of trust and behavioural issues (2.2).  In relation to product management 
disruptions, Participant 6 observed that: 
It could be any sort of process really, so it could be how we transfer funds between 
banks over ten years old. There's a written process around that and that will have 
a number of controls built into it, but the person executing that process, following 
it, could follow the process as it's written and if there are errors in the actual way 
that it's documented, you could still end up with a risk or an actual disruptive effect. 
Lack of strategic management understanding of retail compliance issues (2.0) contributes to 
negative consumer credit retail and co-branded credit card performance by Australasian retail 
credit associations (2.13), which, in turn, contributes to retail and small business disruption 
from emerging generations of consumers responding to innovative new businesses (2.14), 
together with the underperformance of digital and direct growth in the retail division due to 
digital disruption (2.11). Poor handling of credit operations (2.1) is also a contributing factor.  
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Poor organisational culture and advice (2.2) causes a decline in investment and corporate 
performance for both debt and equity (2.7), and insurance and superannuation declines are 
driven by lower investment yields (2.12), contributing to an environment where there are high 
credit risks because borrowers fail to make payments, combined with the loss of principal and 
interest, disruption to cash flows and increased collection costs (2.10). Poor organisational 
culture and advice (2.2) also causes negative feedback from inaccurate balance sheets and 
liquidity, balance sheet fluctuations and how banks manage the risks of asset–liability 
mismatches (2.3), contributing to potential financial market declines because of major effects 
with negative effects (2.9). The influences of organisational culture were described by 
Participant 5, who stated that: 
In reference to culture, I have a saying that you can create the perfect mousetrap. 
It’s not an original saying, but if people won't use it, it's useless. So, I think your 
risk design, you're getting the full value chain, working together, owning 
responsibility. That comes down to your culture, so you've got to make sure that 
culturally that is seen as the preferred direction. You've got to make sure you don't 
build a pocket of resistance to the culture of the organisation.  
As described in previous sections, customer service satisfaction is in decline (2.4) arising from 
a range of customer-facing operational failures, but with no apparent business strategy to 
counter the decline, through either operational or business strategy improvements. Similarly, 
technology issues and their impacts (1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.19, 1.20, 1.21) also account for disruptions 
in service delivery across all areas of product management. A cause is that increasing 
complexity makes it difficult to integrate new financial technologies (fintech) with old legacy 
systems (2.5) and this contributes to enterprise development declines due to declines in screen 
 139 
 
and assessment platforms (2.6). Also, there is a technology-related failure to meet customer 
service levels, quality and needs (2.8). Similar to other operational issues, the product 
management CRT shows that failure is multidetermined by a complex interacting system of 
causes, most of which are related and can be both determinants and effects, and which, in turn, 
have other effects. 
In summary, Table 4.3 shows the main product management core risk effects found by the 
CRT (Figure 4.4) analysis as contributing to the product management failure UDE. The most 
common types of core risks that contributed were product- and market-centred failures, 
product and external service provider disruptions, product and market policy and regulatory 
limitations, and product and market technology hub failures. These are shown in the CRT (see 
Figure 4.4), where they form junctions where multiple effect pathways pass or are 
interconnected with multiple other effects. 
The product management failure related issues described above, which occur at the operations 
and business strategy levels of the bank, are also due to inadequacies at the corporate strategy 
level. The corporate strategy level contributing causes are discussed in Section 4.3.5. IT failure 
is discussed next. 
4.3.4 Current reality tree for information technology 
This section describes the findings of the CRT analysis regarding the reasons why IT issues 
disrupt business operations. Technology is major contributor that enables financial institution 
performance. As described in the literature in Chapter 2 and validated by the participants, 
technology disruptions are major service enterprise risk factors for business operations. Figure 
4.5 shows the CRT for IT business disruptions. 
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Table 4.3 Contributing CRT elements to product management core risk effects 
 
Core risk 
domain Product management core risk effects 
Core problem Product management failures 
Main 
underlying 
core risk effect 
types (UDEs) 
Product and 
market failures 
Product and 
external service 
provider 
disruptions 
Product and 
market policy 
and regulatory 
limitations 
Product and 
market 
technology hub 
failures 
Risk effects 
(UDEs) 
Miscalculation of 
VAR 
Human database 
processing error 
Lending 
operation 
discrepancies 
Natural disaster 
(e.g., offshore 
business 
disruptions) 
Ethical and legal 
issues 
Auditing 
requirements 
failure 
Hardware/software 
issues (e.g., 
system failure) 
Communication 
and technology 
breakdown 
First, the validated and aggregated participant observations in response to inquiry (see 
Appendix A) about the causes and effects of undesired risk effects occurring at the operational 
level of the organisation are described. Figure 4.5 shows that the core or underlying reasons 
why IT business disruptions occur (1.0) are hardware/software issues (coding, security, 
privacy) (1.1), limited capacity and capability of HR (1.14) and limited availability of policy 
guidance giving flexibility to adapt to situational specific circumstances and an overreliance 
on inflexible and invariant procedural specifications (HR policy, operational procedures) 
(1.15).  
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Hardware/software issues (1.1) cause electronic funds processing machine (ATM) breakdowns 
(system support failure, limited cash delivery) (1.2), and potentially exhaust the limited 
number of technicians to cope with ATM malfunction (1.22), resulting in customer transaction 
failures (1.19), lack of ATM cash (1.21) and transaction failures (1.20). These result in online 
(1.6, 1.7) and phone banking (1.9) flow-on effects, which also include increased customer 
visits to branches (1.8) where retail capacity is limited (1.13) and increased pressure on staff 
to process customer needs (1.12). Illustrating the importance of IT, Participant 5 recalled an 
incident where thousands of customers’ information was released due to an IT error: 
It has an impact on their reputation, bank reputation, and safety because the bank 
looks into the safety as well. The interesting factors that are starting to apply to my 
mind is with digital technology, the customer can probably, in most cases, see what 
your internal system can see. These layers of non-disclosed control are starting to 
become more and more blurred as the system starts to digitise themselves. What 
occurred in that situation was they sought to maximise their capital market value 
in the short term (instead of investment in IT risk controls) which is an 
unsustainable business model and because they were doing it via cost control, not 
carrying business efficiency with it as well, you effectually had a breakdown in 
controls and you had a calamity or multiple calamities. 
Financial institutions are subject to annual fluctuations in commodity pricing, shares and 
interest rates, where operational IT business disruptions can cause errors and miscalculations 
about fluctuations in commodity and share prices as well as interest rate issues (1.11) and also 
lead to VAR miscalculations (1.4).  
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Figure 4.5 Current reality tree for information technology 
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Hardware/
software issues 
(coding, security, 
privacy)(1.1)
Mis-Calculation 
VAR-None VAR 
cause wrong 
evaluation(1.4) 
Poor recruitment process 
puts pressure on 
business(1.10)Human data entry 
processing error(1.4)
Enterprise services 
technology failure because 
service is under-developed 
and technology risk is not 
well managed (disconnected 
from enterprise)(3.5)
IT business 
disruption(1.0)
Customer service 
levels and service 
quality fail to meet 
customer needs(2.7)
Incorrect deposit 
amount(1.19)
Enterprise 
development 
declines dues to 
decline in screen 
and assessment 
platforms(2.6)
Customer 
transactions 
failure(1.20
)
No cash in 
the 
ATM(1.21)
EFP machine 
breakdown 
(system support 
failure, limited 
cash 
delivery)(1.2)
ATM failure 
due to limited 
number of 
technicians
Customer has 
trouble using 
applications
(1.3)
Customer service 
satisfaction 
decline(2.3)
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    O
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on
s Customers asked to 
complete their banking 
using the online 
system(1.7)
More unsatisfied 
customers come to 
the branch(1.8)
Retail facilities overcrowded 
(many customers going to 
branch)(1.12)
Limited 
capacity and 
capability of 
people centred 
services (HR) 
(1.14)
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All these issues are compounded by the limited capacity and capability of HR (1.14), which 
contributes to limited policy and procedures (1.15), insufficient professional development 
(1.16) and the poor fulfilment of regulatory requirements (1.17). The ongoing limited capacity 
and capability of people-centred services (1.14), as well as IT failures and capacity to cope 
with disruptions, also result from failure of adequate business monitoring and evaluation 
(1.18). 
Next, the aggregated and validated participant observations in response to inquiry (see 
Appendix A) about the causes and effects of undesired risk effects occurring at the business 
strategy level of the organisation are described. The operations level causes, non-fulfilment of 
auditing requirements and poor governance of regulatory requirements (APRA) (1.17), 
insufficient continual professional development (training, leadership, communication) (1.16), 
limited policy and inflexible procedures (HR policy, operational procedures) (1.15) and 
business monitoring and evaluation failure (1.18) are caused by many elements of a chain of 
effects arising from operational UDEs. In turn, these operational UDEs also cause business 
strategy failures, including a lack of strategic management understanding of retail compliance 
issues (2.0), poor handling of credit operations (2.1) and poor organisational culture factors 
such as poor advice and lack of trust (2.2). 
Lack of strategic management understanding of retail compliance issues (2.0) contributes to 
negative consumer credit retail and co-branded credit card performance by Australasian retail 
credit associations (2.11), which, in turn, contributes to retail and small business disruption 
from emerging generations of consumers responding to innovative new businesses (2.12), 
together with the underperformance of digital and direct growth in the retail division due to 
digital disruption (2.13). Poor handling of credit operations (2.1) also contributes to these 
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issues. Participant 5 explained how lack of strategic management allowed person-centred and 
other risks to become uncontrolled: 
We have a whole host of third-party relationships which power the supply chain, 
but they haven’t been created in the most commercially sensible ways because it's 
a lack of contractual knowledge by either party or it's a lack of understanding the 
broader domain in which those contracts or relationships are formed So the 
contract formation follows having superior negotiation skills (person-centred) 
based on knowledge, education, understanding of the domain. Everything from a 
why did we lock in a three-year contract when we know that technology is changing, 
we should only go for a 12-month contract. The cost of production is x but we can 
see there's innovation overseas–gaps in our supply chains which relates to IT 
security. We need a fresh look at what’s the state of the world more broadly and 
how rapidly things are changing. 
Poor organisational culture (2.2) causes a decline in investment and corporate performance for 
both debt and equity (2.5) and insurance and superannuation declines are driven by lower 
investment yields (2.10), as well as negative feedback from inaccurate balance sheets and 
liquidity, and balance sheet fluctuations mean that banks must manage the risks of asset–
liability mismatches (2.4). These, in turn, create an environment where there are high credit 
risks because borrowers fail to make payments, combined with the loss of principal and 
interest, disruption to cash flows and increased collection costs (2.9). Also affected are 
potential financial market declines because of major effects with negative effects (2.8). 
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As described in the previous sections, customer service satisfaction is in decline (2.3) arising 
from a range of customer-facing operational failures, but with no apparent business strategy to 
counter the quality decline (2.7). 
Similarly, technology issues and their impacts (1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.19, 1.20, 1.21) also account 
for disruptions in service delivery across all areas of banking operations. A compounding 
factor is that increasing complexity makes it difficult to integrate new financial technologies 
(fintech) with old legacy systems (2.14) and, as a result, enterprise development declines due 
to declines in screen and assessment platforms (2.6). Related to the customer satisfaction 
decline (2.3) is a technology-related failure to meet customer service levels, quality and needs 
(2.7). 
The CRT (see Figure 4.5) shows that capacity to manage IT business disruption is 
multidetermined by a complex interacting system of causes most of which are related and can 
be both determinants and effects, and which, in turn, have other effects on all other parts of the 
financial institution. Table 4.4 summarises the most common IT-related core risk effects cited 
by the participants and that the CRT (Figure 4.5) shows as contributing to the IT disruptions 
UDE. In the CRT (see Figure 4.5), these main effects form junctions where multiple effect 
pathways pass or are interconnected with multiple other effects  
In summary, Table 4.4 shows the types of core risks that were interpreted as the most 
influential by the CRT analysis in terms of contributing to IT business disruptions. These were 
IT system people-centred failures, external service provider disruptions, policy and regulatory 
compliance limitations, and technology hub failures. Participant 9 illustrated the 
interconnection of IT as an enabler of the supply chain and how external service providers are 
important for IT risk: 
 146 
 
We in the industry–tend to outsource without understanding enough about who 
owns the risk and what other, what other overheads do you need to actually manage 
the process well, but again, technology is the 50% enabler and support for 
managing risk in the supply chain because it, it’s the mechanism by which you 
manage your data and do the analysis to make better decisions. It's the transmissive 
conduit for sharing information and presenting information 
Table 4.4 Contributing CRT elements to IT core risk effects 
 
Core risk 
domain Information technology core risk effects 
Core problem IT business disruptions 
Main 
underlying core 
risk effect types 
(UDEs) 
IT system people-
centred (HR) 
failures 
External service 
provider 
disruptions 
Policy and 
regulatory 
compliance 
limitations 
Technology 
hub failures 
Risk effects 
(UDEs) 
Lack of IT 
knowledge 
Human database 
processing errors 
Communications 
and technology 
breakdowns 
IT compliance 
requirements 
failure 
Data security for 
Privacy Act 
concerns 
App crashes 
ATM 
malfunction 
EFTPOS 
machine 
breakdown 
All of these IT business disruption related issues described above, which occurred at the 
operations and business levels of the bank, also reflect and cause inadequacies at the corporate 
strategy level. The corporate strategy level contributing causes are discussed in the next 
section.  
 147 
 
4.3.5 A combined current reality tree for the entire organisation 
In each of the previous four sections on the operational UDEs (demand in retail failing to meet 
customer needs (Section 4.3.1), supply in business banking failing to meet business-to-
business targets (Section 4.3.2), product demand failure (Section 4.3.3) and IT business 
disruption (Section 4.3.4), the results of participant validated responses to questions (see 
Appendix A) about operations level and business level causes of UDEs were each described 
individually. In this section, the four CRTs are combined into a single CRT representing the 
whole of the organisation. In addition, how each of the four divisional business areas were 
thought by the participants to interact with corporate strategy level UDEs are described. 
Corporate strategy level UDEs are described in this whole-of-organisation section on CRT 
findings because the nature of the corporate strategy level is concerned with all parts of the 
financial institution as a whole, as all parts are intended to work together to collectively 
contribute to the achievement of strategic objectives and the financial institution mission. 
Figure 4.6 shows the combined CRT for all four UDE areas previously described individually. 
Figure 4.6 is an aggregated version of the previous four current reality subtrees, with shared 
or common CRT elements combined. This gives a whole-of-organisation view of risk, whereas 
the subtrees in Sections 4.2.1–4.2.4 gave a business-type or divisional-specific view. Like the 
previous CRTs, this combined CRT was a consensus, validated with the participants.  
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Figure 4.6 Combined current reality tree for the entire organisation 
 
Financial 
Payment 
faces 
extreme 
disruption 
in payment 
process 
Culture business 
reputation fail  / silo 
mentality when 
parts of the 
company fail to 
work together
Decline  in 
consumer business 
performance    
impacts businesses 
and consumer 
confidence  
Demand/Retail 
banking fails to 
meet customer 
needs(1.0)
Retail & Small 
Business Disruption  
, from emerging 
generations of 
consumers to 
innovative new 
businesses  
Underperformed 
Digital & Direct 
Growth in the retail 
division Digital 
disruption is shaking 
up banking  
Lack of 
understanding of 
retail 
compliance 
issues
 
Negative 
consumer credit 
retail and co-
branded credit 
card 
performance by 
Australasian 
retail credit 
association
Insurance & 
Superannuation 
Decline is driven by 
lower investment 
yields
Internal politics 
creates problems 
inside the 
business(1.11)
Insufficient continual 
professional 
development (training, 
leadership, 
communication)(1.22)
Current retail capacity 
is limited(1.10)
Limited policy and 
inflexible 
procedures (HR 
policy, operational 
procedures)(1.23)
Ongoing retail resource 
allocation issues(1.14)
Business monitoring 
failure (evaluation)(1.24)
Non-fulfilment of 
auditing requirements 
and poor governance of 
regulatory requirements 
(APRA)(1.21)
Inadequate staff training 
and induction(1.4)
 Corporate, small 
& medium 
business 
department 
 underperforms/
fails to achieve 
shareholder target  
Supply/Business 
banking fails to 
meet business-to-
business 
targets(1.1)
 Decline  Investment/
Corporate Performance  
for both the debt and 
equity
Online banking fails to 
support customers 
(website has limited 
functionality)(1.8)
Phone banking takes a 
long time to be 
activated(18)
Poor business advice from staff , poor 
culture,  trust issues, audit-critical 
employees 
Business fail to 
use Cards, and  
handling  credit 
operations well.
High Credit Risk 
Business because   
borrowers failing to make 
required payments,  lost 
principal and interest, 
disruption to cash flows, 
and increased collection 
costs
Wholesale business  
decline/ fail to maximise 
portfolio outcome ( due 
to  product costs )
Product 
management 
failure(1.2)
Financial market 
decline can be the 
result of major 
catastrophic events, 
economic crisis or the 
collapse of a long-term 
speculative bubble 
In- accurate Balance 
Sheet & Liquidity, 
balance sheet 
fluctuations, Banks 
manage the risks of 
ALM mismatch
Complex Services- 
complexity has  impacted 
on  fintech and legacy 
systems on banking, 
complex to integrate 
these into a back office 
system 
Fluctuation in 
commodity 
prices, share 
prices, interest 
rates(1.25)
Lending operations 
discrepancies(1.31)
Hardware/
software issues 
(coding, security, 
privacy)(1.9)
Mis-Calculation 
VAR-None VAR 
cause wrong 
evaluation(1.26) 
Poor recruitment process 
puts pressure on 
business(1.30)Human data entry processing 
error(1.19)
Enterprise Services 
Technology Failure  
because service is 
under developed 
and  technology-
risk is not well 
managed 
(disconnected from 
enterprise )
IT business 
disruption(1.3)
Customer services level 
decline in  customer 
service quality and aren't 
fully prepared to meet 
customer's needs
Incorrect deposit 
amount (1.34)
Enterprise projects  
Decline in screening 
and assessment 
platform, enterprise 
development has 
declined
Customer 
transactions 
failure(1.32)
No-cash 
in the 
ATM
(1.33)  
EFP machine 
breakdown 
(system support 
failure, limited 
cash 
delivery)(1.27)
ATM failure due to 
limited number of 
technicians(1.28)
Customer has 
trouble using 
applications(1.29)
Customer service 
satisfaction decline 
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ns 
There is a tremendous pressure 
on the retail staff to process 
customer needs(1.7)
Customers asked to 
complete their banking 
using the online 
system(1.16)
More unsatisfied 
customers come to the 
branch(1.15)
Retail facilities 
overcrowded (many 
customers going to 
branch)(1.20)
Branch staff 
with limited 
capacity to 
perform 
work(1.6)
Ineffective policy 
and 
governance(1.12)
Limited capacity 
and capability of 
people centred 
services 
(HR)(1.3)
Limited resources 
(staff numbers, 
equipment, 
physical 
space)(1.5)
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This section also describes the findings from participant responses to inquiries about the causes 
of corporate strategy level UDEs. For example, the response of Participant 2 to questions (see 
Appendix A) about corporate strategy level UDEs illustrated how people-centred failure is a 
shared issue across all the business areas examined in the previous CRTs, as people-centred 
functions are located at multiple functional levels: 
In our organisation, the responsibility for training exists with the business, not the 
HR area. So those failures or the drivers that relate to people. It’s people-centred 
failures, that would include error, lack of training, lack of capability. This is a 
pandemic that fuels multiple risks–all of those sort of things–not enough people, 
capacity, capability–all those sorts of things related to people skills. 
The operational level causes of underlying UDEs are shown in Figure 4.6. These comprise 
limited policy and inflexible procedures (HR policy, operational procedures) (1.23), limited 
capacity and capability of people-centred services (1.3), and hardware and software issues 
(1.9). These resulted from many elements of the chain of effects, resulting in the main UDEs 
(1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3). The core effects of these UDEs on the business strategy level included a 
lack of strategic management understanding of retail compliance issues (2.0), poor 
organisational culture factors such as poor advice and lack of trust (2.2), in-service balance 
fluctuations and mismatches (2.10), customer service satisfaction decline (2.11), and the 
impact of the complexity of fintech and legacy systems on back office banking processes 
(2.12). 
Lack of strategic management understanding of retail compliance issues (2.0) caused negative 
consumer credit retail and co-branded credit card performance (2.3), which, in turn, caused 
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retail and small business disruption from emerging generations of consumers responding to 
innovative new businesses (2.4). Poor handling of credit operations (2.1) also contributed to 
underperformance of digital and direct growth in the retail division due to digital disruption 
(2.6). 
Poor organisational culture (2.2) caused a decline in investment and corporate performance for 
both debt and equity (2.8), and insurance and superannuation declines are driven by lower 
investment yields (2.5), while negative feedback from inaccurate balance sheets and liquidity, 
and balance sheet fluctuations mean banks must manage the risks of asset–liability mismatches 
(2.10). These, in turn, create an environment where there are high credit risks because 
borrowers fail to make payments, combined with the loss of principal and interest, disruption 
to cash flows and increased collection costs (2.7). Also affected are potential financial market 
declines because of major effects with negative effects (2.9). As described in the previous 
individual business area CRTs in the four previous sections, customer service satisfaction has 
declined (2.11), arising from a range of customer-facing operational failures, combined with 
no apparent business strategy to counter the decline through operational improvements. 
Similarly, technology issues and their impacts (1.9, 1.27, 1.32, 1.33, 1.34) also accounted for 
disruptions in service delivery across all areas of banking operations. Increasing complexity 
makes it difficult to integrate new financial technologies (fintech) with old legacy systems 
(2.12) and enterprise development declines due to declines in screening and assessment 
platforms (2.13). As customer satisfaction declines (2.11) from all these contributing causes, 
there is a flow-on effect from technology-related failure to meet customer service levels, 
quality and need (2.14). 
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Figure 4.6 shows that customer-facing operational failures (retail, wholesale, products and IT 
services), while having causes related to operational shortcomings, also compound various 
business strategy failures. These business strategy failures, in turn, contribute to corporate 
strategy shortcomings and reduce capability to meet organisational objectives. Figure 4.6 
shows the aggregate results of the participant responses to inquiry about corporate strategy 
level UDEs. It shows the findings that small, medium and large business department 
underperformance and failure to achieve shareholder targets (3.1), together with extreme 
disruption of financial payment processes (3.2), contribute to wholesale business decline that 
fails to maximise portfolio outcomes (3.3). These issues are also due to enterprise service 
technology failure because technology services are under-developed and technology risk is not 
well managed and disconnected from the enterprise (3.5). Also contributing to these is a failure 
of organisational culture and reputation, as business units function with an inward-looking silo 
mentality that takes insufficient account of shared co-dependencies in the business. According 
to the participants, all of this corporate strategy failure causes a decline in consumer business 
performance that affects business and consumer confidence in banking (3.0). 
Figure 4.6 also illustrates the dynamic and complex nature of mutual and interacting causality 
in financial institution risk and the UDEs so created. While financial institution risk is mainly 
inherited from business operations level risk, it can also be negatively compounded by further 
deterioration of operations due to effects emanating from both business and corporate levels. 
This means that direction of risk movement can be seen to be bidirectional when viewed from 
an entire organisation perspective, even though it might appear unidirectional when viewed at 
a more micro or specific area instance.  Elicited through inquiry using the cause–effect–cause 
TP method with participants, Figure 4.6 shows how risk moves from the bottom up, from 
operational risk to business risk to corporate risk, where corporate strategy level and business 
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strategy level UDEs reflect operational shortcomings. In response to inquiry about causes and 
effects, a silo mentality, where parts of the organisation fail to work together (3.4), was 
mentioned as a business culture failure. For example, Participant 5 commented on the contrast 
between the existing silo view of the business and the dynamic nature of risk determinism:  
What we had previously defined as independent risks and effects, they now appear 
interconnected and they influence each other. This is a highly complex environment 
that we are operating in at the moment and we have interdependencies that, when 
you start to think about them, you realise how interconnected everything you're 
doing is. 
For example, because the multiple risks inherited from the operations level can negatively 
affect business demand, together with retail operations and compliance issues and a lack of 
understanding of these (2.0), this can also lead to negative consumer credit and co-branded 
credit card performance (2.3). Because this is not in alignment with the Australian Retail Credit 
Association, it results in retail and small business disruptions among emerging and innovative 
businesses (2.4). These corporate strategy level UDEs inherit risk from these and other 
business strategy level UDEs.  
Also affecting the corporate strategy level, this risk changes the business landscape for both 
corporate shareholders and executives in terms of leadership and competitiveness. Risk 
inherited from the operations level significantly affects a business when cards are not properly 
used or when credit operations are not managed effectively (2.1), which causes 
underperformance in digital divisions and increased digital disruption among financial 
institutions (2.6). 
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The risks caused by operations level product management failures, such as inaccurate balance 
sheets and liquidity, balance sheet fluctuations and banks having to manage asset/liability 
mismatch (2.10), can cause financial market declines (2.9) that can result in economic crises 
or the collapse of long-term speculative bubbles. Such disruptions lead to a decline in corporate 
performance and productivity (3.1).  
Technology operations are directly linked to risk, particularly within the enterprise services 
division (3.5, 2.12). Risk movement from the operations level through the business strategy 
level (2.12) into the corporate strategy level (3.5) affects financial technology and legacy 
systems because integrating these systems into a backend system is difficult. Thus, enterprise 
services fail on screening and assessment platforms (2.13), and customer service quality 
declines because staff are not fully prepared to meet customer needs (2.14), resulting in 
negative business performance (3.4, 3.5). In summary, business risk is caused by disruptions 
in the frontline of financial institutions’ operations. Such risk is strongly connected to and has 
a direct impact on overall financial service delivery and institutional reputation, compounding 
business strategy and corporate strategy level risk.  
As corporate strategy level risks are affected by the operations level of financial institutions, 
this has a negative impact on overall business performance and reputation. For example, retail 
and small business disruptions among the emerging generation of consumers and innovative 
businesses (2.4), combined with underperformance in digital and direct growth in the retail 
division (2.6), negatively affects business and consumer confidence (3.0). Additionally, high 
business credit risk is caused by borrowers failing to make required payments, lost principal 
and interest, disruption to cash flows and increased collection costs (2.7), leading to declining 
performance among corporations and medium and large businesses (3.1). Financial market 
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decline and complex services (2.9) directly affect wholesale banking (3.3), and poor customer 
service (2.11) and underperforming digital and direct business (2.14) significantly affect 
enterprise service performance (3.5). 
All the CRTs show the interactions among various risk effect movements between the 
operations, business strategy and corporate strategy levels of an organisation. Additionally, 
they show the movement of core risk effects from the customer-facing frontline to the 
corporate level through the business. The cumulative negative impact of risks throughout the 
business described by the participants culminated with corporate underperformance and 
management failure to meet performance targets. 
Table 4.5 summarises the main core risk effect types that the CRTs (Figures 4.2–4.6) identified 
as contributing to the main UDEs. These effect types were interpreted as the most influential, 
as they were the most commonly mentioned by participants, and their pathways shown in the 
CRTs (Figures 4.2–4.6) tended to cross into all three functional levels of the institutions and 
across all business types. These effect types also tended to be located at the junction points of 
multiple pathways in the combined CRT (Figure 4.6), which provides a view of the 
organisation in its entirety. This shows that these effect types are likely to be influencing 
multiple UDEs across the organisation; because of this causal-related connectivity, they are 
interpreted as the underlying causes of UDEs.  
The most influential core effects contributing risk across the business problem domains cluster 
together under four main core risk effect types: people-centred failures, external service 
provider disruptions, policy and regulatory compliance limitations, and technology hub 
failures. Similarly, the participants identified that many risks in product development and IT 
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arise from poorly controlled risk, as functions outsourced to contracted external service 
providers go on to contribute to risk in both retail and business-to-business banking. 
Table 4.5 Main underlying core risk effect types 
Core risk effect types 
People-centred 
failures 
External service 
provider disruptions 
Policies and 
regulatory 
compliance 
limitations 
Technology hub 
failures 
These underlying risks, although described as types, are not intended to be portrayed as 
exclusive of each other. Instead, all these underlying risk effect types were found to constrain 
achievement in all four business areas, and contribute to retail banking failing to meet customer 
needs, business banking failing to meet targets, product management failures and IT 
disruptions. Further, the causal pathways associated with the core or underlying UDEs also 
cross over the functional levels of financial institutions (operational level functions, business 
strategy level functions and corporate strategy level functions). For example, Participant 4 
commented in response to validation questions (see Appendix A) about external provider 
disruptions that ‘the push to outsource has produced efficiency benefits but perhaps at a cost 
of increased risk that was not foreseen through reduced internal capability to control the risk’. 
As described in Section 4.1, the process of participant interview inquiries about UDE causes 
and effects was first to iteratively come to a shared view of organisational structural and 
functional characteristics (shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 respectively). The CRT analyses then 
summarised the results of these inquiries, which had elicited UDE causes and effects aligned 
with organisational characteristics. Figure 4.7 summarises the risks caused by the main 
underlying core risk effect types shown in Table 4.5 mapped onto the functional organisational 
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structure. It shows the movement of risk through the functional levels of the financial 
institutions from operational level risk, through to business strategy risks and corporate 
strategy level risks. 
The operations level of the banking organisation represents the area where risk effects are 
prone to occur. The participants described the operations level as the location of main 
underlying core risk effect type.  From the participant inquiries summarised in the CRT 
analyses, these were classified as limited human resource (HR) capabilities or people-centred 
failures, disruptions caused by substandard external services providers, ineffective design 
policies and regulatory and technology operational failures.  
Also shown in Figure 4.7 are operations level risks, such as operating risk, credit risk, customer 
fairness risk, regulatory risk and compliance risk. The participants agreed that these areas are 
how financial institutions generally understand types of risk. For example, at the operating 
level of the organisation, operating risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes and controls, people and systems or external effects. Operating risk, as well 
as credit, customer fairness, regulatory and compliance risk, arise from the underlying core 
risk effect types.  
The business strategy level risks (see Figure 4.7) are located with the business units located in 
each division (see also Figure 4.1). In the retail division business strategy level, where demand 
operations core effect risks occur, the retail and small business units, digital and direct growth 
units, and asset management and finance units are associated with retail and small business 
disruption, underperforming digital and direct growth, and asset management and finance 
complications risk themes respectively. 
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In the business banking division, where operational supply core risk effects occur, the business 
strategy level market units, balance sheet and liquidity units and product change units are 
associated with the risk themes of improper business advice, credit card failures, declines in 
superannuation, and insurance issues respectively. Risk themes associated with business units 
in the wholesale banking area where product management risk effects occur are market 
declines, inaccurate balance sheets and liquidity, and product change issues. The risk themes 
associated with technology business units are technology failures in customer payments and 
declines in shared services and business management effectiveness. 
The corporate strategy level risks are also shown in Figure 4.7, which shows that financial 
institution strategic objectives and mission, intended to provide medium-to-longer-term 
guidance on the direction of the business as a whole, fails to meet expectations. The risks 
include declines in consumer confidence in retail banking, underperforming small-to-medium 
business banking, declines in wholesale banking and enterprise technology service failures. As 
illustrated in the CRTs, the participants portrayed the movement of risk between the levels and 
across risks within the levels, where different risk features at different parts of the financial 
institution can reciprocally affect other risks and areas at different levels. 
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Figure 4.7 Summary of the identified risks mapped to financial institution functional structure 
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4.3 Summary 
This chapter first provided a participant consensus view of the typical or generalised financial 
institution functions and organisational structure as a template to organise and make sense of 
the risk faced. This generalised financial institution model was described in Section 4.2 and 
provided the conceptual organisation for how the results about risk were depicted and 
institutionally contextualised. 
Section 4.3 presented the finding of inquiries with participants regarding the causes and effects 
of undesired risk effects, progressively through each functional level of the institution and for 
each major structural or divisional function. These inquiries were validated and triangulated 
into detailed representations using the TOC CRT method to comprehensive map what was 
perceived as the current reality of the institutional dynamics of risk. This was undertaken for 
each of the core effect types to present an integrated and holistic view of the complex 
determinism of risk, taking account of the functional and structural characteristics of financial 
institutions identified in Section 4.1 and the nature of risk described in Section 4.3. 
In summary, the CRTs (Figures 4.2–4.6) show that customer-facing operational failures (retail, 
wholesale, products and IT services) have causes related to operational shortcomings, which 
contribute to various business strategy failures, and these, in turn, compound corporate strategy 
shortcomings. The CRTs also show the dynamic risk movement through the institutions and 
illustrate that risk is multidetermined by a complex interacting system of causes. The findings 
show that risk crosses over onto different functional levels, and is transformed as one type of 
risk interacts with another and compounded as it moves through organisational structures and 
functions. In the next chapter, based on the CRT findings, a TOC FRT analysis provides insight 
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into what the participants thought an effective and desired future might look like, and shows 
how financial institution risk may be effectively managed.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS:  
FUTURE STATE ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
The results of the application of the TP FRT analysis method are described in this chapter. 
This presents an aggregate view of what the participants considered an effective and desired 
future, where Australian financial institution risks previously identified in Chapter 4 are 
effectively managed and controlled. The TP FRT method was described in Section 3.3.3. First, 
Section 5.2 describes participant consensus on the nature of the risk treatments or injections 
that they thought would be needed to transform the current risk state and turn it into the 
desirable future state. Second, Section 5.3 describes the findings of the FRT analysis, which 
proposes solutions for Australian financial institutions that seek to transform UDEs into DEs; 
the FRT illustrates the result of the exchanges of the UDEs, previously identified by the TP 
CRT methods described in Chapter 4, with DEs produced by the hypothetical application of 
solutions.  
Chapter 4 described an aggregate view of what the nine participants from three Australian 
financial institutions thought was the nature of the risks in Australian financial institutions. 
This was aligned and informed by the conceptual model of risk core effect types derived from 
the literature. A detailed analysis using the TP CRT method provided what was perceived as 
the current reality of the institutional dynamics of risk for each core effect type, to present an 
integrated view of the entire organisation showing the complex determinism among UDEs, 
portrayed in the context of the functional and structural characteristics of Australian financial 
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institutions. These Chapter 4 results form the basis of the analyses and results in this chapter. 
Utilising the same institutional functional structures (see Figure 4.1) as the CRT findings 
described in Chapter 4, the FRT analysis in this chapter creates a representation of a desired, 
improved future state of Australian financial institutions, where risk is portrayed as more 
effectively managed and controlled by transforming UDEs into DEs.  
In summary, the FRT method answers the TP questions ‘What to change?’ and ‘Change to 
what?’ As described in Section 3.3.3, UDEs previously identified by the CRTs described in 
Chapter 4 are transformed into DEs by treating the causes of UDEs. Next, the solution 
treatments (which do not yet exist but are identified as needed to transform the current state 
into the desirable future state) are described.  
5.2 Risk treatments: injections 
As described in Sections 3.3.3.3 and 3.3.3.4, the FRT method is intended to assist in 
overcoming the challenges facing participants regarding how to identify barriers that preffect 
addressing the cause of a problem. The FRT method seeks to create awareness of solutions to 
a problem by utilising the logic previously developed in the CRT. The FRT is similar to the 
CRT, but the hypothetical solutions or actions with potential to transform an UDE into a DE 
are identified and placed within the tree diagram to illustrate possible future solutions for the 
issue and to describe a desired future state (Balderstone 1999; Dettmer 1997; Hohmann 2015; 
Kim, Mabin & Davies 2008). For example, if excessive operational costs are identified by the 
TP, management may take various steps to reduce costs, which will affect the current reality 
structure and also have future effects. The FRT identifies possible steps to take to eliminate 
the effects caused by the introduction of new processes in the future (Hohmann 2015). Through 
inquiries (Appendix A) undertaken with participants, this FRT method was intended to assist 
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participants to identify barriers that prevent addressing the cause of a problem, and how to 
overcome those barriers. It helps in solving the ‘What if?’ questions that arise when a new 
operation with a remedial purpose is introduced into a system. The FRT portrays the use of 
these new operations, called injections. Injections are actions or something new or done 
differently that have the effect of neutralising the effects of the UDEs and converting them into 
DEs (Balderstone 1999; Dettmer 1997; Hohmann 2015; Kim, Mabin & Davies 2008). In 
summary, the FRT method is intended to show the effect of exchange of the UDEs with DEs 
through the application of injections.  
Before an FRT analysis is undertaken, a list of potential injections to be tested and then 
illustrated in the FRT analysis is first elicited from the participants. As part of the future state 
phase of the research and interview process described in Section 3.5 and inquiry semi-
structured questions shown in Appendix A, the participants were prompted about a desired 
future regarding the treatment of organisational risk related problems. These injections were 
collated into a list by the researcher, with adjustments to terminology to reflect an aggregated 
consensus view, and then reflected back to the participants for validation as part of the research 
steps described in Section 3.5. These were then used as the injections to be mapped as part of 
the FRT methods of inquiry.  
The injections are described over the three levels of major institutional functions (see Figure 
4.1), comprising the operations level (Section 5.2.1), business strategy level (Section 5.2.2) 
and corporate strategy level (Section 5.2.3). Although not mutually exclusive nor independent, 
the purpose of organising the injections according to these functional levels of the financial 
institution was to facilitate the systematic inquiry of the FRT method to ensure an entire 
organisational view. Like the CRT method and approach described in Chapter 4, the 
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information from all three financial institution cases and the nine participants was aggregated 
into a single generic view judged by the participants to be representative of typical or generic 
Australian financial institutions, which comprise banking services as a major part of the 
financial products and services mix offered. The injections were described by the participants 
to reflect a consensus view of the contemporary risk-related practice terminology in use in 
Australian financial institutions among staff who have a predominantly risk-related role. 
5.2.1 Operations level related injections 
5.2.1.1 Operations injection 1: Operations actions 
This injection refers to the implementation of an action plan comprising several potential 
tactical actions intended to transform UDEs and their precursors into DEs and whatever 
prerequisites might be required for the transformation. For example, Participant 3 mentioned 
people-centred capacity and capability related actions to remediate people-related failure 
effects:  
that would include error, lack of training, lack of capability. You know, pandemic–
all of those sort of things– we need enough people, and to build their capacity and 
capability– all those sorts of things related to people skills that causes issues across 
the board. 
Actions in this example could include improvements to recruitment processes, improved 
training and professional development, improved people-related policies and procedures, job 
redesign and work value reviews. The particular UDE and its underlying causes would be 
examined to determine what action would best transform it into a DE. The design of the action 
plan uses multiple sources of input, such as CRT findings and the outputs of the other 
injections. For example, the action plan would be designed by the control centre (Section 
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5.2.1.3) using intelligence gained from operations assessment (Section 5.2.1.2), the risk library 
(Section 5.2.1.6) and the risk register (Section 5.2.1.4), together with information collated, 
synthesised and shared through the operations monitoring and reporting centre (Section 
5.2.1.5). 
5.2.1.2 Operations injection 2: Operations assessment 
This injection includes diagnostic recommendations about operational strategies and responses 
to the current risk. This arises from where risks have been identified, categorised and assessed 
by likelihood of occurrence and possible severity of the impact of the consequence of an 
occurrence. Together, these indicate whether the investment into the response to the risk should 
be mandatory or allowed to be discretionary. For example, a number of participants suggested 
that where an impact involved likely failure to adhere to a regulatory requirement, responses 
should more likely be required to be mandatory. Operations injection 2: operations assessment 
is the injection function where this kind of assessment is undertaken.  
5.2.1.3 Operations injection 3: Operations control centre 
This injection delivers a comprehensive view of the status of risk control across the operations 
of the financial institution and designs the action responses to reduce risk. Using combined 
intelligence from multiple sources including the information outputs of the other information 
collection, classification and repository related injections, it facilitates a full understanding of 
risk, including the design and implementation planning for operations injection 1: operations 
actions. It enables adaptive prioritisation of risk control tactical actions. For example, if an 
injection element does not work as intended, the control centre provides a clear indication of 
whether the process or control is effective or not, and what further remedial action is required. 
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5.2.1.4 Operations injection 4: Operations risk register 
The operations risk register injection is a sortable list that identifies risks, which are then 
classified and catalogued according to a fit-for-organisational purpose taxonomy of common 
risk types and domains. It also contains resources to help institution risk practitioners conduct 
a qualitative risk assessment of the items listed in the register. It is intended to support a 
strategic and holistic appreciation of risk and to inform risk assessment and tactical remedial 
action design and implementation planning. 
5.2.1.5 Operations injection 5: Operations monitoring and reporting centre 
The operations monitoring and reporting centre helps to assess and monitor risk in frontline 
customer-facing operations. It identifies new risks and the planning for them, keeps track of 
existing known risks to check if a reassessment is necessary, notes if any risk conditions have 
been triggered, and monitors risks that could become more critical over time. It also tracks 
remaining risks that may require a longer-term, planned, and managed approach with risk 
action plans, and reclassifies risk based on new or updated information. For example, this 
includes risks that are ongoing and cannot be closed, where ongoing criticality needs to be 
monitored. The operations monitoring and reporting centre monitors the effects of the 
implementation of an action plan over time. This enables the action plan or other injection 
effectiveness to be assessed and determines whether it should be re-examined. 
5.2.1.6 Operations injection 6: Operations risk library 
The operations risk library is used to save and record information on operations level risks. It 
summarises and defines, in a common repository, risks to which the financial institution is 
exposed. The library helps to facilitate discussions of risks and their definitions, and promotes 
both consistency and a culture of risk awareness. It is a resource that stores information about 
various processes, sub-processes, operational risk effects and control types across the 
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institution’s businesses. For example, it is the repository for the processes of risk assessment 
and measurement, risk effect definition and information about the links of business unit results 
to institutional performance. The library repository enables more effective risk management 
and improvement by keeping records and information about defining and identifying the types 
of risks and various risk effects, defining and identifying specific controls, assessing and rating 
the controls, and supporting other monitoring and risk reporting and documentation needs. It 
is the institution’s durable ‘organisational memory’, which facilitates retention and 
development of risk management capability. Next, five injections operating at the business 
strategy functional level of Australian financial institutions are described. 
5.2.2 Business strategy level injections 
5.2.2.1 Business strategy injection 1: Business risk library 
The business risk library records all business strategy level risk related information. It has the 
same functions as operations injection 6: operations risk library described in Section 5.2.1.6 
but the repository content includes risk information concerning the business strategy level of 
the organisation. 
5.2.2.2 Business strategy injection 2: Business actions 
Similar to operations injection 1: operations actions regarding control actions described in 
Section 5.2.1.1, this injection refers to the design and implementation of an action plan 
comprising potential tactical actions needed to transform UDEs located at the business strategy 
level and their precursors into DEs. 
5.2.2.3 Business strategy injection 3: Business assessment 
Similar to operations injection 2: operations assessment described in Section 5.2.1.2, but with 
a focus on business strategy level functions, this injection includes recommendations about 
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business strategies and responses to the current risk, based on risks having been identified, 
categorised and assessed by likelihood of occurrence and possible consequence of an 
occurrence. Together, these indicate whether the response to the risk should be mandatory. 
5.2.2.4 Business strategy injection 4: Business control centre 
Similar in nature to operations injection 3: operations control centre (Section 5.2.1.3), and 
operating in conjunction with it, this injection delivers a comprehensive view of the status of 
risk control across the business strategy level functions of the financial institution.  
5.2.2.5 Business strategy injection 5: Business monitoring and reporting centre 
Working in conjunction with operations injection 5: operations monitoring and reporting 
centre described in Section 5.2.1.5, the business monitoring and reporting centre helps assess 
and monitor risk behaviour in the decision-making levels of the divisions of the business. It 
helps to assess and monitor risk behaviour regarding business strategy. It identifies new risks 
and the planning for them, keeps track of existing risks to check if reassessment is necessary, 
monitors risk conditions that may have been triggered, and monitors risks that could become 
more critical over time. It also tracks remaining risks that may require a longer-term, planned, 
and managed approach via risk action plans, and reclassifies risk based on new or updated 
information. 
Finally, three proposed injections at the corporate strategy functional level of each of the four 
core risk effects areas in financial institutions are described. 
5.2.3 Corporate strategy level injections 
5.2.3.1 Corporate strategy injection 1: Risk appetite 
This injection comprises modification of the amount and type of risk for which the financial 
institution is prepared to pursue reduction or to retain. Risk appetite influences the core risk 
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effects and the organisational system of interacting causal dynamics illustrated in the CRTs. 
This injection indicates the risk policy settings at the corporate level at which the business can 
accept or reject a course of action, and whether the related decisions facilitate or inhibit the 
attainment of organisational objectives and mission. To illustrate, Participant 8 observed that: 
The way I see it, the common denominator across credit risk, operational risk, all 
these types of risk, is the risk management framework that sits in its own bubble 
and that drives issue management, change management, obligation adherence, 
compliance adherence, operational risk business environment, definition, and how 
I said what the most important thing is would be risk appetite settings at the very 
top. That appetite framework drives all this interaction and provides input into 
process improvement after the fact. 
5.2.3.2 Corporate strategy injection 2: Cultural adaptation 
This injection concerns corporate-led implementation strategies to improve relationships with 
supply chain business partners and both business and consumers through enhanced 
intercultural awareness and adapting to both global and multicultural contexts. It also refers to 
complementary internal-facing strategies that improve cooperative and supportive 
relationships among business units and functional levels of the financial institution to both 
improve organisational climate and promote proactive management and prevention of risk. 
The importance of creating a cultural context was emphasised by Participant 7 who observed 
that: 
If you're getting the full value chain, working together, owning responsibility. That 
comes down to your cultural adaption, so you've got to make sure that culturally 
that is seen as the preferred direction. 
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5.2.3.3 Corporate strategy injection 3: Collaboration centre 
This injection concerns the creation of the mechanisms that facilitate cross-area cooperation, 
information exchange, organisational values and the establishment of a corporate culture of 
shared responsibility for the mitigation of risk. It comprises approaches that enable cross-
functional engagement and creates the conditions that reduce the UDEs of business unit 
structures that operate independently and in an isolated way, where the failure to effectively 
collaborate leads to decisions and conditions that promote risk. Participant 4 noted the need 
for organised effort for risk reduction collaboration in large financial institutions: 
And then cross divisional collaboration. It’s very difficult. I don't think any 
company has got that down pat. It's too difficult … To get uniformity, whether it's 
in processes, whether it's in procedures, whether it's in reporting, is very difficult 
and takes a deliberate and planned effort.  
The next section illustrates how the injections described above are intended to transform UDEs 
to DEs. The FRTs illustrate the future state that an organisation desires to achieve arising from 
the proposed implementation of the injections in each core risk domain areas and for each of 
the three functional levels of financial institutions (operations, business strategy and corporate 
strategy). 
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5.3 Future reality tree analysis 
Whereas the CRT method identified the root cause of the problem from the UDEs, the FRT 
method portrays the effect of using injections. Described in Section 5.2, injections are actions 
or something new or done differently that have the effect of neutralising the effects of the 
UDEs and converting them into DEs. The FRT illustrates the exchange of UDEs with DEs 
through the application and effects of injections. FRTs are constructed in this section to test 
the eﬀects of the proposed injections located in each of the three functional levels of financial 
institutions (operations, business strategy and corporate strategy). The FRT is constructed from 
the CRT for each core risk domain area described in Chapter 4. 
Whereas the CRTs in the previous chapter explained and mapped the causes of risks or 
obstacles in financial institutions, each FRT ‘injects’ various remediation elements to illustrate 
the logic of how they mitigate the problematic impact of the different risks. Participant 
observations in response to inquiry questions (see Appendix A) about the application of 
injections to transform undesired risk effects occurring at each functional level of the 
organisation into DEs were determined and validated with the participants.  
In summary, the FRT illustrates the logic of how injections are used to neutralise the effects 
of UDEs and convert them into DEs. For example, poor service provided by people-centred 
services or the HR department can be changed via better remuneration, job training and good 
supervision to create the desired effect of high-quality service provision. Four FRTs are 
presented, one for each of the four core risk domain areas also used for the CRTs in Chapter 4 
where the core UDE is transformed into a desirable effect. The domain areas are demand in 
retail banking (Figure 5.1), supply in business banking (Figure 5.2), product management 
(Figure 5.3) and IT (Figure 5.4). 
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5.3.1 Future reality tree for demand in retail banking 
This section describes the findings from inquiries with participants about how the UDE of 
retail banking failing to meet customer needs, described in Section 4.3.1 and illustrated in 
Figure 4.2, is transformed into a desired future state where customer needs are met. Participant 
observations in response to inquiry questions (see Appendix A) on the application of injections 
to transform undesired risk effects occurring at the operational functional level of the 
organisation into DEs were aggregated into the FRT and validated with the participants. These 
aggregated findings of the inquiry process are illustrated in Figure 5.1, which shows the 
expected effects on Australian financial institution retail banking when the injections described 
in Section 5.2 are implemented to eliminate or mitigate the undesired risk effect of retail 
banking failing to meet customer needs (Section 4.3.1). 
Operations injection 1: operations actions (see Section 5.2.1.1) comprises a range of 
operational level tactical actions in the retail banking area strategically applied to a variety of 
operational elements to maximise impact and reduce risk vulnerability. These are applied to 
increase the effectiveness of staff induction and training (1.3), which, in turn, improves retail 
capacity to meet needs (1.5), continued professional development (1.14) and improved 
recruitment (1.11). Improved recruitment (1.11) also increases the capacity and capability of 
HR functions (1.8). As a consequence of improved retail capacity to meet needs (1.5), policy 
and procedures (1.15) to guide people-centred operations is improved. Resulting also from 
the effect of injection 1: operations actions, less pressure on retail staff (1.4) contributes to 
more effective HR policy and procedures (1.15). The indirect effects of injection 1: 
operations actions, which resulted in improvements in retail capacity and support (1.5), went 
on to also increase the capacity and capability of HR or people-centred functions (1.8), and to 
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contribute to more effective business monitoring and evaluation (1.12). Participant 2 
highlighted people-centred improvement: 
Capacity and capability are what comes to mind. Where you've got here–branch 
staff capability–it's part of that and I do see it coming from supply issues. We're 
also talking about capacity? Across our point of view, I see those are the main 
drivers for HR issues. From a capability and a capacity. You need to manage 
those two things in HR. 
Injection 1: operations actions also improve phone banking services provision (1.7) and 
hardware and software practices (1.1), which, in turn, improves electronic services including 
further improvement in phone banking (1.7), online banking uptake (1.2), EFT functions 
(1.10), as well as improved compliance (1.13) and better business monitoring and evaluation 
(1.12). Electronic services improvements result in more customers using online services (1.2) 
and branch customers are more satisfied (1.9).  
All of these improvements either directly or indirectly resulting from injection 1: operations 
actions were designed, supported and made more effective through the combined effects of 
the complementary injections comprising injection 2: operations assessment (Section 5.2.1.2), 
injection 4: operations risk register (Section 5.2.1.4) and injection 6: operations risk library 
(Section 5.2.1.6), where an effective injection 3: operations control centre (Section 5.2.1.3) 
provided implementation guidance and coordination of the changes. 
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Figure 5.1 Future reality tree for demand in retail banking 
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Overall, injection 5: operations monitoring and reporting centre (Section 5.2.1.5) provided 
overall monitoring of risk behaviour in frontline operations to feedback intelligence to the 
other injection functions to adapt to changes where needed to continue to mitigate risks and 
obtain the DEs. For example, Participant 5 suggested that ‘to avert risk effects in retail you 
need to have the control capacity in place to identify and respond before it occurs to prevent 
it’. 
Figure 5.1 also shows business strategy injection 2: business actions applied to the business 
strategy level of demand in retail banking. Together with improvements arising from the 
operations level injections, including changes in various people-centred or HR functions (1.14, 
1.15) and other operations level improvements (1.1, 1.11, 1.12, 1.13), as well as information 
from the other operations injections including operations injection 6: operations risk library 
and operations injection 5: operations monitoring and reporting centre, business strategy 
injection 2: business actions included tactical actions that together improved responses to 
innovation (2.5), performance of digital and direct growth of retail (2.6), better managed credit 
risks (2.7) and contributed to financial market performance (2.8), and contributed to increases 
in customer service levels and quality (2.12). Business strategy injection 4: business control 
centre also contributed to better managed credit risks (2.7) through tighter risk controls. 
The improved operational level influences (1.12, 1.13, 1.14, 1.15), together with the influence 
of business strategy injection 3: business assessment, contribute to the improved quality of 
staff advice (2.2), which, in turn, improves consumer business confidence (2.11), increases 
investment and corporate performance for debt and equity (2.3), and improves management of 
high credit risk (2.7). The effect of the business handling credit operations well (2.1), which 
was improved by operational level improvements such as regulatory compliance adherence 
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(1.13), contributes to growth in the retail division (2.6) and improved credit performance (2.4), 
which, in turn, together with business strategy injection 2: business actions, stimulates 
innovation in retail and small business (2.5) and contributes to improved retail growth (2.6). 
Risk arising from the complexity of legacy systems, which was controlled through operational 
level policy and procedures (1.15) and improvements in the effectiveness of business 
monitoring (1.12), leads to increased confidence in consumer business performance (2.11) and 
contributes to a well-performing financial market (2.8). Improved consumer business 
performance (2.11), together with increased customer service satisfaction (2.9), combined with 
the effect of business strategy injection 2: business actions, lead to increases in customer 
service level quality (2.12). 
At the business strategy level overall, business strategy injection 5: business monitoring and 
reporting centre, supported by intelligence stored and accessed from business strategy 
injection 1: business risk library, provided overall monitoring of risk behaviour in business 
units strategies and their effectiveness. This is intended to feedback intelligence to inform the 
other injection functions and to adapt to changes where needed to continue to mitigate risks 
and obtain the DEs. Participant 5 noted:  
The need for a consolidated view where for each performance unit, it does have an 
effective control environment in place to mitigate the risks. You need to have a 
reporting and collaboration centre between the business and the corporate level of 
the organisation. 
The corporate strategy level injections of risk appetite modification (corporate strategy 
injection 1: risk appetite) and cultural adaption improvement (corporate strategy injection 2: 
cultural adaptation) both led to higher consumer business performance (3.0), contributed to 
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meeting shareholder performance targets (3.1) and better wholesale portfolio outcomes (3.2), 
and improved enterprise technology (3.3). Improvement in these were also helped by business 
strategy level effects through retail and small business improvements (2.5), retail growth (2.6), 
and better management of credit risks (2.7), as well as improved financial market performance 
(2.8) and better customer service levels and quality (2.12). Improvement in cross-area 
cooperation, information exchange, organisational values and the establishment of a corporate 
culture of shared responsibility for the mitigation of risk through the efforts of the collaboration 
centre (corporate strategy injection 3: collaboration centre) also contributed to the creation of 
the DEs. Together, better understanding of shareholder expectations and consumer needs when 
engaging both business strategy and operations provides clear direction and quick response to 
risks provided through the combined effects of the injections.  
In summary, this section showed the effect of injections applied at three functional levels of 
the financial institutions in the retail banking domain, which had UDEs contributing to the 
UDE of failing to meet customer needs. In Chapter 4, the most influential types of core risk 
types found to contribute to this failure were people-centred failures in the retail platform, 
external service provider disruptions, retail policies and regulatory limitations, and retail 
technology hub failures. The demand in retail banking FRT (see Figure 5.1) showed how a 
range of injections (Section 5.2) transformed these contributing UDEs into DEs, with the 
combined effect of retail banking meeting customer needs. The FRT findings showed that the 
effects of the injections were a result of their combined effects at multiple leverage points 
across the institution corresponding to each of the main core risk areas and at each functional 
level. Further, in addition to the direct effects of the injections, the DEs created a flow-on 
improvement influence on other effects, and when combined with injection effects, also co-
contributed to other UDEs’ transformation into DEs. 
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5.3.2 Future reality tree for supply in business banking 
This section describes the findings from inquiries with participants about how the UDE of 
business banking (business-to-business banking including wholesale banking services) failing 
to meet business-to-business targets, which was described in Section 4.3.2 and illustrated in 
Figure 4.3, is transformed into a desired future state where the targets are met. Participant 
observations in response to inquiry questions (see Appendix A) about the expected effects of 
the application of injections to transform undesired risk effects occurring at the business 
strategy functional level of the financial institutions into DEs were aggregated and validated 
with the participants. The findings of this inquiry process are illustrated in Figure 5.2, which 
shows the expected effects on Australian financial institution business banking when the 
injections described in Section 5.2 are implemented to eliminate or mitigate the UDE of 
business banking failing to meet business targets (Section 4.3.2). 
The expected effects on the financial institution operations level are shown in Figure 5.2, where 
the six operations level injections described in Section 5.1 are implemented to eliminate or 
mitigate expected risks arising from the failure of business banking to meet business targets 
(1.0). Operations injection 1: operations actions comprises a range of tactical actions 
strategically applied to a variety of operational elements to reduce risk vulnerability by 
transforming UDEs into DEs. The effects of operations injection 1: operations actions 
included more effective policy and governance (1.10), resources provided to meet business-
to-business needs (1.5), staff meeting business-to-business needs (1.7) and improved 
recruitment processes (1.13). 
These desired effects, in turn, led to improved HR capability to support the business (1.9) and 
to more effective professional development and training (1.17) and improved people-centred 
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policies and procedures (1.18). Also, through improved recruitment (1.13) and improved 
technology operations (hardware and software) capability (1.2), there was improved internet 
and phone services (1.1, 1.3), with flow on to business monitoring and evaluation (1.15) 
improvements. These improvements were designed, supported and made more effective 
through the combined effects of the complementary injections comprising operations injection 
2: operations assessment, operations injection 4: operations risk register and operations 
injection 6: operations risk library, where operations injection 3: operations control centre 
provided guidance and coordination for the changes. 
Overall, operations injection 5: operations monitoring and reporting centre provided 
oversight monitoring of risk of business-to-business operations to feedback intelligence to the 
other injection functions to adapt to changes where needed to continue to mitigate risks and to 
obtain the DEs. 
Figure 5.2 also shows the effects of business strategy level injections applied to business 
banking. Together with improvement arising from operations level people-centred 
improvements (1.13, 1.17, 1.18) and other operational level improvements (1.15, 1.16), these 
led to improved credit performance (2.2), which then led to improved innovations in small 
business (2.3) and better handling of credits operations (2.0) and better business advice from 
staff (2.1).  
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Figure 5.2 Future reality tree for supply in business banking 
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As well as information gained from the other operations level injections (recorded in business 
strategy injection 1: business risk library), business strategy injection 3: business assessment 
informed the tactical actions (business strategy injection 2: business actions) that together 
improved innovation (2.3), performance of digital and direct growth of retail (2.4), and better 
managed credit risks (2.6) and contributed to financial market performance (2.7). Also 
improved by better business advice (2.1), improved management of asset–liability risks (2.8) 
contributed to improved financial market performance (2.7). The improved operational 
influences (1.12, 1.15, 1.18), combined with the effects of the business injections and the 
improved quality of staff advice (2.1), improved the ability to control the complexity of 
interfaces with legacy systems (2.10), leading to other technology improvements (2.11) with 
increases in customer service levels and quality (2.12) and satisfaction (2.9). Overall, business 
strategy injection 5: business monitoring and reporting centre provided overall monitoring of 
risk behaviour in business units strategies to feedback intelligence to the other injection 
functions. This allowed responsive adaption to changes where needed to continue to mitigate 
risks and obtain the DEs. For example, Participant 3 reported: 
Effective collaboration and monitoring are critical elements in the central role of 
the interface between the corporate side of the business and can have real impacts 
on operational risks. Risk mitigation action that is well coordinated, mutually 
informing and communicated can have a positive effect on things like training, 
recruitment, customer service levels and innovation. You really need a strongly 
connected and aligned supporting context that is cross-functional ... 
The corporate injections of risk appetite modification (corporate strategy injection 1: risk 
appetite) and cultural adaption improvement (corporate strategy injection 2: cultural 
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adaptation) both led to higher consumer business performance (3.0), and contributed to 
meeting shareholder performance targets (3.1), better wholesale portfolio outcomes (3.2) and 
improved enterprise technology (3.3). Improvement in these were also helped by, and, in turn, 
influenced, business and operations effects.  
Improvement in organisational culture through the establishment of a corporate culture of 
shared responsibility for the mitigation of risk through the efforts of the collaboration centre 
(corporate strategy injection 3: collaboration centre) also contributed to the creation of the 
DEs. Together, better understanding of shareholder expectations and large business consumer 
needs can have a significant impact on a financial institution’s productivity; however, adaptive 
rebalancing of business financial risk appetite also contributes to productivity and improved 
collaboration helps avoid both expected and unexpected risks. 
In summary, this section showed the effect of injections applied at three functional levels of 
the financial institutions in the supply in business banking domain, which had UDEs 
contributing to the UDE of failing to meet business-to-business targets. In Chapter 4, the most 
common types of core risks found to contribute to this failure of supply in business banking 
were people-centred failures in business operations, external service provider disruptions, 
policies and regulatory limitations, and technology hub failures. The demand in business 
banking FRT (Figure 5.2) showed how a range of injections (Section 5.1) transformed these 
contributing UDEs into DEs, with the combined effect of business banking meeting business-
to-business targets. The FRT findings showed that the effects of the injections were a result of 
their combined effects at multiple leverage points across the institution, corresponding to each 
of the main core risk areas and each functional level. Further, in addition to the direct effects 
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of the injections, the DEs created flow-on improvement influences on other effects, and when 
combined with injections effects, co-contributed to other UDEs’ transformation into DEs. 
5.3.3 Future reality tree for product management 
This section describes the findings from inquiries with participants about how the UDE of 
product management failures, described in Section 4.3.3 and illustrated in Figure 4.4, could be 
transformed into a desired future state where product management is successful. Participant 
observations in response to inquiry questions (see Appendix A) about the expected effects of 
the application of injections to transform undesired risk effects occurring at each functional 
level of the financial institutions into DEs were aggregated and validated with the participants. 
The findings of this inquiry process are illustrated in Figure 5.3, which shows the expected 
effects on Australian financial institution product management when the injections described 
in Section 5.2 are implemented to eliminate or mitigate the UDE of product management 
failure (Section 4.3.3). 
The operations injection 1: operations actions to transform UDEs contributing to product 
management failures into DEs is guided through the establishment of an operations injection 
3: operations control centre that provides coordination to reduce risk vulnerability. That led 
to improved people-centred capacity and capability to support the business (1.15), leading to 
more effective policy and governance (1.14), professional development (1.13), and contributed 
to more effective business monitoring (1.11). These injections also led to more controlled 
product resources (1.10), which better fulfilled audit and regulatory requirements (1.12) and 
contributed to professional development improvement (1.13).  
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Figure 5.3 Future reality tree for product management 
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Also, through improved recruitment (1.17) and improved technology services and operations 
capability and functions (1.1, 1.2, 1.6, 1.17, 1.18, 1.19), there was improved internet and phone 
services (1.4, 1.5), and with technology improvements, better business monitoring and 
evaluation (1.15). All of these improvements were informed by risk information, supported 
and made more effective through the complementary injections, comprising operations 
injection 2: operations assessment, operations injection 4: operations risk register and 
operations injection 6: operations risk library, which provided intelligence to the operations 
injection 3: operations control centre, enabling coordination of the transformations by the 
operations injection 1: operations actions. Also, as product management became more 
successful, customers coming into branches were more satisfied (1.9). Overall, the operations 
injection 5: operations monitoring and reporting centre provided overall monitoring of risk 
behaviour regarding product management related operations to feedback intelligence to the 
other injection functions to adapt to changes where needed to continue to mitigate risks and 
obtain the DEs. 
Figure 5.3 also shows the business strategy injections (Section 5.2.2) applied to the business 
strategy level of product management functions to produce key improvements in strategic 
business unit risk contributing to product management failures. Together with improvements 
arising from operations level changes in various people-centred functions (1.13, 1.14) and 
other operational improvements, as well as risk information collated from the operations level 
through the operations injection 5: operations monitoring and reporting centre and informing 
business strategy injection 3: business assessment, business strategy injection 2: business 
actions included tactical actions that together led to improved responses to innovation (2.7) 
and performance of digital and direct growth of retail (2.8), through better managed credit risks 
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(2.6). With positive influence from operational level improvements (1.11, 1.12, 1.13, 1.14), 
better business advice from staff (2.1) and better handling of credit operations (2.0) also 
contributed to reduced credit risk (2.9) and led to retail growth (2.8) respectively. Together 
with other influences (1.11, 1.14, 1.16) and business strategy injection 3: business assessment, 
better advice (2.1) also led to more accurate balance sheets (2.2) and improved enterprise 
development (2.5). 
In turn, more accurate balance sheets (2.2) and more effective management of legacy systems 
management contributed to improved financial market performance (2.10). The improved 
operational influences, together with business strategy injection 3: business assessment, 
business strategy injection 1: business risk library and business strategy injection 4: business 
control centre, also improved the quality of staff advice (2.1), and the ability to control the 
complexity of interfaces with legacy systems (2.4), leading to other technology improvements 
(2.5) with increases in customer service levels (2.11). Overall, the business strategy injection 
5: business monitoring and reporting centre provided overall monitoring of risk behaviour 
regarding business units’ strategies to feedback intelligence to the other injection functions to 
adapt to changes where needed to continue to mitigate risks and obtain the DE of success in 
product management. 
Together with business strategy level improvements (2.7, 2.8), the corporate strategy level 
injections corporate strategy injection 1: risk appetite modification and corporate strategy 
injection 2: cultural adaptation improvement both led to higher consumer business 
performance (3.0), and contributed to meeting shareholder performance targets (3.1), better 
wholesale portfolio outcomes (3.2) and improved enterprise technology (3.3). Improvement in 
these were also both helped by, and, in turn, influenced, business and operations effects. 
 187 
 
Participant 2 noted that ‘it's important that communication and messaging comes from the top. 
Communications and messages, some of the policies and messages that get rolled out has to 
come from the top and then that disseminates across the organisation’. 
Improvement in organisational culture through the establishment of a corporate culture of 
shared responsibility for the mitigation of risk through the efforts of the corporate strategy 
injection 3: collaboration centre also contributed to the creation of the DEs. Together, better 
understanding of shareholder expectations and business consumer and wholesale needs can 
have a significant impact on a financial institution’s productivity. However, rebalancing 
business financial risk appetite also helps, and improved collaboration helps avoid expected 
risks in product management as well as other core risk effect types. For example, Participant 
1 stated: 
The effective implementation of corporate risk appetite driven control over product 
risk is often blocked or reduced by a silo mentality of individual areas. They go 
about their business somewhat disconnected from controls whose intention is to 
monitor and moderate risks, but these intentions often don’t bear fruit because of 
the disconnects, and can cause issues I’ve seen with swapping exchange rates for 
example. 
In summary, this section showed the effect of injections applied at three functional levels 
of the financial institutions in the product management domain, which had UDEs 
contributing to the UDE of product management failure. In Chapter 4, the most common 
types of core risks found to contribute were product and market-centred failures, product 
and external service provider disruptions, product and market policy and regulatory 
limitations, and product and market technology hub failures. The product management 
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FRT (Figure 5.3) showed how a range of injections (Section 5.2) transformed these 
contributing UDEs into DEs, with the combined effect of product management success. 
The FRT findings showed that the effects of the injections were a result of their combined 
effects at multiple leverage points across the institution, corresponding to each of the main 
core risk areas and each functional level. Further, in addition to the direct effects of the 
injections, the DEs created a flow-on improvement influence on other effects, and when 
combined with injection effects, co-contributed to other UDEs’ transformation into DEs. 
5.3.4 Future reality tree for information technology 
This section describes the findings from inquiries with participants about how the UDE of IT 
issues disrupting the business of the financial institution, described in Section 4.3.4 and 
illustrated in Figure 4.5, could be transformed into a desired future state where IT effectively 
supports the business. Participant observations in response to inquiry questions (see Appendix 
A) about the expected effects of the application of injections to transform undesired risk effects 
occurring at each functional level of the financial institutions into DEs were aggregated and 
validated with the participants. The findings of this inquiry process are illustrated in Figure 
5.4, which shows the expected effects on Australian financial institutions when the injections 
described in Section 5.2 are implemented to eliminate or mitigate the undesired effect where 
IT disrupts the business (Section 4.3.4). 
The application of operations injection 1: operations actions to undesired IT failure related 
effects is guided through the establishment of an operations injection 3: operations control 
centre and informed by operations injection 2: operations assessment to provide intelligence, 
guidance and coordination to reduce risk vulnerability by transforming UDEs into DEs. With 
improved management of hardware and software issues (1.1), ATMs better meet customer 
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demand (1.8), electronic funds processing is more effective (1.7), and phone (1.4) and online 
banking (1.2) services are improved, leading to more effective customer transactions (1.19), 
more satisfied customers (1.6) and improved uptake of online services (1.3). Improved 
technical systems (1.1) improve business monitoring support (1.16), and people-centred 
capacity and capability is improved through access to better and more reliable internal systems 
(1.14). Better systems (1.1) also assist in fulfilling compliance requirements (1.17).  
In addition, as a result of operations injection 1: operations actions, the capacity and capability 
of people-centred functions is further improved, with flow-on benefits to improved 
professional development (1.18) and, with other DEs (1.1, 1.13), more effective business 
monitoring (1.16). More effective HR policy and governance (1.18) and professional 
development (1.17) from improved people-centred capability (1.18) leads to improved 
recruitment (1.10) and improved technology operations capability and functions (1.1). All of 
these improvements were designed, supported and made more effective through the 
complementary injections comprising the operations injection 4: operations risk register and 
operations injection 6: operations risk library, where an effective operations injection 3: 
operations control centre provides guidance and coordination for the changes. As technologies 
become more reliable in meeting needs, and together, improve customer satisfaction (1.9), 
applications use (1.9) and other technical services improve (1.7), with less error (1.5). Overall, 
the operations injection 5: operations monitoring and reporting centre provided overall 
monitoring of risk behaviour regarding frontline operations to feedback intelligence to the 
other injection functions to adapt to changes where needed to continue to mitigate risks and 
obtain the DEs. 
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Figure 5.4 Future reality tree for information technology 
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Figure 5.4 also shows the injections applied to the business strategy level of the financial 
institution to produce improvements in strategic business unit risk contributing to minimising 
IT disruptions. Improvements in business strategy level functions arise from operations level 
improvement changes (1.16, 1.17) that mean that credit card operations were well handled 
(2.0), and improvements (1.16, 1.17, 1.18) leading to improved business advice from staff 
(2.1). When these (2.0, 2.1) are combined with the business strategy level injections, including 
business strategy injection 2: business actions and business strategy injection 3: business 
assessment, these together increased investment and corporate performance for debt and equity 
(2.5), improved insurance and superannuation use of digital technology (2.6), responses to the 
performance of digital and direct growth of retail (2.7), and better managed credit risks (2.8) 
and contributed to financial market performance (2.9).  
The improved operational level influences (1.8, 1.12, 1.15, 1.16), together with improved 
quality of staff advice (2.1), improved the ability to control the complexity of interfaces with 
legacy systems (2.3), leading to other technology improvements (2.4) with increases in 
customer service levels (2.10). Increases in customer service levels (2.10) were also improved 
by operations level improvements (1.2, 1.4, 1.7, 1.19). Overall, the business strategy injection 
5: business monitoring and reporting centre provided overall monitoring of risk behaviour 
regarding business units’ strategies to feedback intelligence to the other injection functions to 
adapt to changes where needed to continue to mitigate risks and obtain the DEs. 
The corporate injections of corporate strategy injection 1: risk appetite modification and 
corporate strategy injection 2: cultural adaptation improvement led to higher consumer 
business performance (3.0) and contributed to meeting shareholder performance targets (3.1), 
better wholesale portfolio outcomes (3.2) and improved enterprise technology (3.3). 
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Improvement in these were also both helped by, and, in turn, influenced by both business 
strategy level and operations level effects. Improvement in organisational culture through the 
establishment of a corporate culture of shared responsibility for the mitigation of risk through 
the efforts of the corporate strategy injection 3: collaboration centre also contributed to the 
creation of DEs related to technology services supporting the financial institution in the 
achievement of strategic objectives. Participant 7 provided this perspective on both corporate 
leadership and external service providers regarding the nature of risk in the delivery of 
enterprise technology services: 
More leadership around reinforcing a view of IT external service providers, 
internal business needs and IT system integration should be more driven by 
delivering information that supports business decision-making rather than an 
unbalanced focus on isolated technical risks. You know, having a connected risk 
control soft-infrastructure in place is necessary to mitigate risk in the hard 
enterprise infrastructure. 
In summary, this section showed the effect of injections applied at three functional levels of 
the financial institutions in the IT domain, which had UDEs contributing to the UDE of IT 
business disruptions. In Chapter 4, the most common types of core risks found to contribute 
were IT systems people-centred failures, external service provider disruptions, policy and 
regulatory compliance limitations, and technology hub failures. The IT FRT (Figure 5.4) 
showed how a range of injections (Section 5.2) transformed these contributing UDEs into DEs, 
with the combined effect of IT effectively supporting the business. The FRT findings showed 
that the effects of the injections were a result of their combined effects at multiple leverage 
points across the institution corresponding to each of the main core risk areas and each 
 193 
 
functional level. Further, in addition to the direct effects of the injections, the DEs created 
flow-on improvement influence on other effects, and when combined with injection effects, 
co-contributed to other UDEs’ transformation into DEs. 
5.3.5 Overall institutional perspective of injections 
In Section 4.3.5, a whole-of-organisation perspective summarising the findings on the causes 
and effects of UDEs was provided. Figure 4.7 provided a summary of the Chapter 4 current 
state CRT findings mapped to a generic financial institution structure. Similarly, Figure 5.5 
provided a whole-of-financial-institution view of the findings of the FRT method regarding 
the application of injections where the current state (shown by the CRTs in Sections 4.3.1–
4.3.5) is transformed into a desired future state (the FRTs described in Sections 5.3.1–5.3.4). 
Figure 5.5 shows the injections (Section 5.2) and how they are located and organised, taking 
into account both the functional and structural characteristics of the organisation, as described 
in Chapter 4. To summarise, Figure 5.5 illustrates the results of the FRT findings, mapped to 
the same organisational structure as the CRT findings illustrated by Figure 4.7, where the latter 
is transformed into the former through the effects of the injections. 
In Figure 4.7, the underlying core risks effect types are shown as being the foundation for 
operational level risks, moving up to create business strategy level risks, before manifesting as 
corporate strategy level risks. In Figure 5.5, these core risk effect types (shown in Table 4.5 
and described in Section 4.3.5) are also shown, and include people-centred failures, external 
service provider disruptions, policy and regulatory compliance limitations, and technology hub 
failures. In Figure 5.5, the injections that control these core UDE risks are shown at each 
functional level of the financial institution (operations, business strategy and corporate 
strategy).  
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Also shown are each major divisional structure associated core effects, comprising demand in 
retail, supply in business banking, product management and IT. At the business strategy level, 
the UDEs or risks associated with the divisional business units are shown, together with the 
major strategic objectives associated with each division at the corporate strategy level. Aligned 
with each of these institutional functional and structural characteristics, Figure 5.5 shows the 
organisational location of the injections described in the Section 5.2 and whose effects were 
illustrated in Figures 5.1–5.4.  
At the operations level, the injections operations actions (Section 5.2.1.1), operations 
assessment (Section 5.2.1.2), operations control centre (Section 5.2.1.3), operations risk 
register (Section 5.2.1.4), operations monitoring and reporting centre (Section 5.2.1.5), and 
operations risk library (Section 5.2.1.6) are shown. Aligned with each of the core risk effect 
types, the operations risk library is the risk intelligence repository for risk controls, operations 
assessment and operations risk register for each of the core risk effect types, comprising 
people-centre failures, external service providers disruption, policy and regulatory limitations, 
and technology hub failures. The operations monitoring and reporting centre for the 
operations level provides control and oversight for the design and operation of risk solution 
operations actions, and determines whether actions require mandatory (as opposed to 
discretionary) implementation, in line with a risk assessment of risk severity and likelihood. It 
also monitors and evaluates all these operational risk features to ensure appropriate adaption 
and modification of actions and assessment to ensure ongoing effective risk mitigation. 
At the business strategy level, Figure 5.5 shows the divisionally arranged business units’ DEs. 
These DEs are established and maintained by the application of the business strategy level 
injections, comprising the business risk library (Section 5.2.2.1), business actions (Section 
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5.2.2.2), business assessment (Section 5.2.2.3), business control centre (Section 5.2.2.4) and 
business monitoring and reporting centre (Section 5.2.2.5). This is where the monitoring and 
reporting centre, with business risk library support, implements business level contributions to 
maintaining appropriate risk appetite-related business unit behaviour. Appropriate risk 
mitigation actions are designed and operated across the business unit related risks (UDEs), and 
together, business risk assessment and control centre functions determine the effectiveness of 
the controls and make adaptive modifications where required.  
At the corporate strategy level, Figure 5.5 shows the strategic injections (comprising risk 
appetite appropriateness (Section 5.2.3.1), cultural adaptation (Section 5.2.3.2) and the cross-
divisional collaboration centre (Section 5.2.3.3)) providing risk mitigation direction to the 
major strategic objective domains, comprising consumer business growth, corporate, small and 
medium business growth, wholesale business (product and market) growth and enterprise 
technology effectiveness.  
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Figure 5.5 Future reality tree injections mapped to financial institution structures
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Importantly, the entire organisational view provided by Figure 5.5 also conveys that all the 
injection elements work together, directionally through the functional levels (operations, 
business and corporate strategy) and also cross-functionally and across the main divisional 
structures (demand in retail banking, supply in business banking, product management and 
enterprise technology). The results of the FRT analyses summarised in Figure 5.5 show that 
interconnectedness in risk control injections was found across the entire organisation. This 
potential future perspective (illustrated in Figure 5.5) was thought by the participants to offer 
the promise of more effective risk reduction than the current state described in Chapter 4. For 
example, Participant 2 explained: 
Whether it’s big IT, retail issues affecting customer satisfaction, risks with product 
development outsourcing, or just that they are so big and diverse, we have written off 
large amounts because the risk trade-offs are wrong. Because we didn’t understand 
properly. We need a system of controls that can get good intelligence about risks to 
make better decisions and to more effectively implement controls, I think that what you 
show here, reflects well how things should be in place ...   
5.4 Summary 
This chapter first described the injections that the participants judged as needed to transform 
the current risk state into a desirable future state, where financial institution risks are effectively 
managed. Section 5.3 described the findings of the FRT analysis for each of the core problem 
areas, comprising demand in retail banking, supply in business banking, product management 
and IT. The FRT analyses interrogated and illustrated how the injection solutions would 
transform UDEs into DEs. Section 5.3.5 provided an entire organisational perspective of a 
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comprehensive and coordinated approach to managing financial institution risk. Next, the 
results from Chapters 4 and 5 are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
The findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5 on the nature of risk in the financial institutions 
investigated are discussed in this chapter. It first provides a summary of the approach adopted 
to answer the research questions in Section 6.2. Second, a summary of what was found is 
discussed in Section 6.3. The implementation into practice considerations of the research 
findings are described in Section 6.4, including how the findings could inform applied risk 
management in financial institutions that seek to transform a current state into a desired future 
state, such that UDEs of risk effects are transformed into DEs.  
6.2 Summary of the research approach 
This research conducted an exploratory investigation of the probable causes of FSCR common 
to Australian financial institutions, such that inquiry information from nine participants from 
three financial institution cases was aggregated into a single generic Australian financial 
intuition view of risk. The three financial institutions were sampled from three different 
Australian deposit-taking financial institution capitalisation tiers (large, medium and small), 
so as to be broadly representative of deposit-taking financial institutions in Australia (Gorajek 
& Turner 2010). Deposit-taking institutions are the largest financial institutions in Australia, 
and comprise banks, credit unions and building societies, which together make up about 60% 
of the Australian financial system’s assets (Donovan & Gorajek 2011). Life insurance 
companies and superannuation funds account for about a quarter of the system’s assets. APRA 
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(2018) provides regulatory oversight of these parts of the Australian financial system. 
Australian deposit-taking institutions remained profitable during the global financial crisis, 
although they underwent changes where they strengthened their capital position and improved 
resilience by increasing the proportion of funding sourced from deposits and longer-term 
securities (Donovan & Gorajek 2011). While Australian financial institutions were therefore 
apparently successful in managing external risks, the questions in this research were limited to 
the internal organisational risks within the scope of more direct institutional risk control 
(Section 1.7). 
To accommodate the complexity and multidetermined nature of risk causality in financial 
institutional settings, TP methods taken from the TOC (Goldratt & Cox 1984) management 
philosophy approach to organisational problem solving were used. The two TP methods 
employed were CRT analysis (described in Chapter 4) and FRT analysis (described in Chapter 
5). These were selected to holistically examine both the contributing causes of the risks and 
the risk management solutions that could be applied in the future to control those risks (Kim, 
Mabin & Davies 2008). Unlike the typical thematic content analysis of case study data, which 
identifies and interprets themes (Braun & Clarke 2006; King, Horrocks & Brooks 2018; 
Vaismordi et al. 2016), TP methods instead seek to find the weak links within the firm that are 
significant and worth investigating, so that the issues that are found to constrain performance 
within the business can be overcome (Goldratt 2010). This includes the effects of any weak 
point or link within the organisation thought to radiate out to become a source of broader 
damage (Goldratt 2010). 
The objectives of this research were, through the application of TP methods, to provide an in-
depth understanding of FSCR and their mitigation in Australian financial institutions. An in-
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depth understanding aimed to identify the nature and causes of FSCR in Australian financial 
institutions by taking an entire organisational view of FSCR from a supply chain perspective. 
A further aim was that this in-depth analysis could provide a basis to devise approaches for 
mitigating the identified FSCR appropriate for practical application in Australian financial 
institutions. The following research questions (RQ) were posed: 
RQ1: What FSCR are identified as currently present in Australian financial institutions? 
RQ2: What is the nature of the causal relationships among the FSCR that adversely affect 
financial institution business functions? 
RQ3: What future risk control practices could mitigate FSCR in Australian financial 
institutions? 
How these research questions were addressed to meet these objectives is described next. 
To address the first research question (RQ1) about what FSCR are identified in Australian 
financial institutions, this research first developed a conceptual model of risk from the 
literature. The model included four main types of supply chain risk: inadequate demand 
management, supply management, product management and information management. 
Second, the model was applied, refined and developed through iterative interviewing inquiry 
with participants in a multi-case study design where the TP methods were derived from the 
TOC and where the cases were aggregated to provide a single, generic financial institution 
perspective encompassing the entire organisation. The participant informants were nine senior 
managers with risk management responsibilities from three Australian financial institutions.  
Ho et al. (2015) suggested that the case study approach is an example of the types of 
methodologies needed to investigate associations among risks. Research that can use methods 
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that accommodate investigation among multiple risks, rather than in isolation, has potential to 
be used to make sense of real-world complexity in a way that informs practical risk mitigation 
models and understanding. The aggregated list of risks from the interview inquiries (see 
Appendix B) were interrogated and developed as part of the TP CRT method of inquiry used 
to address the second research question. 
To address the second research question (RQ2) about the nature of the causal relationships 
among the FSCR identified that adversely affect financial institution business functions, CRT 
inquiry and analysis methods based on the TP methods were employed (Goldratt 1988; Kim, 
Mabin & Davies 2008); these have been extensively used both in research and applied to a 
broad range of organisational types and problems (e.g., Ikezeri et al. 2018), although rarely in 
financial institutions, and not with Australian financial institutions.  
Originally developed from applied organisational problem solving (Rahman 1998), and suited 
to the nature of case study data (Kohli & Gupta 2010; Ikezeri et al. 2018; Mabin & Balderstone 
1999), the TP methods accommodate the complexity of real-world application of organisation 
problem analysis and solving (Eisenhardt 1999). The methods used included the development 
of CRTs that model and map the multidetermined nature of problems (UDEs), to identify the 
main underlying causes from among a complex array of related, contributing and interacting 
financial institution risk effects (Dettmer 1997; Goldratt 1990). This method allows for 
multiple risks to be examined together, to determine their interrelationships from a holistic or 
entire organisational perspective. 
The analysis of the contributing causes of undesirable risk was conducted at three 
organisational levels of the financial institutions. As described in Section 4.1, the first 
comprised the customer-facing operations level. The second, the business strategy level, 
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comprised the business unit functions of the institutional divisional structures. The third was 
the corporate strategy level that gives organisational strategic leadership for the achievement 
of organisational objectives and accountability to shareholders and regulators. This 
conceptualisation of functional structure was informed by the interview participants who 
formed a consensus view on Australian financial institutions that include banking as part of 
the financial services mix offered. This organisational modelling was undertaken to 
contextualise the results reported in Chapters 4 and 5, and served to illustrate the organisational 
location, nature and interrelationships of the core risks effects thought to be the key 
contributors to undesirable outcomes arising from FSCR. 
The TP CRT method was applied to the core risk effects thought to cause UDEs in four main 
business areas of the financial institutions, applicable to each of the case studies, irrespective 
of capitalisation size. These four included demand-related retail divisions, supply in business-
to-business relationships and transactions, the product development part of the business (which 
includes the development and management of financial products designed for resale through 
the wholesale market) and IT or enterprise services that electronically enable all the other 
services and critical financial functions and transactions. 
To address the third research question (RQ3) about future risk control practices that could 
mitigate FSCR in Australian financial institutions, a future state analysis was undertaken. This 
examines the relationship between FSCR and the future application of risk treatments to 
improve risk handling. In this future state analysis, the results of the CRT analysis were used 
to develop FRTs, which model and map the application of proposed risk reduction solutions, 
called ‘injections’, in the TOC (Hohmann 2015). Intended to rectify the cause of problems 
revealed by the CRTs, injections are placed within the CRT map to illustrate and conceptually 
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test their effect, where UDEs and effects are transformed by the injections into DEs 
(Balderstone 1999). A FRT depicts the desired future, where the proposed injections are 
thought to effectively mitigate risk and resolve problems affecting institutional performance. 
The dynamic causal pathway mapping provided by both the CRT and FRT methods also 
provides for an examination of the entire organisation, where multiple risk determinants and 
mitigation are examined jointly. In this research, this gave a holistic perspective of a 
comprehensive and coordinated approach to assessing and managing financial institution risk, 
by mapping the desired future effects onto the entire organisation. 
6.3 Summary of the findings 
The findings provided a participant consensus depiction of the typical or generic Australian 
financial institution functions and organisational structures (Section 4.1). This served as a 
conceptual scaffolding to contextually illustrate the organisational functional location of the 
findings on the risks to be investigated (Chapter 4) and the risk solution injections to be 
subsequently developed (Chapter 5).  
The participants’ views regarding the nature of the risks from a supply chain perspective in 
financial institutions were aligned and informed by the conceptual model of the four main risk 
types derived from the literature (Section 2.8), which, in turn, were also aligned to the major 
functions of the financial institutions. The use of TP CRT investigation methods with the 
participants provided for the consideration of multiple factors jointly, to provide a holistic 
approach to the examination of risk; this had previously been identified as a gap in the literature 
as supply chain risks had largely been examined in isolation rather than jointly (Fan & 
Stevenson 2018; Ghadge et al. 2012; Gelsomino et al. 2016; Ho et al. 2015). 
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A main finding was that the main types of underlying core risk effects contributing to these 
UDEs and hence corporate undesirable outcomes included people-centred failures, external 
service provider disruptions, policies and regulatory compliance limitations, and technology 
hub failures. These underlying core risk effect types and the UDEs that contribute to them are 
summarised Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1. For example, HR-related issues such as shortcomings 
in recruitment practices, insufficient in-service training, rigid procedures and lack of flexible 
policies to guide situational decision-making, were all undesirable risk effects labelled together 
under the core risk effect type ‘people-centred failures’. Similarly, the participants identified 
that many risks in product development and IT arise from poorly controlled risk, as functions 
are outsourced to contracted external service providers, which further contribute to risk in both 
retail and business-to-business banking. These underlying risks, although described as types, 
are not intended to be portrayed as exclusive of each other. Instead, all underlying risk effect 
types were found to constrain achievement in all four business areas, and contribute to retail 
banking failing to meet customer needs, business banking failing to meet targets, product 
management failures and IT disruptions. Further, the causal pathways associated with the core 
or underlying UDEs also cross over the functional levels of the financial institutions 
(operational level functions, business strategy level functions and corporate strategy level 
functions). 
These findings align with the themes in the literature regarding the broad types of risk that 
have been described in attempts to create typologies of risk (Ho et al. 2015), such as demand, 
supply, product and IT factors, which formed the basis of the conceptual model described in 
Section 2.8. In the context of Australian financial institutions, these typologies or categories 
of risk made sense to the case study participants, who found that the model aligned with their 
understanding of banking business areas and risk. Further, rather than examining each type of 
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risk in isolation, this research collectively examined the internally controllable risk types, 
which were considered jointly to gain an understanding of their interacting effects in complex 
organisational dynamics. The results showed that the risk typologies were not mutually 
exclusive and had causal influences on each other. For example, people-centred failures 
contributed to both product management and technology failures. The results showed the 
interactive nature of the risk types—what the literature presented as arbitrary groupings of risk 
elements were found to be mutually bidirectional and cross-categorical in nature when 
examined dynamically with the TP CRT method.  
In financial institutions, the interactivity found by the results among both risk types and 
organisational features also meant that categorising financial risk as separate from other kinds 
of risk is an artificial distinction in risk typology that has little meaning in an applied financial 
institution context. For example, previous definitions of financial risk have encompassed 
supply chain financing risk related to risk concerning adequate funding of supply chain activity 
(Popa 2013). Fan and Stevenson (2018) described a finance risk perspective related to 
accounting, working capital optimisation and asset financing. Popa (2013) also sought to make 
a distinction between general supply chain risks and financial risks. However, this research 
shows that all supply chain related risks in a financial institution have a financial aspect to 
them, regardless of whether the financial relatedness is direct or indirect. For example, people-
centred failures can relate to financial knowledge and capabilities of people, adequacy of 
training in financial-related matters, or have financial impacts such as poor management of 
credit-related matters or failure to frame the financial aspects of external service provider 
contracts adequately. When examined jointly, rather than in isolation, and where a dynamic 
underlying causal pathway is mapped for the entire organisation, the distinction between FSCR 
and non-financial SCR previously made in the literature was not found in the results. These 
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findings support the more inclusive nature of the FSCR definition in this research, where it 
was defined as risk examined from a supply chain perspective in financial institutions. 
As portrayed in detail in Chapter 4, Figure 6.1 shows a summary of the core risk contributing 
effects that were comprehensively mapped with CRT methods to produce what was seen as 
the current state of the institutional dynamics of FSCR in the financial institution cases under 
investigation. The CRTs illustrate an integrated and holistic view of the complex determinism 
of risk, taking account of the functional and structural characteristics of financial institutions 
identified in Section 4.2 and the nature of risk described in Section 4.3. Figure 6.1 shows how 
the results map onto the conceptual model described in Section 2.8, reflecting the grouping 
arrangement of the results on risk effects. The CRT results show that the core risk effects 
related to each of the four main financial institutions business divisions (demand in retail 
banking, IT, product management and supply in business banking). Figure 6.1 shows how the 
core risk effect types jointly contribute to FSCR in Australian financial institutions aggregated 
from the sample of the three financial institutions cases.  
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Figure 6.1 Summary of core risk effects contributing to FSCR 
 209 
 
From the entire organisational perspective results described in Section 4.3.5, Table 4.5 and 
illustrated in Figure 4.7, Table 6.1 summarises UDEs found by the CRT analyses to make up 
the four main underlying core effect types that operate across financial institutions and 
contribute financial supply chain risk in the financial institutions. Building on the CRT findings 
described in Chapter 4 and summarised in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1, the Chapter 5 future state 
analysis shows the results of FRT methods to provide a view of what the participants thought 
would be an effective and desired future, if these financial institutions’ underlying core risk 
effects were effectively managed. Solution options (termed ‘injections’ in TP) for 
organisational problems were identified and described over the three levels of major 
institutional functions (operations, business strategy and corporate strategy). The combination 
of injections working together across the organisation was intended to provide the overall 
solution to financial institution problems. The injections were mapped in FRT figures (Figures 
5.1–5.4) for each of the four main risk domain areas (main businesses or divisions of the 
generic Australian financial institution): retail banking, business banking, product 
management and IT. 
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Table 6.1 Summary of undesired effects contributing to underlying core risk effect types 
 
Underlying core risk effect types 
People-centred 
failures 
External service 
provider 
disruptions 
Policy and 
regulatory 
compliance 
limitations 
Technology hub 
failures 
Inadequate staff 
training 
Unfulfilled audit 
requirements (e.g., 
complaints) 
Limited HR 
processes & policies 
Lack of specialised 
knowledge 
Human data 
processing errors 
Miscalculations 
Poor recruitment 
process 
Insufficient 
professional 
development 
Outsourcing issues 
Business support 
disruptions 
Frequent internal 
and external fraud 
Communications 
and technology 
breakdowns 
Lending operations 
discrepancies 
Natural disaster 
(e.g., offshore 
business 
disruptions) 
Limited professional 
development and 
experience 
Human error in 
database entry 
Auditing issues 
Government 
interventions 
Regulatory non-
compliance (APRA) 
IT compliance 
requirements failure 
Data security for 
Privacy Act concerns 
Ethical and legal 
issues 
 
IT system 
disruptions & 
failures 
Cyber security 
threats 
EFTPOS & ATM 
outages 
Online banking 
outages 
Business transaction 
disruptions 
Application crashes 
Communication and 
technology 
breakdown 
As described in Chapter 5, the FRT method derived a consensus set of injections designed to 
be applied simultaneously at different levels, structures and functions of the generic financial 
institution. As summarised in Figure 6.2, the injections were intended to be mutually 
supporting, where the injections’ risk appetite, monitoring and performance centre, 
collaboration centre, libraries and risk registers all enable, guide and support the application 
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of the more directly intervening injections, comprising cultural adaption, control centres, 
business assessment and tactical actions.  
The injections are envisioned to mitigate the UDEs of the core risk effect types, which manifest 
UDEs at multiple levels, structures and functions of the financial institution. The participants 
agreed that if risk was multidetermined in a complex organisational system, then to be effective 
at reducing risk, a risk mitigation approach would have to be comprehensive and comprise 
multiple cohesive components acting jointly as part of a highly organised approach to risk 
management and mitigation. An example of technology hub failure risk is where technology 
outages cause online, ATM and EFTPOS customer service failures. These can receive media 
attention because of their extensive disruptive effects on both personal and business banking 
(Graham 2018). A people-centred failure example was where the Commonwealth Bank 
underpaid about 8,000 staff after its HR technology systems failed to accurately calculate and 
process entitlements, forcing the bank to repay millions of dollars to current and former 
employees. This UDE example illustrates where a people-centred failure has a technology 
component (Australian Payroll Association 2019). Another example that attracted media 
attention was an undesired external service provider effect where a bank employee with 
responsibilities for external contractors was arrested for substantial fraud (Calderwood 2019). 
Further, the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial 
Services Industry showed that undesired regulatory compliance effects were found to be 
common in most major financial institutions in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 2019). 
Figure 6.2 shows that the injections are conceived as risk management methods able to be 
applied to multiple core risk effects, regardless of type related to other people-centred failures, 
external service provider failures, policies and regulatory compliance limitations or technology 
hub failures. 
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Figure 6.2 Summary illustration of injections to mitigate core risk effects 
 
The FRTs described in Chapter 5 illustrate how the participants thought that the injections 
could be used to neutralise the effects of the UDEs and convert them into DEs. Aligned with 
financial institutional functional and structural characteristics and levels, the organisational 
interfaces with the injections were linked with the core risk effect types, and included risk 
libraries, risk assessments and risk registers for people-centred failures, external service 
provider disruptions, policy and regulatory compliance limitations, and IT hub failures. 
Informed by the other injections, the control centres and monitoring and reporting centres 
provide control and oversight for the design and operation of risk solution actions and 
determine whether actions require mandatory (or discretionary) implementation via a risk 
assessment of severity and likelihood. The centres also monitor and evaluate all risk features 
to ensure appropriate adaption and modification of actions and assessment to ensure ongoing 
effective risk mitigation. 
At the corporate strategy level, the strategic injections comprise risk appetite appropriateness, 
cultural adaption and a collaboration centre. These would provide risk mitigation direction to 
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the major strategic objective domains, comprising consumers, businesses (corporate, small and 
medium), wholesale (products and the market), and enterprise technology services. The 
amount and type of risk the financial institution is prepared to tolerate is called risk appetite 
(Reserve Bank of Australia 2018b). Risk appetite is influenced by core risk effects and the 
organisational system of interacting causal dynamics illustrated in the CRTs. A risk appetite 
injection indicates the risk policy settings at the corporate level at which the business can 
accept or reject risk vulnerability, and whether the related decisions facilitate or inhibit the 
attainment of organisational objectives.  
Adapting risk appetite based on feedback loops from organisational intelligence provided by 
monitoring and reporting centres on changing risk attributes over time informs how an 
organisation articulates and updates its risk appetite and then communicates this to the 
organisation. Further, the risk appetite framework would inform the risk appetite statements 
that guide both internal requirements as well as what might need to be provided to regulatory 
authorities (Reserve Bank of Australia 2018b). These corporate strategy level injections 
provide entire organisation risk mitigation direction to the major strategic objective domains 
and business units and divisions, as well provide for the strengthening of cross-functional and 
cross-divisional collaboration to mitigate risk and to put in place the necessary organisational 
culture settings to support a risk mitigating context. 
Fan and Stevenson’s (2018) review of supply chain risk management (see Section 2.6.1) 
identified four routinely cited elements (e.g., Hallikas et al. 2004) of supply chain risk 
management: risk identification, assessment, treatment and monitoring. Risk identification 
aims to discover all relevant risks and recognise future uncertainties. Fan and Stevenson (2018) 
found that risk types and categories vary according to the specific context under examination 
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and that there was no agreed risk management typology. Risk assessment concerns identifying 
what constitutes risk, priorities for action, and assessment of the potential implications of 
taking action. Risk treatment was defined by Fan and Stevenson (2018) as having a focus on 
the categorisation of treatments and distinguished from mitigation, which was related to 
treatment implementation strategy, where different treatments might be matched to different 
risks to maximise mitigation effects. Also identified in the literature by Fan and Stevenson 
(2018), risk monitoring recognises that risk is not static, and monitoring for changes in risk 
provides for treatment strategies to be adjusted to take account of changes.  
Table 6.2 shows the findings on all the injections identified in this research (Section 5.2) from 
the participant inquiries of the TP FRT method, conceptually mapped to the typology used by 
Fan and Stevenson (2018) in their systematic review of the supply chain risk management 
literature. In that review, they mapped the findings of over 300 papers covering multiple 
countries and industries.  
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Table 6.2 Classification of injections with supply chain risk management process typology 
  SCRM Process Typology  
  Risk identification Risk assessment Risk treatment Risk monitoring 
Operations level 
injections 
(Section 5.2.1) 
Operations actions (Section 5.2.1.2)     
Operations assessment (Section 
5.2.1.2)      
Operations control centre (Section 
5.2.1.3)     
Operations risk register (Section 
5.2.1.4)     
Operations monitoring and reporting 
centre (Section 5.2.1.5)     
Operations risk library (Section 
5.2.1.6)     
Business 
strategy level 
injections 
(Section 5.2.2) 
Business risk library (Section 5.2.2.1)     
Business actions (Section 5.2.2.2)      
Business assessment (Section 5.2.2.3)     
Business control centre (Section 
5.2.2.4)     
Business monitoring and reporting 
centre (Section 5.2.2.5)     
Corporate 
strategy level 
injections 
(Section 5.2.3)
Risk appetite (Section 5.2.3.1)     
Cultural adaptation (Section 5.2.3.2)     
Collaboration centre (Section 5.2.3.3)     
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Table 6.2 shows that a number of the injections operate in more than one risk management 
process category previously identified in the literature. For example, the corporate strategy 
sponsored collaboration centre operates across all the Fan and Stevenson (2018) categories 
shown in Table 6.2, as this injection concerns the cross-functional sharing of all types of risk 
information and cross-area collaboration on all aspects of risk management. However, Fan and 
Stevenson (2018) noted that the previous literature was limited regarding consideration of the 
joint effects and application of risk management. They reported that research has failed to 
identify inter-relationships between risk management categories, and noted Gange et al.’s 
(2012) observation that a holistic perspective was largely missing from the literature.  
Importantly, the FRTs illustrate how all the injections are intended to work together, both 
cross-functionally and through the levels, to provide a comprehensive and coordinated 
approach to managing financial institution risk from an entire organisation perspective. This 
potential future perspective was thought by the participants to offer the promise of more 
effective risk reduction than the current reality. The participants were familiar with the 
individual injections or risk control practices, but the process of dynamically mapping them to 
remediate UDEs, together with seeing the multiplicity in risk causation revealed by the CRT 
findings, raised awareness about the effectiveness related to mutual dependency of the 
injections. In the validation phase, in which the FRTs were affirmed by the participants, they 
agreed that the injections should operate as a comprehensive and coordinated system of risk 
management that crosses all functional levels and business divisions, to maximise 
effectiveness. In Chapter 5, it was reported that the participants noted that organisational risk 
functions were often siloed (i.e.,  a system, process or business unit whose function is 
operationally treated as isolated from others), and that this functional isolation acts as a barrier 
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to effective risk mitigation. The solutions mapped in the FRTs illustrate the required 
connectivity between the injections.  
The lack of examination of the joint effects of management risk identified by Fan and 
Stevenson (2018) and the examination of risks in isolation (Ho et al. 2015) reduces the 
usefulness of research in guiding the implementation of learning from research into practice. 
However, the perspective revealed by the findings in this research regarding the 
interconnectivity of injections and the attainment of a desired future was made visible through 
a holistic examination of both the current state and the future state that was accommodated by 
the use of TP CRT and FRT methods.  
6.4 Implementation in practice 
An objective of this research was to design strategies to manage risk that have potential for 
application in practice. This section discusses some of the considerations that the participants 
identified as concerned with the transition from a current state to a desired future state. This 
need for attention to implementation was illustrated by Participant 1, who reported that: 
We want the big plan about how to apply all the risk reduction and control 
processes. What happens now where we might have similar things in place, is that 
each of these systems or processes at times starts looking like silos. So then 
developing silos, they become kind of quite obstinate about what needs to be done, 
how it needs to be done. There should be flexibility. There should be plans and 
guidance. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates an example of a risk mitigation implementation process that could be 
employed to implement the FRT findings into the practices of a financial institution. It shows 
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how to transition from the existing organisational risk profile, informed by the CRT analysis, 
to an expected desirable future risk profile, informed by the FRT analysis, where the injections 
are implemented. The transition from the current state into a desired future state is illustrated 
in Figure 6.3, in which three potential phases of implementation are shown.  
The first phase concerns the examination of risk as demonstrated through the CRT analysis. 
This provides the institutional intelligence about risk to inform the design and establish the 
risk strategies and frameworks to subsequently guide the implementation planning. These are 
informed by an assessment of risk, the formulation of an organisational risk profile, and the 
location and nature of risk aligned with the profile. This phase could be supported by methods 
such as the TP CRT. These are intended to show how the risk management strategy can 
contribute to and support the achievement of the financial institution service objectives. 
The second phase is proposed to communicate the risk policies, comprising strategies and plans 
and other communication artefacts, to the organisation. Business units and divisions align their 
tactical or operational risk reduction strategies and plans with the organisation’s strategies and 
frameworks. One mechanism for this is a financial institution’s risk appetite statement, which 
considers the most significant risks to which a bank is exposed and provides an outline of the 
approach to managing these risks. All strategic plans and business plans for functional areas 
should be consistent with this statement (Reserve Bank of Australia 2018b).  
The third phase is to implement the risk management approaches into practice, including the 
various injection solutions, supporting structures and functions. As described in Chapter 5 and 
shown in Figure 6.3, the injections include a collaboration centre, risk monitoring and control 
centres, risk assessment, and actions and a managerial process to continuously monitor and 
adapt. In summary, Figure 6.3 is an example of how a financial institution might transition 
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from a current state of risk to the implementation of a desired future state. Figure 6.3 illustrates 
how the findings of this research, or use of the methods demonstrated, could be utilised and 
implemented into the risk-related practices of a financial institution. 
Going beyond the perceptive individual organisations, an implication of the findings is in 
relation to the insights gained from an entire organisation view that have been described. The 
adoption of this entire organisation view by the financial sector and regulators, could be 
inferred from the findings that there may be some merit in considering whether an entire 
organisation perspective and associated approaches to risk becomes integrated into sectorial 
policies or a risk appetite statement standards, where a whole of organisation perspective is 
required to be adopted.  
6.5 Summary 
In this study, the TOC methods employed provided for a more holistic view of supply chain 
risk (Gelsomino et al. 2016), both in terms of the CRT analyses (Chapter 4) that described the 
complex nature of existing risk, but also in formulating a risk reduction approach using FRT 
methods (Chapter 5) to guide real-world application in Australian financial institutions 
(Section 6.4). For example, Figure 6.3 shows how an approach informed by the CRT and FRT 
findings could be applied in an Australian financial institution. The national and regulatory 
context of Australian financial institutions was discussed, and the characteristics of the cases 
contributing to the generic Australian financial institution model that provided the context of 
the illustration of the findings were noted in Section 6.2. 
This chapter summarised the research approach in Section 6.2; in Section 6.3, the findings 
from the analyses were discussed. They included formulating a generic financial institution 
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functional structure, describing the current state of the risk characteristics of the financial 
institutions (CRT), and formulating the injections to be applied to reduce risk and offer a 
desired future (FRT). Implications of the findings for research and theory, limitations of the 
research and suggestions for future research are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Figure 6.3 Institutional transition phases from a current state of risk to a desired future state 
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CHAPTER 7 
IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The objectives of this research were to create an in-depth understanding of risk and risk 
mitigation in three Australian financial institutions, through an exploratory multi-case study 
approach using TOC TP methods. The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the findings, 
research implications, theoretical and practical contributions, and limitations of this research. 
This chapter is organised as follows., Section 7.2 revisits the research questions and explains 
the findings of this research. Section 7.3 discusses the theoretical implications and the practical 
application contribution of the research. Section 7.4 discusses the limitations. Finally, Section 
7.5 discusses how this research could be extended in the future and Section 7.6 provides the 
concluding remarks. 
7.2 Addressing the findings of the research 
The objective of this research was to provide an in-depth understanding of FSCR and their 
mitigation in Australian financial institutions, to identify the nature and causes of FSCR by 
taking an organisational view of risk from a supply chain perspective in Australian financial 
institutions. A further aim was that this in-depth analysis provides a basis to devise approaches 
for mitigating the identified FSCR appropriate for practical application in financial institutions. 
To fulfil these objectives, the following research questions (RQ) were posed: 
RQ1: What FSCR are identified as currently present in Australian financial institutions? 
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RQ2: What is the nature of the causal relationships among the FSCR that adversely affect 
financial institution business functions? 
RQ3: What future risk control practices could mitigate FSCR in Australian financial 
institutions? 
To address the first research question (RQ1) concerning FSCR identified as currently present 
in Australian financial institutions, a conceptual model of risk was developed from the 
literature. The model included four main types of risk that the literature described as affecting 
institutional performance. These risk types relevant to financial institution services comprised 
demand management, supply management, product management and IT services provision. 
The model was applied, refined and mapped to the organisational characteristics. This was 
used to organise and make sense of the inquiries with participants. It was found that the 
identified risks were able to be aligned with financial instructional structures comprising 
demand in retail banking, supply in business banking, financial institution product 
management and enterprise technology. The risks identified were able to be mapped to these 
structures as well as to the financial institution’s functional levels, comprising the operations 
level, business strategy level and corporate strategy level. 
To address the second research question (RQ2) about the nature of the causal relationships 
among the FSCR that adversely affect financial institution business functions, the risks or 
UDEs identified in answering the first question were examined by a TP CRT current state 
analysis. The underlying effect types that were found to affect the institution’s undesirable 
outcomes were people-centred failures, external service provider disruptions, policies and 
regulatory compliance limitations, and technology hub failures. These underlying risk effect 
types were found to constrain achievement in all four business risk areas, and contributed to 
retail banking failing to meet customer needs, business banking failing to meet targets, product 
management failures and IT disruptions. 
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The CRT method found that these causes of undesirable risk contributed at three organisational 
levels of financial institutions: a customer-facing operations level, a business strategy level 
(comprising the business unit functions in the institution’s divisional structures) and the 
corporate strategy level. This CRT modelling illustrated the nature and interrelationships of 
the core risks effects found to be the key contributors to undesirable outcomes arising from the 
FSCR identified. It was found that the risks are interconnected and their dynamic causal 
pathways crossed over risk categorisations, as well as traditional functional levels and 
institutional divisions. 
The CRT method was applied to the core risk effects thought to cause the UDEs in four aspects 
of the banking businesses. These included the functions and divisions comprising demand in 
retail banking, supply in business banking, product development and IT. The risk effect types 
in these areas were considered jointly and their collective impact explored. It was found that 
all the risks had some financial relatedness, either directly or indirectly, in the financial 
institutional context. This included financial institution supply chain transactions, the nature 
of the financial products, the financial nature of information content managed by enterprise 
architecture, and both the financial content and impact of people-centred functions. 
To address the third research question (RQ3) regarding future risk control practices that could 
mitigate FSCR in Australian financial institutions, the participants described a desired future 
state comprising a comprehensive risk management approach to inform the translation into 
applied practice in financial institutions. These were illustrated in FRT maps. The FRTs 
modelled the application of participant proposed solutions (called ‘injections’) to the problems 
previously identified in the CRT current state analysis. These comprised a range of risk 
remediation solutions operating across all three functional levels of the financial institutions, 
where a number of risk controls were proposed to apply to operations, business strategy and 
corporate strategy levels of organisational functions. A key finding was that, collectively, the 
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injections need to operate jointly and in a highly organised and managed system of risk 
management that dynamically adapts to intelligence and feedback about risk. This was 
considered essential for the effectiveness of risk controls as they change and evolve over time 
and in response to both the changing risk environment and gauging the effectiveness of the 
measures that seek to impose risk control. 
7.3 Implications of the research 
7.3.1 Theoretical research implications 
This multi-case study and the findings of this research provided an in-depth understanding of 
the complex dynamics of supply chain risk in financial institutions. In a review of the literature, 
Ikeziri et al. (2018) lamented the lack of TOC research into supply chain risk. Kim, Mabin and 
Davies (2008) similarly noted that the focus of TOC research was often isolated, with limited 
apparent applicability to real-world organisations. The use of TP methods in this research 
facilitated a comprehensive examination of financial institution risk from a supply chain 
perceptive that encompassed the entire organisational view. This novel approach comprised 
several elements that contribute to the theoretical understanding of financial institution risk. 
First, multiple risks were jointly identified and mapped together, giving an entire 
organisational view. Second, the relative importance of the risks for explaining business 
disruption was evaluated. Third, the interrelationships among the risks and the pathways of 
risk movement through the institutions was identified and the interconnected nature of risk 
processes demonstrated. These TP method elements, which Chapter 2 identified from the 
literature as showing potential, have through their application to financial supply chain risk in 
this research contributed to the better understanding of the nature of financial supply chain risk 
in financial institutions. Informed by this comprehensive examination of risk from a 
perspective that encompasses the entire organisation, the dependencies among risk 
 226 
 
management phases and approaches that were demonstrated also contributed to better 
understanding of risk mitigation effectiveness. 
Consequently, a major contribution of this research was to take a holistic approach that 
examines risks jointly rather than in isolation. It utilised the TP CRT and FRT methods in an 
approach that accommodated the complexity of an entire organisation perspective, and the 
practical application utility that such a perspective provides. The location and alignment of the 
CRT and FRT findings to an aggregated generic Australian financial institution structural and 
functional scaffolding provided a perspective to the findings that further showed the 
interconnectedness of both risk and the risk solutions considered. Further, these features of the 
research revealed the dynamic nature of risk causal pathways when risks are examined jointly 
and contextualised with organisational functional and structural characteristics. It also showed 
that distinctions between FSCR and other non-financial SCR when applied to Australian 
financial institutions are not readily separable. This is because of both the intrinsic financial 
nature of the business of financial institutions and the dynamic and interconnected nature of 
risk causal pathways. 
A further limitation is that consideration of positive risks was outside the scope of this research. 
This is where a positive risk is any condition, event, occurrence or situation that provides a 
possible positive impact. The TP TOC methods employed only considered negative risks 
where UDE’s identified through the TP CRT method, were sought to model the conversion to 
DE’s through the application of the TP FRT method. This may be viewed as where identified 
UDE’s could be viewed as existing negative risks, are then examined as to how they might be 
converted to reduce negative impact and to potentially increase the likelihood of positive 
impact in a desired future. Examination of existing positive risk was incorporated into the 
methods, except in so far as participants may have drawn on their experience of risk 
management practices to inform their observations as part of the TP FRT method. 
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The research also sought to reduce the gap in terms of the lack of research on FSCR in financial 
institutions and to apply methods that can accommodate complexity and practical application 
utility. Further, it sought to fill gaps regarding risks that originate from internal organisational 
factors. Unlike external risks, such as financial system disruptions, where risk is indirectly 
managed through hedging or capitalisation strategies that seek to provide buffers against 
external stresses such as those experienced in the global financial crisis (e.g., Donovan & 
Gorajek 2011), internal risks are able to potentially be controlled directly. With novel 
application to financial institutions in Australia, this is the first study to apply TP methods from 
a supply chain perspective to undesired risk-related effects located within the institutions and 
able to potentially be controlled. It also provides a contribution where exploratory methods 
were used holistically to investigate, analyse and provide potential solutions to FSCR in 
financial institutions, where the variables under investigation were considered jointly from the 
perspective of the entire organisation rather than in isolation. 
The objective of qualitative case study research, with an exploratory aim, is not to generalise 
to populations to the extent that a randomised representative survey might attempt, but rather 
to generate theory, which could be tested by other researchers in future studies or to take a 
confirmatory rather than exploratory approach in the methods employed (Al-Busaidi 2008; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2014, 2017). However, the multi-case sampling design used in this 
research is based on a case replication logic rather than a statistical logic (such as in a survey). 
The three cases were financial institutions representing one of three market capitalisation size 
tiers in the Australian financial institution system (Gorajek & Turner 2010). This was so the 
research questions were related to examination of FSCR in Australian financial institutions, 
rather than in any particular individual institutions with limited generalisability. The CRT and 
FRT analyses represented and were constructed from the combined data from all nine 
participants from all three cases aggregated into a single generic case. The nature of the 
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institutional cases was such that they are from the same industry sector rather than from 
different sectors. In addition, all the participants have roles related to the management of 
organisational risk. A multi-case study design comprising three financial institutional cases, 
stratified with three participants each to make a sample of nine participants, was thought to be 
a reasonable sample size to allow for the retention of the benefits of a case study design 
(Eisenhardt 1991). It also provided for a design benefit from the ability to cross-case 
triangulate and aggregate participant information, providing replicability across cases that 
gives increased generalisability over a single case (Patton 1999; Yin 2014). In addition, data 
volume was balanced with complexity to both provide an in-depth analysis typical of 
qualitative case methods combined with the facility to suggest generalisability beyond a single 
instance. These features of the design of the sampling were thought to provide a foundation to 
make observations about Australian financial institutions without the loss of depth inherent in 
larger samples using quantitative methods (Dubois & Araujo 2007). 
In this research, the TOC TP CRT and FRT methods provided a thorough examination of risk 
variables considered jointly rather than in isolation, and provided for both risk identification 
and risk reduction possibilities. This demonstrated research utility where a holistic approach 
enabled a comprehensive examination of institutional risk from the perspective of the entire 
organisation. This showed that the TP methods have application potential to comprehensively 
identify, analyse and reduce risk in financial institutions. 
The risks identified within the financial institutions were contextualised with the risk 
categorisations in the conceptual model aligned with both the literature and the financial 
institutions’ structures and organisational functional characteristics. However, unlike previous 
research where supply chain risks are often examined in isolation (Fan & Stevenson 2018; 
Ghadge et al. 2012; Gelsomino et al. 2016; Ho et al. 2015), this research used a current state 
method (TP CRT) applied to multiple risks jointly across the entire organisation, and found 
 229 
 
that the nature of the risks are not easily separable into categories. An interpretation of the 
results is that a category-based approach would not take account of the mutual and dynamic 
connectivity between the risks demonstrated by the TP CRT findings. Further, the identified 
risks were found to be not singularly located in an isolated part or function of the organisations, 
but rather, their causal pathways spanned different functional levels and divisional structures. 
Where previous research has adopted a categorical approach to the examination of themes, this 
tends to create an artificial view that does not reveal the intra-organisational complex dynamics 
of the interconnectivity of risk. In the current states reported by the participants, there was a 
tendency for risk management components in practice to be isolated or separated from other 
components or restricted to business unit perceived responsibility boundaries. This observation 
is understandable in the context of the literature where approaches comprising the arbitrary 
categorisation of the examination of risk reflect previous researchers’ critiques of the literature 
(Fan & Stevenson 2018; Ghadge et al. 2012; Gelsomino et al. 2016; Ho et al. 2015) concerning 
the isolated rather than joint examination of risk. The findings show that both risk and the 
management of risk are likely highly interconnected, both among the risk effects, their causes 
and effects, and their mitigation (both the manifestation of risk and the mitigation of risk across 
organisational structural and functional boundaries). The findings lend support to calls for 
increased research attention on the importance of methods that can accommodate the 
examination of risk variables jointly. 
In addition to the theoretical contributions facilitated by the application of the TP methods 
discussed earlier, the findings about risk interconnectivity from an entire organisation 
perspective also calls into question the validity of the categorisation of risk into financial and 
non-financial categories (e.g., Popa 2013). In the context of financial institutions, the findings 
suggest that this categorical distinction is not valid, as most risk examined from a supply chain 
perspective from a holistic, entire institution view is all either directly or indirectly financial 
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in nature. The findings supported the inclusive definition of FSCR used in this research, which 
defined FSCR as risks examined from a supply chain perspective in financial institutions. This 
contribution can be extended to suggest interpretative caution in relation to the investigation 
of general supply chain risks where the methods employed are categorical in nature. 
Categorisation has the facility to reduce complexity as a way of helping to make sense of 
observed phenomena; however, an unintended consequence may be to convey an altered 
understanding that differs from the true interconnected nature of the reality of the phenomena 
under investigation, where the interconnections are not captured by the categories. This, in 
turn, may truncate consideration of the range of organisational effectiveness enhancement 
options available for implementation in practice. 
7.3.2 Practical implications of the research 
An objective of this research was to design strategies to manage risk that have potential for 
application in practice (Al-Busaidi 2008; Eisenhardt 1989). The findings of the CRT and FRT 
analyses extend understanding of the dynamics of financial institution risk, and show how they 
can be practically applied in a financial institution and give examples of the processes and risk-
related artefacts that could be implemented. The findings show how the existing risk profile of 
an organisation (informed by CRT methods) can be transformed through a transition to a 
desired future state (informed by FRT methods). The implementation example in Figure 6.3 
illustrated the phases to translate FRT findings to illustrate how the contribution to practice 
might be implemented. 
The in-depth analysis comprising a whole-of-institutional perspective, where the findings were 
also mapped to a participant consensus view of generic financial institution structures and 
functions, both served to facilitate illustrating the practical applicability of the results and their 
interpretation. This was particularly so for showing that the nature of the underlying FSCR 
identified was not organisationally isolated or discretely located, but dynamically interacting 
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and affecting multiple areas, functions and other FSCR. The practical implication of both the 
current state and future state analyses is that organisations not only need to look at what 
individual risk control treatments they have in place, but ensure that they are interconnected in 
a highly coordinated and well-managed system of control, comprising feedback mechanisms 
and the capacity for adaption that takes a whole-of-organisation perspective.  
A broader consideration of the implications of the findings is in relation to the insights gained 
from an entire organisation view risk that could have benefits for the financial sector. Although 
outside the scope of this research, benefits regarding the adoption of an entire organisation 
perspective could be integrated into sectorial policies or a risk appetite statement standards, 
where a more systemic perspective is required to be adopted.   
The major practical implication, therefore, is not so much about any particular risk or risk 
treatment; rather, it is the recognition of the high level of interconnectivity both in the nature 
of risk and the effectiveness of responses to risk. Many organisations may already have 
substantial risk control approaches in place; what this research suggests is that these, both in 
terms of their diagnostic and treatment functions, are best managed as a whole, as an 
interconnected system that transcends internal organisational boundaries that would normally 
govern the segmented and hierarchical organisation of work. 
7.4 Limitations of the research 
This research adopted two established TP methods (CRT and FRT) that evolved out of the 
TOC management philosophy and from practical application in manufacturing organisations 
(Rahman 1998). In Chapter 2, it was described how TOC and TP methods were later 
generalised and applied to many types of organisations and problem types. The interest in the 
approach was not only because of this practical problem-solving utility, but also because it 
could accommodate the complexity and multiplicity of determinants of organisational and 
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other problems that exist in the real world (Eisenhardt 1989). TOC has since been applied to 
many types of organisations and problem types (Ikezei et al. 2018).  
The TP method can accommodate calls for greater use of organisational case study designs 
that seek a closer examination of associations among supply chain risk than what has occurred 
previously (Ho et al. 2015). In-depth inquiry and capacity to examine multiple variables and 
accommodate real-world complexity (Al-Busaidi 2008; Eisenhardt 1989) are the advantages 
of qualitative methods. The TP CRT and FRT methods are suited to case study designs, 
particularly as they aim to dynamically identify underlying causes and solution options (Kim, 
Mabin & Davies 2008). Despite these strengths, case study designs have limited 
representativeness and caution should be exercised regarding generalisability of the findings 
to other organisations (Yin 2014, 2017). In this research, this limitation was addressed to some 
extent by adopting a multi-case study design, where the cases were selected from different 
financial institution capitalisation tiers in Australia (Gorajek & Turner 2010) and then 
aggregated to a single generic case that was more generalisable than each of the contributing 
cases examined alone, because shortcomings such as lack of particular information in one case 
could be supplemented with information from another case. Similarly, a distortion in one case 
might be moderated by the information from other cases to present an aggregated case that is 
more valid than each of the contributing cases taken alone. With this case sampling and 
aggregation approach, the combined findings from the case were expected to be more likely to 
be representative and generalisable to other Australian financial institutions than if a single-
case study design had been used. 
Another limitation is the generalisability of the findings from deposit-taking institutions to 
other types of financial institutions such as insurance companies and other vendors of financial 
products. There is likely some similarity, as deposit-taking institutions also provide insurance 
products, but caution should be exercised in regard to confidence about making inferences 
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about comparability (Olsen 2007; Ruddy 2008; Välimaa 2008) due to variability in product 
and services mixes offered by the different instruction types. Another generalisability 
limitation might be between Australian financial institutions and those located in other 
countries. In favour of comparability is that some Australian institutions are global and some 
global banks operate in Australia, so many of their organisational characteristics are likely 
similar. Notwithstanding, however, in the Australian financial market, regulatory controls 
(APRA 2018) and other environmental factors (Donovan & Gorajek 2011) may differ from 
other countries. For example, core risk effect types that relate to the regulatory context may be 
less generalisable, but those relating to people-centred risk effects may be more generalisable. 
One final limitation of this study is the possible bias that not only the researcher brings into 
the story, but the bias of each participant interviewed. Kvale (1996, p. 286) argued that 
‘personal interaction in the interview may have a decisive impact on the results’. The 
researcher acknowledges that the TP inquiries, as a part of the research process described in 
Chapter 3, were reflected back to the participants for validation. The research also reflects the 
researcher’s implementation of the TP inquiry with the participants (Neuman 2014). 
Through the recognition of these limitations, some of the results should perhaps be regarded 
as more suggestive than conclusive. Despite these limitations, this study makes a significant 
contribution to making sense of the complex dynamics of risk and potential risk mitigation 
approaches in financial institutions in Australia. 
7.5 Implications for further research 
In terms of future research, this study could be extended by further inquiring about FSCR and 
their management characteristics in a variety of other financial institutions, irrespective of 
whether banking service provision is part of the financial services mix or not. This would 
enable the researcher to further explore the theory and current findings with reference to other 
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cases where organisational and service characteristics vary from the cases used in this research. 
Whether similar results to those developed in this particular study were found, or whether the 
risk management practices of other such financial institutions may varyingly have similarities, 
could be examined.  
As this was a qualitative study, the findings could be used to develop hypotheses, which could 
be examined using quantitative methods. For example, these could be tested by surveys, 
sampling a larger number of organisations. By utilising a quantitative approach, the design of 
such could be informed by the findings of this qualitative study. A larger sample of participants 
and institutions involved in the FSCR process could be approached in a confirmatory manner. 
Increasing the number of organisations and participants in future studies would enable an 
increased confidence in the generalisability of the results. 
For example, while this study explored the risk characteristics of an aggregation of three 
financial institutions, it could be extended in several ways, including the investigation of the 
participants’ risk practices within other inbound and outbound parts of the supply chain 
process, which could be explored in more detail. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The management of FSCR in financial institutions was found to be important for organisational 
performance. FSCR were defined as financial institution risk effects viewed from a supply 
chain perspective that constrain attainment of institutional objectives. Chapter 1 of this thesis 
presented a brief description of the background of the research on FSCR in Australian financial 
institutions, the rationale for the research, the research aims and questions, and the research 
methodology used to meet the research objective.  
Chapter 2 provided a review of the literature where supply chain risks, transactional risks and 
the impacts of financial risks to both global and Australian financial institutions were 
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discussed. Research on FSCR was then reviewed and approaches that have been described 
about the management of risks in the supply chain were examined. Based on the literature, a 
conceptual model was presented to describe the major types of risk components of the supply 
chain, including demand and supply operations, product management in the supply chain, and 
IT risk in the supply chain. The literature showed that the nature of supply chain risk is complex 
and multidetermined. The TP methods of the TOC management philosophy, previously 
applied in organisational problem-solving research, were shown to be able to accommodate 
the examination of multiple risks together. 
Chapter 3 described the TP and qualitative methods to be used in the research process and the 
steps followed to meet the research aims, through the application of the adopted research 
strategy. First, the paradigm that formed the basis of the methodological framework and which 
was utilised to address the objective of this study was described. How the methodology would 
answer the research questions was explained and how the cases were sampled and the 
participants selected was described. Finally, the structure and design of participant semi-
structured interviews, the CRT and FRT inquiry process, and ethical considerations were 
described. 
Chapter 4 described the analysis and results of the current state analysis. It provided the 
findings of the application of the TP CRT method to interview data from senior risk 
management participants from three financial institutions. First, it described the nature of the 
function and structure of financial institutions in Australia. Second, it provided a description 
of the core risk effect categories thought to be the underlying causes of risk. Third, the findings 
of the CRT TP method over three functional levels of financial institutions (the operations 
level, business strategy level and corporate strategy level) were presented, to describe the 
contributions to risk and the proposed causal pathways among the risk-contributing 
characteristics at and between each level.  
 236 
 
Chapter 5 described the analysis and results of the desired future state analysis. It provided the 
findings of the application of the TP FRT method, which proposed a number of solutions that 
jointly respond to the risks identified from the CRT in Chapter 4. The FRT findings showed 
what the participants considered a desired future, where risks are effectively controlled. 
Chapter 6 provided a summary of how the research questions were answered and a discussion 
of the findings, and how the findings could be implemented in practice. 
This chapter summarised the research and the contribution of the findings to practical 
application, the research implications and the limitations. The TP methods employed were 
used to populate an entire organisation structural and functional conceptual scaffolding 
representing an aggregate view of the participating cases intended to give a generic view of 
Australian financial institutions comprising banking services. The TP methods accommodated 
the complexity and dynamic nature of both the causes of risk that affect institutional 
performance and the examination of the dynamic nature of a set of mutually dependant 
solutions.  
This research was a novel application of TP methods from a supply chain perspective to 
examine risk and risk mitigation in Australian financial institutions. This research showed 
that an Australian financial institution perspective encompassing an entire organisation was 
accommodated by the application of TP methods. The theoretical implication is that rather 
than portraying risk arising from a discrete subset of variables and manifesting in isolation, 
the results revealed the complexity of supply chain risk determinism in Australian financial 
institutions, where risk causal pathways were found to be interconnected and crossed over 
organisational functions and structures. The results showed that the most influential risk core 
effect types comprised people-centred failures, external service provider disruptions, policy 
and regulatory compliance limitations, and technology hub failures 
 237 
 
The results also showed the causal risk pathways arising from these effects as risk moved 
dynamically among the operational level, business strategy level and corporate strategy level 
of the financial institutions and across the major business types comprising retail financial 
services, wholesale and business financial services, product management and enterprise IT 
services and management. 
The findings contribute to extending understanding both of the nature of Australian financial 
institution risk and of its improved control through a similarly interconnected system of cross-
institutional risk treatments managed as a whole. Consequently, risk mitigation 
implementation approaches in Australian financial institutions are recommended to be highly 
interconnected and comprehensively managed as an interacting and interconnected system of 
risk controls.  
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Appendix A: Semi-structured interview 
schedule 
1. Participant role description questions 
a) What is your role in your organisation? 
b) How long have you worked for your current organisation? 
c) How long have you previously worked in a financial institution? and in a risk-related 
area? 
d) What is your educational attainment? 
2. Organisational characteristics questions 
a) What are the main divisions or business areas (approximately 3 to 5) of your 
organisation and what is their principal business focus? 
b) What are the main functional levels (same function across different business units) of 
the institution’s structure, for example, operational /business /corporate strategic 
levels? 
3. Organisational structures validation/triangulation 
a) Look at this draft diagram of a generic financial institution structure, does it fairly 
represent (in a generic way) the functions and structures in your organisation? What 
adjustments would you make?  
4. Current state inquiry (Thinking process - What to change?)   
Questions repeated for each of the four business areas/divisions and each of three 
organisational functional level consensus-agreed from (3) above: 
 Three organisational functional levels comprising operations, business strategy 
and corporate strategy; and, 
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 Four divisional/business functions retail, wholesale/business, product 
management, information technology management. 
a) What are the undesirable effects (UDEs) or risk effects from your perspective for 
each level of the organisation? (list undesirable effects & effects – not necessarily 
causes) 
b) Does this risk effect really exist at this level and how do you know? 
c) Is the UDE operation-business-corporate level located? 
d) In what other ways is it undesirable?  
e) Why do you/the financial institution tolerate the UDE/risk? 
f) What institutional strategic objective/s is being constrained by the UDE? 
g) What specifically results (if this... then…. what does it cause next?) from the UDE? 
h) Is there a specific action/effect causes the UDE? (“Constraint”) 
i) Are there other effects coming from this UDE/risk? 
j) Are all the causes\constraints here equally responsible for a financial institution's 
performance? If not then which of the cause\constraints have the biggest effect? 
k) Does this effect really exist in the current environment “How do we know this?”, 
“What about alternative explanations? E.g., Is it definitely lack of knowledge and not 
lack of time, or lack of motivation or some other factor?” 
5. Current state validation/triangulation 
a) Look at this draft diagram of UDE/risk effects mapped to each area of the generic 
financial institution structure, does it fairly represent (in a generic way) risk effects 
and their causes in your organisation? What adjustments would you make? 
6. Future state inquiry (Thinking process - what to change to and how?) 
Repeated for each of four business area/division and each organisational functional level: 
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 Three organisational functional levels comprising operations, business strategy 
and corporate strategy; and, 
 Four divisional/business functions retail, wholesale/business, product 
management, information technology management. 
 Use current reality tree maps consensus agreed from (6) as interview stimulus 
exhibit 
a) How we can mitigate the risk at the operations/business /corporate, what are your 
suggestions? 
b) What is the institution’s strategic objectives (that the risk effects constrain and that 
we want to better achieve through more effective risk control?) (desired future)? 
c) What are the critical success factors for achieving the desired future where the risks 
are better controlled and attainment of the institution’s objectives are less constrained 
by the risks? 
d) What are the necessary conditions needed to bring about these critical success 
factors?  
e) What (solutions/injections) would remediate the underlying UDE’s, how could the 
UDE’s be converted into more desired effects (DE’s) 
f) Should a financial institution try and address all the causes\constraints"? What 
happens if it addresses only some of them? 
g) Should a financial institution try to take all the actions or only a few of them? Which 
of them will have the most impact? Which action should be taken first, second and so 
on? 
h) If several actions are being taken simultaneously, is there a way to know which of 
them is the most effective? Are there dependencies between the solutions, i.e., for one 
to work another must be also present? 
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i) How can a financial institution ensure that an action does not improve one aspect of 
the financial institution at the expense of another? 
 
7. Future state validation/triangulation 
a) Look at this draft diagram of injections and their effects in each area of the generic 
financial institution structure on each of the main UDE’s, does it fairly represent (in a 
generic way) how risk and UDE’s and constraints could be better managed in your 
organisation? What adjustments would you make? 
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Appendix B: Sample interview transcripts 
Tier 1 Sample Interview 
Researcher 00;01 Today I'm going to interview about the FSCR and this is part of my project 
for the PhD and post-graduate, post PhD as well. I'm going to start, Participant 6, to ask you 
a few questions. If there's a chance, to give me more information about what's happening in 
your organisation. Before I start to go in more detail about the project, can you tell me about 
what's your background in the financial institution and how many years you have been 
working there? 
Researcher: 00:23 I want to put more details here. I just want to make sure I start recording. 
Recording now. Today we are going to be recording Tier 1 Participant. Tier 1 Participant: 
00:25 For operational risk, so I have an operational risk lead. I don't have a credit risk means. 
Researcher: 00:36 So Tier 1 Participant, I just want to ask you a few questions first and then 
I'll go into more detail about the demand operation and supply operation which are the most 
important things. Can you please tell me about background and your experience in the 
organisation? 
Tier 1 Participant: 00:49 Okay. I joined the Bank in 2004. My first job was looking after the 
cash in transit contracts. 
Researcher: 01:00 Oh, so  
Tier 1 Participant: 01:03 We use ***** predominantly. 
Tier 1 Participant: 05:44 I worked in cash in transit. Then I worked in procurement more 
generally. Then I worked in operations. Then, for the last seven years I've worked in risk 
roles, including two years at ***. 
Researcher: 06:05 When you talk about risk, which one? 
Tier 1 Participant: 06:07 Operational risk. 
Researcher: 06:08 Operational risk. When you say operation risk, what's involved? 
Tier 1 Participant: 06:12 I worked in–are you familiar with the three lines of defence? 
Researcher: 06:17 Yeah, first line second line. 
Tier 1 Participant: 06:18 Yeah, so I worked in the second line team within the CRO teams in 
what was group business services. It's now in process and transformation, so basically 
supportive– 
Researcher: 06:29 GBS. 
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Tier 1 Participant: 06:29 GBS. Yeah, that's right and I've supported lending businesses, the 
distribution businesses, financial crime when it was set up, broker business, so essentially the 
back offices businesses, not a customer facing business. 
Researcher: 06:49 When you say about defence, you're challenging the first line? 
Tier 1 Participant: 06:55 Correct so first line was responsible for managing risk. 
Researcher: 06:58 Yeah, engaging with that. 
Tier 1 Participant: 06:58 Second line was responsible for oversight challenge review of the 
work they did and the solutions and put in place and that's still the model we run today. 
Researcher: 07:10 It is. I was looking to the model and how they are impacting because 2009 
and now they have significant change about the structure. 
Tier 1 Participant: 07:18 There's been significant change. The three lines of defence model 
has remained, it's slightly tweaked. When I started in risk, each business had risk people that 
worked together. Now they've been consolidated into what's called the management 
insurance function. 
Researcher: 07:37 Exactly. What do you think about the second line defence? They should be 
working in the risk team or they should be working in the actual business unit? Or what 
about the first line and second line? 
Tier 1 Participant: 07:48 First line should be in the business. It has to be in the business, has 
to be connected to the business, working with the business, sitting with the business. 
Researcher: 07:54 Reporting to the business people? 
Tier 1 Participant: 07:56 Reporting to the business because they need to be part of the 
business, otherwise the business outsources its first responsibilities to somebody else, so they 
need to have ownership and they need to have reporting line up. Second line needs to report 
to risk because they need to be independent, otherwise if they sit with the business, they have 
lunch with the business, they talk, they go for drinks with the business, you end up with a 
sceptic. It's very hard to maintain that level of independence if you're structurally aligned to 
who it is as you're oversighting. You need that separation, and you need to make sure that if 
you have a concern you can escalate it through a different chain of command. 
Researcher: 08:38 Okay, so what do you think about–I'll come to that question later. This is 
your experience and anything change or what the change or the significant change has 
happened in the financial supply chain risk, in terms of operation, business banking, 
investment banking, wealth? 
Tier 1 Participant: 09:01 I guess conduct and it has been a huge issue for this bank and I 
think it's an emerging issue for the Australian industry. There's more and more. There's a 
greater awareness with the new organisation of the risks we are exposed to based on the 
pavers of our people and the design of our products and initiative right through the supply 
chain. One of the ways BANK has tried to address that is by building special capability so 
that the products and markets business we have is a product design house. 
Researcher: 09:40 Yes, part of their general design. 
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Tier 1 Participant: 09:42 That's right. The distribution business is a retail and business bank 
and distribution only, so they manage the risk of distributing the product, but they don't have 
any involvement in the design of the product. All product design is done essentially in one 
house in the products and markets area, so the risk teams that support their business have 
specialty expertise in there, whereas historically, within the retail business, we had both retail 
product design and retail distribution. That specialty was spread across. 
Researcher: 10:10 Okay, the question is here–you said people that design the product and the 
people that deliver the product–when you design the product, you're not exactly the same 
person who delivers the product? What's the change they're facing or how you are going to 
improve the product? Because you have to implement the product in the market. 
Tier 1 Participant: 10:26 The product design is responsible not only for the physical product, 
but also the process by which the product is distributed, so it's an end-to-end design 
requirement. Not only design the collateral that goes with it, in terms of conditions, all that 
sort of stuff, you're responsible for end-to-end design and then the distribution business 
basically just takes the product and sells a product as per the process. 
Researcher: 10:50 Okay, because you answered the second question. That's why this is going 
to go through any change that has happened during that or  
Tier 1 Participant: 10:58 That's probably doing the biggest from our organisation. 
Researcher: 11:01 Yes, comparing with another bank– 
Tier 1 Participant: 11:05 Yeah, and to be honest, APRA as a regulator struggles with that as a 
model because the other banks have regional models. 
Researcher: 11:14 They take your information. They're taking your information. 
Tier 1 Participant: 11:17 That's right. APRA can't quite get comfortable with, there's no 
personal 11:24 ??? for Australia. There's no one person that's responsible for end-to-end 
Australia because products and markets is responsible–element–the distribution business is 
responsible for the other piece, whereas your ends in model, bank1 model, the bank2 model–
there was a hit of all Australia and they can go and say, "Tell me how you do XYZ in 
Australian." That's not way our model works, so we do have some challenges getting APRA 
as a regulator around the complexities of our model. Structurally, the other thing that's 
significant is we run a performance unit framework. 
Researcher: 11:58 Yep. I know about that. 
Tier 1 Participant: 12:00 That's right 
Researcher: 12:00 So what do you think, or what you have seen in the last decades in the 
banking industry? In the financial model, the business model. It's much more digital, right. 
Checks are practically disappeared. Cash is diminishing and– 
Tier 1 Participant: 12:26 Yeah, Bitcoin 
Researcher: 12:27 Yeah, well that that's an emerging technology, so that's right. The risks we 
face are much more around financial disruptions and tech companies, people who come up 
with PayPal-type disintermediation of the services that a typical bank like ours, we'd offer, 
but yeah. You know, it's around credit card transactions, just general penetration of credit 
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cards. The ability to not generate any sort of paperwork when a credit card service swipe; 
much more customer focused; online payments, mobile wallets, all that.  
Researcher: 13:11 I want to ask you a question not from here. When you say about the credit 
card, why is the bank responsible for the credit card or any products? Why not the people 
that owe the organisation to produce the product.  
Tier 1 Participant: 13:23 So Visa or MasterCard? 
Researcher: 13:25 Yep. 
Tier 1 Participant: 13:27 Because what the banks offers is a distribution business, right? 
Researcher: 13:30 Yep, different channel. 
Tier 1 Participant: 13:30 That's right, yes. Visa are a global organisation, but in reality they're 
a quite small organisation, given the scope and reach because basically banks like ours are 
distribution houses for the visa card product.  
Researcher: 13:47 Why they are not responsible the loss? For example, I have my credit card 
and I lost maybe 1,000-2,000, through fraud or whatever. Why the bank have the guarantee 
or they cover the loss? Why not Visa because they have produced the product? 
Tier 1 Participant: 14:01 Because the bank– 
Researcher: 14:02 Distribution, is the agent. 
Tier 1 Participant: 14:04 That's right and part of the agency agreement is, for getting to clock 
the ticket on every transaction, I get to basically provide insurance or loss coverage to my 
customers for that. I have to make a trade-off. 
Researcher: 14:21 Agreement. 
Tier 1 Participant: 14:22 Business benefit. 
Researcher: 14:23 So we're just contracting an agreement. 
Tier 1 Participant: 14:25 That's exactly right.  
Researcher: 14:25 Already you've done it with Armour Guard or Chop. 
Tier 1 Participant: 14:27 Exactly, so it's the same sort of thing. I understand what my loss 
profile looks like. I get to manage and influence that because if Visa wore the final cost, they 
have no way of actually influencing the customer behaviour. They would then have to have 
huge numbers of staff to manage that. So if you lose your card, who are you going to ring? 
You ring your bank and because we manage the card, we will stop the transactions. We will 
also alert you proactively if we see some strange transactions on your card. If Visa had to do 
that globally for every card with their logo on it, that would just be unmanageable. 
Researcher: 15:03 I understand that, but my other question is, I'm not asking Visa to manage 
that. I'm asking why we are not and putting some cost involved that if this client lost his card, 
like $1,000, say 95% the bank will cover that and 5% visa because that one will give the Visa 
the opportunity also to act in a proactive way to develop the new product that helps the bank. 
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Tier 1 Participant: 15:33 So you're arguing that Visa aren't incentivised to improve? 
Researcher: 15:37 To making them improve their product, 
Tier 1 Participant: 15:39 Yep, that's an arguable point, yes. 
Researcher: 15:43 It's one way to they let them think about the way that they have to deliver 
a new product for you to innovate new things because when you ask them what is 
responsible, they will start to innovate something different, rather than just do the product 
and deliver it.  
Tier 1 Participant: 15:57 Well, I think you'd have to argue that they have it right, so chip 
cards are a card manufacturer lead innovation that now exists that didn't exist twenty years 
ago. That wasn't made by a bank. 
Tier 1 Participant: 16:09 Different product. 
Researcher: 16:10 That's right. That was product development and certainly that has 
materially influenced the–certainly cardinal present transactions are more risky than when a 
card is present, so it has made a material difference and that's a product lead innovation. 
Researcher: 16:27 So can you please explain for me the financial supply can work has 
worked in your organisation? 
Tier 1 Participant: 16:34 That's where I need you to frame up some stuff for me and I will try 
and fill in the blanks. 
Researcher: 16:38 Okay. Now, let's go to the personal banking–personal banking or go to 
retail banking, we call it. They have cash delivery for the branches and how it's work that, 
what's improvement or place or other way this. Other example like credit card when the 
customer go to the bank or customer going to deliver some money through their ATM 
machine, not through the branch staff. 
Tier 1 Participant: 17:03 Okay, so we'd start a retail bank, so we have outsourced cash 
management, so cash services. They provide cash management services for all of our 
branches in Australia, so branches are on a delivery schedule and they get to–if they need 
special deliveries, whatever. Cash services, as you know, also manage our ATM deliveries 
and so they do all the tracking of ATMs and they do that. 
Researcher: 17:30 AMC. 
Tier 1 Participant: 17:32 Yep, that's right. Branches take deposits from ATMs, so for those 
ATMs that are in branch versus standalone ATMs, so they manage that and in emergencies 
branches can, not very often, but we'll stock ATMs, but typically that's done by– 
Researcher: 17:56 Some of the ATMs, yeah. Very rare. 
Tier 1 Participant: 17:58 For delivery of credit cards, that's often by customer preference and 
there's also a risk lens applied to that. There are certain suburbs that we would choose not to 
mail a credit card to a customer's home. We would ask them to nominate a branch and collect 
from this branch. 
Researcher: 18:19 Based on what? 
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Tier 1 Participant: 18:20 Based on crime stats, so western Sydney, for example, probably not 
so much. 
Researcher: 18:26 Auburn. 
Tier 1 Participant: 18:26 That's right, you know the places, right? And southern Melbourne, 
so it's not a city centric thing, but there are certain suburbs where people can recognise what 
a blank envelope looks like and what it might be. They go through people's mails if 
mailboxes aren't secure. 
Researcher: 18:45 Is that the government they have to put the different procedure in place to 
mitigate the crime or fraud? 
Tier 1 Participant: 18:52 I'm not sure it's necessary. Well, you should argue it's an overall 
government responsibility, but governments would see this as a bank risk. You are making 
money out of this product and the balance we need to find out is, to be perfectly honest, most 
customers, all customers, would prefer the credit cards delivered to their mailbox because it 
saves them a trip. We have to make a risk-based decision around how much we deliver on 
the customer’s wishes versus what it costs us when the card gets stolen and used for 48 
hours. 
Researcher: 19:35 Okay, but are you delivering the card, but you're not delivering the VIN 
number. 
Tier 1 Participant: 19:39 Yeah, but as know, it's got a chip. 
Researcher: 19:41 Correct, but you can't activate the chip unless the customer calls. 
Tier 1 Participant: 19:45 But no, people that are good at that they can sell a blank card and 
then they can extract the information off it. 
Researcher: 19:50 Which is they scan the device. 
Tier 1 Participant: 19:51 Its whole value to the criminal in society is a blank card, and it's not 
a great customer experience at the first–you know, you get a card and then it gets deactivated 
and then you have to fill out whole paperwork that says you didn't get the card. You state the 
date that says the card wasn't delivered. So that's credit cards. A lot of our wealth businesses 
is done through adviser channels. You asked about wealth, right, so we have some in-house 
advisors, but a lot of that was done by aligned financial planners and those sort of people 
Researcher: 20:27 We know what's happening here, in UK, and other banks as well. 
Tier 1 Participant: 20:33 That's right and that's really a part of the challenging model. I mean, 
the advantage for us is it allows us to grow a distribution network really quickly. The 
challenge is it's how do we manage the quality of the service, the quality of advice, how do 
we make sure that the device is delivered, which is in the best interest of the customer and 
not necessarily the best interest in the adviser because there's always this internal conflict. If I 
sell you a product and I'm an advisor, I get paid for that. 
Researcher: 21:06 Correct. Yes, you get commission. 
Tier 1 Participant: 21:08 That's right. Now, so I am challenged by if none of the products are 
suitable for you, what I should say is none of the products are suitable for you. 
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Researcher: 21:18 What about your performance? 
Tier 1 Participant: 21:19 That's right, so there is an inherent conflict in that as a distribution 
model. 
Researcher: 21:25 Exactly, that happened with bankA. 
Tier 1 Participant: 21:27 With stock. That's right. Inappropriate advice was provided because 
the incentives were good. Certainly bankB has led the way with the reduction of 
commissions, so if you want a financial account from an email seat, that's alright, a financial 
plan for an email seat, you will have to pay a flat fee upfront and you clear what you're given 
and what you're not given and so you form a value about whether or not you want to invest 
another thousand bucks, 15 hundred bucks, whatever it is, to get a financial plan, but it's not 
commission based so advisors and senior advisors do a good job.  
Researcher: 21:58 BankC first speak what happened in UK a few years back. 
Tier 1 Participant: 22:03 Conduct losses, yeah. To a certain extent, we're a victim of the 
industry. Everyone was selling payment protection insurance. We are a very small fish in the 
Australian and everyone was doing the same thing and we were just a buff. Should we have 
been smarter on that? Yes, we should've. 
Researcher: 22:24 Just more work. 
Tier 1 Participant: 22:26 That's right. 
Researcher: 22:26 What's an impact of the demand operation or the financial supply chain 
risk, when we're talking about demand. 
Tier 1 Participant: 22:34 This is customs demand? 
Researcher: 22:35 Correct. 
Tier 1 Participant: 22:35 Customers are more time poor so they have less appetite to meet in 
person. Things that can be done online digitally is good. The challenge for us on that is email 
legislation. 
Researcher: 23:00 Yes, email, that's one of the things. 
Tier 1 Participant: 23:02 Yeah. We need to be much–particularly around where there's a risk 
that we might be financing terrorists or accepting money from terrorists, we need to know the 
customer. The KYC requirements are much higher than they were and we need to make sure 
we've got an evidence-based defensible position. Now, to extent that you can create an 
identity online without ever going face-to-face, does represent a challenge. That's what the 
customer wants and for all the honest and genuine customers, that's a fantastic experience. 
The risk it creates for us is that we need a secure way of verifying that the person on the end 
of the phone line, on the end of the computer screen is the person they're portraying to be and 
that's the risk for us. 
Researcher: 23:56 Okay, I like that. When the customer come to the branch or engaging with 
the bank, why not create a new account or new email? 
Tier 1 Participant: 24:10 Like a bank generated email? 
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Researcher: 24:12 Yeah, which is easy, more secure. 
Tier 1 Participant: 24:16 Yeah, absolutely, so when we have email correspondence or we 
have message correspondence within our internet banking, offering. 
Researcher: 24:22 Yeah, I was thinking that's why the bank is one of the worst transactions. 
Create account. 
Tier 1 Participant: 24:28 But you're a customer. If you want to be communicated to–I mean, I 
don't know about you, but I have three email accounts. I don't actually want a fourth one 
that's a bank one. What I want is for the bank to communicate with me with the email 
accounts I currently use. If they want to send to me–your statements are available–I want that 
to my existing email account. I don't want to have to remember to go into my internet 
banking to get a message or I'm already in my internet banking–I can see my statements are 
there.  
Researcher: 24:59 Yeah, but the email more secure. 
Tier 1 Participant: 25:03 The email is more secure. 
Researcher: 25:05 One thing. The other thing is like you can generally, like how you have 
credit card, exactly how you have to have your email. You have your online banking, but you 
have your own email. They've logged everything what you want, checking all the history. 
Instead of sending invoices, invoices, or sending envelopes or bank statement transactions. 
Tier 1 Participant: 25:24 Absolutely by preference, we don't mail anything to any customer. 
We would like all customers to deliver–they can get electronic copies of the mortgage 
documents, they can get electronic statements that are online, are archived for seven years. 
They can generate all their tax statements online, so all of that is the way the customer, so 
they can do all their banking from home. That that's what they want because they don't want 
to have to A find a park outside of a city branch, go into a branch, wait in a queue. 
Researcher: 25:56 No parking. 
Tier 1 Participant: 25:57 But also, I mean they're prepared to do that, if there's an advice or if 
there's a specialist element to the conversation. But if it's just I want to get a credit card, I 
want to get a form, I want to I want to get a statement, they don't see that as value adding for 
their time. They can have that delivered to them. 
Researcher: 26:16 Yeah, that's correct. How are we going to minimise that–the demand 
operations challenge? 
Tier 1 Participant: 26:27 It's always going to be a trade-off between making it as simple as 
possible for the genuine customers. 
Researcher: 26:37 Simplifying them. 
Tier 1 Participant: 26:39 Simplifying the whole process, so getting on-boarded. One of the 
challenges for us, and maybe it's the same for other banks, but certainly for us is that if you 
charge through multiple channels, and multiple systems won't talk to one another. If you're 
an MLC customer and then you open and join a–you get a transaction account and maybe 
you've come to a talk with business banking, you get a business account, you will probably 
end up with three different profiles. 
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Researcher: 27:12 What about the complexity here? 
Tier 1 Participant: 27:13 That's the trade-off. We have vast number dollars invested in 
complex systems. Aspirationally, what we would like to have is a centralised customer 
management process. 
Researcher: 27:25 Next gen? 
Tier 1 Participant: 27:26 Next gen will go some way to that, but essentially that's still a 
personal banking platform. It's certainly not in the life business so ZZZ products, insurance 
products won't sit there in generation one. It's not a business banking platform at the present 
time. In an ideal world, customers expect because I've interacted with you once that you 
know who I am and that I don't have to repeat everything. Now, that's a reasonable 
expectation of the customer. It's very hard to do from a technology and multiple systems 
point of view. 
Researcher: 28:00 It's theoretically easy to draw. 
Tier 1 Participant: 28:04 It's easy to draw, exactly. That's right. 
Researcher: 28:04 But to implement it in reality it's a lot of thinking, interactions, especially 
when you put in the customer with the business, with the internal, with the external, provider 
services, internal provider, operation, and all that. Integration is not easy, especially when–
because I have IT background, I understand how they're engaging interaction between all the 
application, how they talk with each other. So it's not easy to implement the theory there and 
that's in programming language. It's very something very complicated. 
Tier 1 Participant: 28:31 That's right, yes, and the reality is even if we had a centralised 
thing, how much information do we collect on the very first time we touch it because if it's 
just a credit card, you just want name and address and confirm your identity and they'll let 
you go, but if then you want a transaction, then we'd need more information, right? So do we 
collect all that information the first time you touch us? So there's always that trade-off 
between what's the right customer experience, what makes sense for us to deliver as a bank, 
and how do we make sure we're managing the risk? 
Researcher: 29:02 Privacy you're talking about? 
Tier 1 Participant: 29:04 Well, privacy is one issue, but more importantly how do we make 
sure we're managing the AML risk and the serious financing risk because that also, 
particularly since modern place and ISIS is sort–all of that sort of stuff–we are getting a 
much stronger focus from a Austrac around how robust our process is. They don't care about 
customer experience. 
Researcher: 29:31 No, no, they don't care. 
Tier 1 Participant: 29:33 They want to make sure that every person that comes in the door 
we've done an appropriate level of identification. So small business customers, they close 
their shop at ten o'clock. They want a channel that allows them to deposit cash at night, so we 
have an ATM that'll take a deposit. 
Researcher: 29:48 That's exactly what I'm looking. The other question is what are the 
impacts of the supply operation? We spoke about the demand. Now we're talking about the 
supply operation. 
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Tier 1 Participant: 29:58 Well, supply is we need to find ways to have more customer 
friendly interfaces, so banks are now open on Saturdays. Ten years ago, twenty years ago 
that never happened. Banks were open from nine used to shut at five, maybe four on Friday, 
so all that. ATMs do a lot more than they used to do. The ability to make a deposit, to bank a 
check–all of that sort of things outside of ours. There are more ATMs. ATMs are smarter. 
Researcher: 30:27 2,000. 
Tier 1 Participant: 30:27 That's exactly right, so all of those sorts of. We're increasing 
touchpoints in shopping centres, we're experimenting the sort of advice-based kiosk type 
stuff. What we're trying to do is rather than force the customer to come to us is to have our 
points of presence where the customer is already there doing something else. 
Researcher: 30:49 So you mean enhancing the relationship between the bank and the 
community or the customer? 
Tier 1 Participant: 30:55 In the customer, yeah, but the old banking model was we decided 
based on–we would get a whole lot of space on a high street and we'd build a great big 
branch there. Now, they're getting smaller and because we actively discourage people to go 
for a branch for a lot of stuff that used to have to go to a branch for now. So we're actually 
trying to say you should be able to most of what you need to do with us online and if you 
can't, we'll try and put somewhere close to you on a Saturday. 
Researcher: 31:28 That's really good. What about in terms of the supply contractor like 
********************** what they have, the application. 
Tier 1 Participant: 31:41 Yeah, so our demands of them are changing to. One is I think we're 
moving to stronger partnerships, so we're looking to leverage their expertise from other 
clients and also other industries. I think part of that problem– 
Tier 1 Participant: 32:01 That's really good points because came to the Visa card because 
when I said to you, "We have to make them responsible 5% or some percent do that." They're 
focusing on not only just to deliver the product or the bank, they're focusing to innovate a 
new way to enhance and lift the bank's performance because as a supplier for the service they 
have not only just to do the business, they have to help the business to move forward. It's not 
going just to bring the card, it's they have to innovate a new way. It could be something 
small–chips; it could be something on the phone; it could be something different; it could be 
like using like different technology. Our life is evolving and changing very quickly and we 
have to be more strategic focused and fast and fast innovators. Other than that, we will be left 
behind and we'll never meet what's the market needs because our life is changing. Since 2000 
and now, a huge change, so we are able to adopt a new thing is the thing. 
Tier 1 Participant: 32:56 Thirty years ago, the only fun you had was in your house and it was 
tied to the wall. 
Researcher: 33:02 Overseas nothing. 
Tier 1 Participant: 33:03 That's right. Now if you walk out without your phone or leave your 
phone at home, it's like your arm's been chopped off. 
Researcher: 33:09 Yeah, you can't live. 
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Tier 1 Participant: 33:13 That's right and people are used to being able to do things on the 
phone. They can look up stuff on the phone, they can book stuff on the phone. They expect to 
be able to pay for stuff from their phone. They expect to be able to use their phone and not 
have to carry a wallet. 
Researcher: 33:24 Do you have any measurement in place to measure the risk that you have? 
Tier 1 Participant: 33:29 The risk, yes. We quantify risk. 
Researcher: 33:30 Based on what? 
Tier 1 Participant: 33:33 Operational risk by capital, so we have a capital model that my team 
runs that's based on inputs that around our internal loss history. We have some future looking 
lost scenarios. We also take we also buy external loss data from all over the world. ORX. 
And we use another internal scoring mechanism that basically rates all of our PUs about how 
mature they are in their risk management. 
Researcher: 34:07 Which application are you using? 
Tier 1 Participant: 34:09 We've just implemented. The model is a home built model, a 
BANK built model. The Oracle platform we've introduced, risk map, provides the internal 
loss data. 
Researcher: 34:19 I recognise 12 I. 
Tier 1 Participant: 34:21 That's an Offsa product. 
Researcher: 34:24 Have you heard about SAP Financial Friendly risk? 
Tier 1 Participant: 34:31 No, is it good? 
Researcher: 34:32 I recently had a discussion with one of the directors there, guy from my–
when I was working for and he said it's a new product for the banking and the banking going 
to like something different. I spoke with him a next gen. He said it is very complicated and I 
think they will face a lot of difficulties to implement it, reality. So I said maybe. 
Tier 1 Participant: 34:58 I think all big systems you have a little bit degree– 
Researcher: 35:01 Everything, exactly. 
Tier 1 Participant: 35:02 We use ****  for our HR records. Operational capital, that actually 
calculates at a hollow bank level what the appropriate level of capital we need to hold to 
manage our risk. We also measure losses and record losses. Businesses will plan and have a 
financial plan so they will measure their performance against how much they've had to put 
away versus how much they expected to lose. 
Researcher: 35:26 That's when 35:27 Var and Non-Var, something like that? 
Tier 1 Participant: 35:29 Yeah, so on a market risk basis, that's right. For operational risk it's 
just a non-lending loss plan line. 
Researcher: 35:36 Okay the other question is information system management. What are the 
impacts? You touch it in the some over here about information privacy. 
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Tier 1 Participant: 35:48 And it touches everything. 
Researcher: 35:52 Data governance, data integration, monitoring, outsourcing, 
communication. 
Tier 1 Participant: 35:55 So that's one of our big risks good that if one of the new things is 
that we probably haven't paid enough attention to how valuable our data is and how accurate 
we need it to be. So things like keeping up-to-date with people's email addresses you keeping 
up-to-date. That stuff is really hard because there are some documents that we required by 
law or where we don't have customers consent to send it by email. We have to physically 
distribute and then we get a third, 20% back because customers have moved. And that's just a 
cost and a waste to the organisation when the customer doesn't get the information they need 
or require. 
Researcher: 36:49 Instead of that they're moving, so about the email they can check emails. 
Tier 1 Participant: 36:54 The email moves with them, so that's great. I have the same email 
address I had 10 years ago or 15 years ago. But I'm at two different addresses in that time. 
Researcher: 37:08 Exactly. What you're saying is there's a right way and a correct way. Why 
Australian provost they're implementing they force everyone to have email and why not the 
bank? 
Tier 1 Participant: 37:19 Two reasons for that. We would love to get customers to have 
email. 
Researcher: 37:24 Yes, like have your customer come to the branch and you have to provide 
email. They'll provide ID, they have to take their email. 
Tier 1 Participant: 37:31 And that will happen over a period of time, but for a certain 
generation of customers, perhaps slightly older than me– 
Researcher: 37:42 That's still young. 
Tier 1 Participant: 37:43 Yeah, but they aren't comfortable. They don't trust email. They have 
a level of concern around being able to do that. And also they like– 
Researcher: 37:55 37:57 Publish and not think. 
Tier 1 Participant: 37:58 They do. They like to walk into a branch once a week and say hi to 
Mary who's behind the thing and Mary knows them and they'll have a five minute chat and 
that's why the queues are so long, that customer loves that interaction. 
Researcher: 38:09 Social. 
Tier 1 Participant: 38:11 That's right. Whereas, I would choose never to go into a branch if I 
could and it's not that I don't like branch people, it's just that– 
Researcher: 38:18 People difference. 
Tier 1 Participant: 38:19 That's right. I'm a busy person there's no value for me going into 
branch. I mean, it's a little bit simpler given that I have to walk past a branch to go into the 
building. So if I have to I can, but my choice I'm never going to go. Anyway, we're talking 
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about technology systems. The challenges that banks historically have had large, big, 
monolithic, centrally run technology systems which are incredibly hard to maintain, 
incredibly hard to update large amounts of investment that require multiple years of delivery 
to do. That's not the customer's experience when they can get a new app in three seconds 
right and if they don't like that app they'll go and try another one. So that's part of the 
challenge we're facing is that we have a business model that's based around having central, 
everyone access to the data and customers are used to providing their data to 25 different 
apps, but that each of those apps are something very unique, very specific, and very value 
adding for the customer, and that's the challenge we are facing. 
Researcher: 39:24 What about the processing and the payment? 
Tier 1 Participant: 39:26 Processing the payment? That probably hasn't changed as much as 
other parts of the bank. It's still banks settling with each other that still. Even though a 
customer may do it via internet banking, once it gets to us it's still essentially processed the 
same way. If it falls out, it's still recovered the same way or a customer inquiry, so that part I 
mean there's probably some on the trade area where it's gone from it used to be all paper 
docks. It's now gone to digital, but fundamentally that part hasn't changed for the big banks. I 
guess where it becomes challenging is you get people like PayPal and bitcoins and these sort 
of things. PayPal less so because at the end of the day there's a bank at the end of the 
transaction. 
Researcher: 40:20 Yes, now, that's very good point.  
Tier 1 Participant: 40:21 Bitcoin is very different, right, because there isn't a bank at the end 
of that transaction. 
Researcher: 40:25 Now why we are not using why we are using PayPal? We're not using the 
bank, or a credit card? Because if your PayPal account doesn't work you can use your credit 
card. 
Tier 1 Participant: 40:38 That's right. 
Researcher: 40:38 So why we are duplicating our process? 
Tier 1 Participant: 40:42 I don't know, but there must there must be something that 
customers–and PayPal I think quite quickly worked on two things. There's general customer 
fear about providing their credit card on an Internet transaction. 
Researcher: 41:00 Directly to their client? 
Tier 1 Participant: 41:01 That's right, yep, and so they said we can have a we can make a 
position here, we can make a market here that says will provide a certain level of security for 
both the buyer and the seller - 
Researcher: 41:12 Correct. 
Tier 1 Participant: 41:12 And we will clip the ticket for doing it 
Researcher: 41:15 But even when we do that through the credit card then it's going only 
binary digits, so how they are another end going to know that? 
Tier 1 Participant: 41:23 No that's right yeah. 
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Researcher: 41:22 So same thing duplicating the process. 
Tier 1 Participant: 41:24 It is, but they've been able to convince customers that there's value 
that they provide in their transaction. 
Researcher: 41:33 That's one of the good things. What do you think about if there is anything 
that we are going to eliminate or minimise the risk that involves information system or 
information system of the information management, information system of technology 
system, application, hardware, software contracts as well? 
Tier 1 Participant: 41:57 We will minimise some of the physical risk through cloud-based 
storages and virtualisation of storage, so we will no longer be exposed to a sprinkler going 
off and hosing down, right? That doesn't happen anymore so I think the physical risk, the 
robustness of the systems is going to be there. However, we are more exposed to cyber threat 
Researcher: 42:26 Cyber, yup, technology.  
Tier 1 Participant: 42:26 Yep absolutely and there are people who make a living out of trying 
to hack banks and they're very good at it and certainly we expect it. It's not an if, it's a when 
it will happen. So we invest a lot of money, time, and resources 
Researcher: 42:46 Integration, security level, encryption.  
Tier 1 Participant: 42:49 Yeah both security, but also in detection and being able to shut it 
down as quickly as possible  
Researcher: 42:54 We face that skimming device, internet banking, especially internal could 
be the challenge that we face, especially if we remember in 2011 when the ATM used to 
double digit, give money. Last week or two weeks ago, one bank in India lost a huge amount 
of money through their cybersecurity, a huge amount of money  
Tier 1 Participant: 43:21 Yeah it's happening, it's coming right. The other thing is we need to 
educate customers about the risks right because what's a really bad customer experiences is if 
I get a lead of an email potentially from a bank and it says look we're about to lock you out 
of the system you just need to confirm that you are still a valid customer, unfortunately 
there's a reasonably high percentage of our customers that will click on that link, provide 
their security details, and think they're doing the right thing. Now, at the end of the day we're 
probably going to make good on that to the customer although we have no legal requirement 
to. From a customer experience point of view we've got to make good on that. 
Researcher: 44:00 The question is, what are the impact of the product management and also 
the challenge that they're facing and how we are going to minimise the risk when you talk 
about the new product life cycle innovation and other things? 
Tier 1 Participant: 44:13 Okay so products are no longer designed for 5 or 10 years horizons; 
they're designed for one or two so there's a much– 
Researcher: 44:21 Mainframe. 
Tier 1 Participant: 44:21 Yeah there's a much faster expectation of product design, get it to 
market quickly. 
Researcher: 44:29 Or respond to market need  
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Tier 1 Participant: 44:30 Respond to market need, get it in there, and we talk in the bank 
about file fast so MVP, Minimum Viable Product. Have an idea and get it to the market as 
quickly as you can. Test of a customer and say, "Hey, look, 80% of this is good. This is the 
20% you need to." Fix that get it out again, so that's an agile delivery, but also an expectation 
that that product is probably not going to be around over the next ten years. You need to 
continually have new products coming along that meeting new needs of customers, so the 
idea of a single transaction account that does all the customers, which is the way we 
traditionally design for a bank, doesn't exist anymore. It's also around you know how can we 
deliver it to the customer in the way they want receive it, so whether that be via phone, via 
internet banking and what’s the trade-off between usability functionality and risk. 
Researcher: 45:29 What's the risk involved? 
Tier 1 Participant: 45:29 Well the risk is if you lose your phone and you haven't locked it, 
people can access or people in steal your identity so identity theft applies. We get people 
calling our call centres saying you know, "I'm Tier 1 Participant. I've lost, my house has 
burned down," but you know whatever, trying to steal my identity and then move money 
around. So it's that always that trade-off between what's the experience you want to give 
99.9% of your customers who are doing the right thing and are genuine versus mitigating the 
risk of the .1% who are there to try and damage the bank. 
Researcher: 46:06 Sorry for interrupting you because I think time running out. What KPI 
involved in your organisation? 
Tier 1 Participant: 46:13 We use KPIs at a business level so PU or performance units, 
whatever a standard set of KPIs. 
Researcher: 46:18 PU? 
Tier 1 Participant: 46:20 Performance unit. Within risk, we have KRI's, we have key risk 
indicators by product, by process that help identify with the product price is within its 
bounds. 
Researcher: 46:36 That's one. And what's the bank percentage that they put in for 
performance and risk. 
Tier 1 Participant: 46:41 So we basically track that against how much money we're losing 
versus how much we expect to lose. 
Researcher: 46:47 Yep. 
Tier 1 Participant: 46:47 Now that we've sold the UK our numbers look a whole lot better. So 
we're tracking better than last year, but things like card fraud, cyber fraud–they go up and 
down depending on you know, who's winning the battle whether the banks and the card 
companies have been able to lock it down or as soon as something's discovered you know 
they just hit you up well fine. 
Researcher: 47:09 Yeah what's the relationship between the financials supply chain risk, 
what we're talking about and then the performance of the organisation? We spoke about all 
the difference. 
Tier 1 Participant: 47:22 Well I mean you've looked at our financial reports. The largest 
write-offs we've had have been related to risks, particularly in the UK. We've written off 
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large amounts so if we get the risk management trade-off wrong, if we are exposed to risks 
that we didn't understand, we end up impacting the financial performance significantly. For 
credit risk and those risk, those are those are cyclical and we follow the market up and down 
and the margin tends to flow with that, but for operational risks, it's not a flat thing so 
conduct risk blows up and then it comes down again, and then cyber risk or fraud or–there is 
no cyclical pattern and there's no way you can build those prices in. So it's very much an 
exposure model. 
Researcher: 48:13 Okay, so that means that there's a significant relationship between the 
financial supply chain risk and the performance for the bank. Is that one a positive thing or 
negative thing? 
Tier 1 Participant: 48:23 Well, if the risks increased, it's negative for the performance of the 
organisation, yeah. I guess the point I was trying to make, there are no leap–so when we start 
losing money on a credit cycle, we start increasing interest rates to reflect that. That's not an 
acceptable response when we start losing money because of operational risks. So if we're 
exposed to more fraud we don't up the credit card rate on all our customers, right. You can't 
do that.  
Researcher: 48:53 Do you have implement any technology or money theory in a place to 
minimise that the risk that the bank they are facing, such as Six Sigma, Kaizen, or other? 
Tier 1 Participant: 49:03 So yes so this is quite a strong Kaizen implement that we focus a lot 
around process improvement. Is it focused particularly around risk? No, but it is focused 
around trying to make the processes robust, resilient, and repeatable, and so to a certain 
extent that reduces the risk of the process but it's not driven with risk as a focus. There's 
acknowledgement that risk as a positive outcome, but typically it's driven around what is the 
customer experience and how do we make it? How to reduce errors in the process so for the 
customer it's right first time 100% of the time? So the focus of tends to be more around 
customer experience, yeah. 
Researcher: 49:43 Do you think that the relationship between relationship between financial 
supply chain risk and the performance of the bank can be enhanced in a positive way by 
Kaizen or Six Sigma or other theory? 
Tier 1 Participant: 49:53 Absolutely. If our ability to minimise–well given I've said there's a 
link between how much money we're losing and financial performance, we can improve how 
much money we lose by improving the processes and the risks. So yes, whatever the tool is–
Kaizen, Six Sigma–yes.  
Researcher: 50:10 Yeah, I doubt Six Sigma is one of the process  
Tier 1 Participant: 50:14 I'm less fussed on what the tool is, but if you focus on mitigating the 
risk, the challenge always is that you can lock the bank down and reduce your risk, and then 
you've got no customers left right? So it's what is the risk reward and to a certain extent, 
banks are in the business of taking risk. That's what we do, that's how we make money. And 
as a consequence, we're always going to lose some money. It's getting the balance right 
between customer trade-off and minimising your risk.  
Researcher: 50:46 One of the last questions. What about the development staff and training 
and all those things? Any specific training or just knowledge-based or this requirement to 
read? 
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Tier 1 Participant: 50:58 So yeah, so we have–within risk we have–we have three levels of 
risk training that all the staff are required to do depending on the role. We have general 
information security training that all staff are required to do. 
Researcher: 51:15 Compliance. 
Tier 1 Participant: 51:15 That's right so there are–and that's refreshed on an annual basis. So 
you know there's training around health and safety, so managing people risk, mental health 
risk–so there are various training courses that are required of all staff. And then for people in 
specialist roles there's specialist training so the cyber security guys will do different training.  
Researcher: 51:40 So what do you think what the way the best way to or what's your 
suggestion to mitigate the risk that the bank facing now? General question. 
Tier 1 Participant: 51:47 General question? 
Researcher: 51:49 Because I'm going to use this question to implement a new strategy, 
especially you see the complex relationship between all the business units. 
Tier 1 Participant: 51:57 So I think the credit stuff's pretty well. I think the opportunity is in 
the operational risk space because I don't think we do enough, we generate enough insightful 
information about where we lose money from operational risks, and I don't–and it's hard to 
take that to particular products and particular processes. That's our gap. I don't know if it's 
the same for all organisations, but we collect good data that says this is where we lose money 
but it's really hard to aggregate at a product process–so you can go back and say the problem 
is with the design process, or the product is with this particular part of distribution. 
Researcher: 52:41 Do you think that it's the process or the reporting? 
Tier 1 Participant: 52:45 Well I think the reporting then allows you to identify the process so 
I think it's two steps. I think they're related.  
Researcher: 52:57 I would like to thank you Tier 1 Participant for the valuable information. 
Thank you very much for that and really appreciate your support on this. 
 
Tier 2 Sample Interview 
Tier 2 Participant: (01:09) I received the document you've asked me to sign and I'll send that 
back to you after the call, if that's alright. 
Researcher: (01:21) Yeah, thank you for that. 
Tier 2 Participant: (01:22) That's okay. Alright, where do you want to take off from? 
Researcher: (01:29) You asked me last time about which division I was working. Yes, I was 
working the risk division under the operations side. 
Tier 2 Participant: (01:42) Yes. I think we've kind of gone through the flaws haven't we, last 
time. You sent me an updated– 
Researcher: (01:52) Right. Basically, the current Reality Tree, the one that we have spoken 
about last week which represents the actually situation in the financial institutions. We have 
identified four main core effects that's affect or increase the level of the risk that the financial 
institution is facing. I have categorised those elements which is in a control failure type 
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which is either people central or from the extended service provider, disruption, or 
regulatory, or the last one which is technology have failure. This is that core control failure 
type.  
Tier 2 Participant: (02:40) Yes, what we were talking about. The only one that's missing 
there from my view would be process. There's the people failure, but an actual failure in the 
process itself, the way it's been set up. 
Researcher: (03:00) Yes. 
Tier 2 Participant: (03:01) When you're with that one stage. 
 
Researcher: (03:03) Yes, I agree with that and that one represent in slide number 18, if you 
see, that has the process. The complicated tree. 
Tier 2 Participant: (03:15) I'll have to go back to your slide. Sorry, I'm sort of jumping 
between that one other one. So slide 18–it was that? 
Researcher: (03:23) Yes. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (03:27) Whereabouts? I can't that here, sorry. There's quite a bit going on 
the slide so I can't see. 
Researcher: (03:34) Slide 18 and it shows the interaction between each element affecting the 
operation side from the front line to a business side. For example, if you go to the demand 
core effect or issue, if we have inadequate staff training (they haven't followed the process or 
they haven't followed the policy that the financial institution has), that will affect the 
operations side in terms of there can be a human error in database. That one can cause 
demand compliance risk. For example, what happened with BankA. One of the staff has 
entered a transfer 5 million to different client. That will cause damage for BankA, as an 
example. So we have to have a process in each equivalent place and each staff have to follow 
the procedure that we have in the financial institution. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (04:36) I guess to me, you see that it can be related, but it could be 
different. You could have a process that's perfect, but then the staff member misunderstands 
or doesn't follow up, so then it's a human error. But you could have a process that's actually 
imperfect and the staff member follows it perfectly, so it's not a human error. It's actually that 
the process is flawed. 
 
Researcher: (05:05) Yep, I'll consider that. I'll put in my notes, yeah. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (05:07) I think it could be different. They're often related. They're often, 
you know, the process isn't fantastic, the person following the process makes a mistake, leads 
to, as you said, a compliance type of effect or it could relate to an execution delivery 
processing-type error that might or might not be compliance related. They're often together, 
but they can be different and I think I certainly have come across a number of risks or even 
ones that take place where it has been a process that's flawed and the person following it has 
followed it properly, but the actual process is still the incorrect (05:52) style. 
 
Researcher: (05:52) You mean by process, the actual framework in the way that reporting 
from one division to another division, or engaging? 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (06:00) Well, it could be any sort of process really, so it could be how we 
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transfer funds between banks over ten years old. There's a written process around that and 
that will have a number of controls built into it, but the person executing that process, 
following it, could follow the process as it's written and if there are errors in the actual way 
that it's documented, you could still end up with a risk or an actual effect.  
Researcher: (06:40) I agree with that and I'll consider that and I'll try to allocate and adjust 
the framework that I'm developing to what you have said. This is what you see in slide 
number seffecteen, which is the current situation in the financial institutions. Do you have 
any suggestion other than that process to consider? 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (07:12) On that one, what I was saying was that I felt there were other 
types of risks as well, under risk category. I felt that that wasn't complete. If it were me, I 
would put regulatory risks and compliance risks under operations risks–that's just how we 
see it. 
 
Researcher: (07:35) Okay. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (07:37) I think your conduct risks can sometimes be seen under operations 
risk, but it can be separate. Obviously, you've got credit risk, but I think that the context of 
the financial institution you've also got market risks and interest rates in the banking book. 
Strategic risks and reputational risks. I think there's probably some others that maybe could 
be called out as risk categories at that forward level. 
 
Researcher: (08:10) Yep, reputation, culture, and market risk. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (08:15) Yeah, I don't know about culture. I think in culture risk and 
conduct risk–I would see culture as being part of a cause above a risk, personally. 
 
Researcher: (08:34) That's okay. Thank you for that. I really appreciate this. I'll adjust in 
there with what you have added as well. Regarding the document that I have sent to you 
today, the future Reality Tree, have you had the chance to–? 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (08:57) I haven't had a good chance to look at it, but I'm happy for you to 
walk me through it while we're talking on the phone. 
 
Researcher: (09:03) Sure. That one is similar to a current Reality Tree. The current Reality 
Tree represents an actual situation and the future Reality Tree which represents how the bank 
needs to be run in the future. We said earlier, there are four effects or causes that cause 
financial supply chain risk, which is demand, supply, product management, and IT core 
effects. Then we go to the second layer. This is the main points that the bank needs to 
consider in terms of controlling the risk that they're facing. For example, people central 
failure. Another way that HR–each business unit has to report to the HR, however also they 
need to engage with a different platform to make sure that when they're recruiting any 
manager or staff, they have to have their own procedure. But if any risk that involves or 
happens should be registered in the risk register and that one aligns with the operation risk 
library. That can be from internal and external as well.  
 
Tier 2 Participant: (10:23) Yeah, is this at a core level though and what you were saying–that 
the people will enter failure? That's a cause or an actual risk? 
 
Researcher: (10:33) This is a cause. 
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Tier 2 Participant: (10:35) Yeah, okay, so it'd be a cause of a number of different risks. 
People failure could be a cause or, when you look at the other types of risks, things that you 
catch and it could be a compliance risk, it could be a fraud risk. It could be an execution risk, 
processing-type risk. People failure could cause, really, most of the risks that we've got, of 
the types of risks that we look at. 
 
Researcher: (11:08) Yes, that's correct. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (11:10) Yes, okay. 
 
Researcher: (11:14) That one aligns with ***** framework? 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (11:17) Yep. 
 
Researcher: (11:17) Also, I was looking at the ***** as well as the risk registry, what they 
have, and try to build the framework that I'm doing, try to align with APRA as well, with 
moving to the top on risk themes as well. Let me go back a little bit. If we read this document 
from the top to the bottom, represent the functional level of the organisation. If you read it 
from the bottom to the top, which is representing the risk. From the side which is the 
division, each one, from the corporate level to the business level and operation or frontline 
level. In the green after the control failure is the operation risk library and that represents the 
risk category one and risk category two. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (12:12) Yes, that's what I was just talking about, so internal fraud, external 
fraud, and client product processes, etc. 
 
Researcher: (12:20) Sure. In case there's any risk or there's any incident, we have to look at 
how we are going to respond to that incidence. To take action, we need to design, respond, 
and operate and take an action. For example, if we have control failure, either by effective or 
ineffective, we have to put that recommendation and it should be mandatory. That one–each 
one–see in the small box there, design and operate an action that respond to that people 
central failure. The second one which is recommendation and mandatory and business 
assessment also responds to the extended service provider disruption. The third one which is 
above control and effective in terms of the way that they look into the change or process or 
action. Underneath that operation side, we have to monitor and report to the higher 
management level. However, if you look to the design and operate an action in the business 
strategy, compare to that design and operate action in operation or front line operation 
strategy. So they have to engage between each other to identify and to align what's happening 
in the operation side with the business strategy because they have to communicate between 
the business and the operation side because the operation side is executing what the business 
request. This is the engagement between each business unit from the operations side to the 
business side. If you go up, for the business strategy, we have also monitoring and reporting 
centre as well. That will be collaboration between business strategy with a corporate strategy 
with that CF and COO level. Also, we have that culture adaption as well for all the 
organisation if they adopt the risk appetite level in between each business unit or each 
division. What do you think? Any suggestion or anything that I need to consider from your 
perspective please? 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (14:54) What's business risk library? What does that mean? 
 
Researcher: (15:00) Business risk? 
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Tier 2 Participant: (15:02) Library. The top one, in your business strategy box on the right 
hand side. There's a thing called business risk library. 
 
Researcher: (15:13) All the risk that's involved in the business side in addition making in 
strategy and level of the appetite as well. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (15:27) Look, I understand where you're coming from. It's a different way 
of presenting it, but I think in reality that is how things should be working. I don't think, to a 
large extent, that is how things are operate within our business. If I go bottom up, which is 
what you've done, start a business tree in that level, we would identify our risk based on–and 
we would look at the causes of those risks and, depending on the size of the risk, we would 
make a decision as to whether we're going to treat the risk and if we're going to treat the risk 
or do something about it, then we would move into what you've got here, which is around 
action, so we would say, "Alright, what treatment plan or action plans are we going to put in 
play?" Which is really, "What controls are we going to build?" and we would look and say, 
"Alright, well how should the control be designed and how should it operate effectively?" 
Effectually, when it becomes a control, we would document it and specifically note how it's 
designed and how operates and we would test almost to be compliant. It will–you're doing it 
to make an assessment and to me it's built up into whether you decide to do something about 
it raise it some or just sort of nicer to have actions where some will be mandatory. For 
example, if we know that there's a piece of legislation that's coming into (17:18) for some at 
the end of June. It's mandatory that we put in place a project or piece of work to make sure 
we're compliant with that and see how that works. I think if I understand what you're saying 
with the control centre that's around testing whether the controls are effective or ineffective 
or if it's based on out of another area. Is that what you mean by that? 
 
Researcher: (17:45) Yes. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (17:46) Yeah, okay. And then we would go up and where you've got 
business strategy, we've rolled everything up so where you've got monitoring/reporting, 
we've rolled it up to a divisional level and at a divisional level, we would have–that's where 
they look across each of the businesses within a division, but they also would look at other 
divisions as well that are either part of their supply chain if you like, so if you're sitting in our 
retail area like our branch network, you'd want to be having a look at the risks that the 
products area are highlighting because obviously if you're in the branches, you're selling the 
products that is designed by the products area. You want to be seeing what the risks are end 
to end on by a mortgage product. That can roll up at that level and then there's a bit of layer 
reporting that I've found at the corporate level, at the brick level again, which is really 
looking across all of the divisions. Seeing how they all link in together and that's really 
looking at what I call key risks, the ones that are material and if they were to increase, the 
ones that we'd end up with a very large block or effect. That's kind of where you're sort of 
thinking about things. I wouldn't say that all of that works perfectly in reality at the moment, 
but it's certainly where ideally we would be going in a powerhouse framework you set up, so 
I think it makes sense. When you said risk themes, we do look at risk themes at a root level 
as well, so we'll take all that bottom-up information and we look and we say, "Alright, where 
are we seeing the concentration in these particular types of risks?" but we don't do any other–
other than any what we've talked about–risks, but we look at it on a theme level and we'll 
say, "We're seeing–did it work?” in the space compliance or annual, so we would say that's a 
risk theme. We then have to indicate it around that theme that we monitor and report on. 
That's sort of top-level. I think what you've got here is probably (20:25) how. It's not exactly, 
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but obviously you're looking across a number of institutions, but I can see how what we do 
would be do too (20:32) deep for you for here. 
 
Researcher: (20:35) Also, I have adopted agile practice in your theme of continuous 
improvement in each division and each business unit. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (20:44) Yeah, we don't do agile here yet. We're about to, but I'll sort of 
understand what you're getting at–that's an iterative approach that you file and see type theme 
where you have a look at something and you're continuously and dynamically updating your 
risks and monitoring all that kind of stuff. I agree with that then. 
 
Researcher: (21:10) The thing that adopting agile to add value from the top level of the 
organisation. That is one of the key elements that scan monitors. What's happening in the 
business? How is that also, in the level of the business or business unit? I'm going to use 
Kaizen as well, contraction between agile and Kaizen in terms that each business unit uses 
which business practice suits that business unit. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (21:43) That fits in pretty nicely I think around your actions because quite 
often, by documenting your risks and your control, we can actually find that you may have 
too many controls as well. That's not always the case, but you find that you've got five 
controls where you could have one and therefore you've got a lot of processes that are 
redundant so you're not really doing them for any particular purpose and I can see how your 
lean principles fade into that process of improvement. The leaner your process is, the less 
likely where you're going to have process cause to as well. 
 
Researcher: (22:29) Yep, I'll write it down, leaner process. That's what I'm looking for, just 
to verify what I'm doing. I'm on the right track. If I need any further update, I'll consider any 
change that you have, I mention, which is the process and also major compliance with the 
regulatory as well and also you've got in there reality tree have the control be and what the 
key risk or main risk and also the leaner process. I'll look to that as well. Then I'm going to 
update the framework that I have now and I'll keep you posted about what I am doing. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (23:16) Okay, alright. That sounds good. So do you need anything else 
from me at the moment? 
 
Researcher: (23:21) No, thank you. I really appreciate that. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (23:21) No, my pleasure. I'll provide you with that sign-off for your record 
as well. I'll email it to you after the meeting. 
 
Researcher: (23:35) Are you able to share with me some operation framework? I'm happy to 
sign a document that's a confidentiality agreement. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (23:46) I'd have to check on that to be honest. I'd have to double check 
about whether that's okay or not. 
 
Researcher: (23:52) Yeah, that's okay.  
 
Tier 2 Participant: (23:57) I mean, I've looked personally, so it doesn't really bother me. I 
don't think there's actually a huge amount. I think you'll find that the bank frameworks are 
going to be largely aligned because of the interaction with that firm. I think they're all going 
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to be pretty similar and they've been largely aligned to what you've got here, to be honest, 
because what they do is look at the first to each of the banks and they may recommend that 
the other banks start following that so you'll see a convergence in what all of the banks are 
doing. We get together with the banks quite regularly as well, so I don't know. You might be 
already aware of this, but there's an inter-bank operational risk forum that all of the banks–
the heads of group up risk from all the banks become, and then there's another group as well 
which is just the **** or the (24:58) *******. There's a lot of sharing of information so 
everyone finds ways to keep in line. 
 
Researcher: (25:07) That's good. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (25:07) You can ask a question about it. I'm just not really sure whether 
we normally would disclose that, so just leave that with me. 
 
Researcher: (25:15) Well, yes, some of the banks they share with me. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (25:19) Yeah, ours will be very similar. There's not a lot of (25:22) goals 
for very difference that I've seen because we're so dictated and regulated by (25:31) APRA 
and so you pretty much end up all being quite similar, I think, in the way that you operate. 
 
Researcher: (25:37) Yep. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (25:38) The other reason is a lot of similarities between the banks–I think 
I mentioned this to you last time–is the because of subscriptions to ORE. They are very 
descriptive on the way in which in you need to categorise–effects that have happened and I 
guess the consistency you bring that across into your risk categorisation as well, so you see 
convergence around your causes and risk libraries and stuff like that as well. 
 
Researcher: (26:10) Yeah, I was in touch with APRA and they gave me some information as 
well. Yeah, I tried to cover up all the different platforms from tier one, tier two, tier three, 
which is I find there's big gap between tier one and tier three in terms of the way that 
managing the risk. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (26:35) Yeah, tricky. I mean I (26:37) pretty generally leave here too, but 
we just got advanced accreditation from an operative perspective, I mean in February. We 
sort of probably (26:55) some operating systems, more up around tier one. In town, I think 
we're doing stuff, I think now. 
 
Researcher: (27:02) That's good. The last question–I don't know if I can ask or not. Is there 
any opportunity after I complete my study? 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (27:18) Within the bank? 
 
Researcher: (27:19) In the risk division. 
 
Researcher: (28:39) Thank you. 
 
Tier 2 Participant: (28:40) No, my pleasure. I'll come back to you about the framework, 
whether we can disclose that, and I'll send that document off to you as well.  
 
Researcher: (28:47) Yep, thank you very much. I really appreciate your support. 
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Tier 2 Participant: (28:50) Okay. No worries. Bye. 
 
 
Tier 3 Sample Interview 
Researcher: (00:00) Good afternoon Tier 3 Participant. Today we are going to ask you a few 
questions about our research and the topic is financial supply chain risk. One of the supervisors 
is from RMIT University and the second supervisor is from Monash University. The topic is 
about to validate the cause of financial supply chain risk and to see the relationship between 
the financial supply chain risk and the performance of an institution. We have selected senior 
risk managers from different financial institution. We are going to go over tier one, tier two, 
tier three. The first question, Tier 3 Participant, could you please tell us about the background 
and the experience that you have done so far in the financial and the credit and the risk that's 
involved in the banking industry? Those three I know that you have extensive experience that 
have been here years and years. 
Tier 3 Participant: (00:55) So just in financial services?  
Researcher: (00:57) Yep. 
Tier 3 Participant: (00:58) I guess I was at BANK for six years from 2000 to 2005, in two 
distinct areas. One in the credit card business, was head of fraud and compliance and then head 
of operations for the cards business, so pretty hands-on role looking after unsecured lending 
environment for BANK in Australia. Then moved to a global op risk program for BANK 
looking at developing advisor to op risk program. I kind of led that for a couple of years. Next 
bit of financial services, specific experience would be when I joined ***** in 2007. I was there 
for about five years or four and a half years. More than half of my clients were in financial 
services so it was a lot of work in reviewing building risk frameworks, doing risk strategy, risk 
appetites, some supply chain specific stuff, but brought up a broad range of risk related activity. 
The next most compelling financial services would probably be coming to M****  about a 
year ago and working here. I’ve worked in, as you pointed out, a number of different industries. 
Risk is very transferable, but the content has been specifically around field services in those 
places. 
Researcher: (02:41) Okay. Second question: what are the significant changes in the tech that 
you have seen in the financial risk division in the last two decades? 
Tier 3 Participant: (02:53) the principal one, probably, is the ability of technological innovation 
to better manage or share, communicate data risk related data so that it’s much easier to make 
more informed disbursed decisions of these days because of the tools and data that's available. 
Researcher: (03:14) So you’re you moving from a traditional system to a digital system. 
Tier 3 Participant: (03:19) Yeah  
Researcher: (03:19) It does look exactly how I put in here. What’s about the models? What is 
a change that you have done or you have seen in the last ten years in that financial industry 
models? 
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Tier 3 Participant: (03:32) I think the models are changing because the risk needs to be, in 
many cases, close to real time, depending on which part of the business you're talking about. 
Researcher: (03:45) Yeah business banking. 
Tier 3 Participant: (03:46) But in supply chain, for example, you either want real time or near 
to real time risk data or risk decisions and therefore what’s changed is how embedded the risk 
process is in the supply chain process. 
Researcher: (04:02) Exactly. I was reading what's called RMJ–Risk Management Journal. I 
have been reading all the things what’s happening in the last–I'm a member with them as well 
so I try keep myself up-to-date what’s happening in market as well, not only just in the 
academic side as well as the banking industry side as well. They have some good article on 
what they accomplished, so operation risk, enterprise risk, and all those things. Category, what 
they have categorised into each different section, that which is diagram. Third question: how 
would you maintain the necessary knowledge and skills? For example, what's the strategy that 
you use for the staff here to update or to keep them motivated about what's happening in the 
market?  
[Interruption 04:48-04:57] 
Researcher: (04:57) Question for you: how would you maintain necessary knowledge and 
leadership in the risk division?  
Tier 3 Participant: (05:03) Two things–in the way our team works, we have a mandatory 
education among. 
[Interruption 05:09-05:20] 
Tier 3 Participant: (05:23) I'm a big believer in education and lifelong learning so in my team, 
I mandate one hour of mandatory industry reading for the team every week, but we also have 
a big focus on different tools that make sure people are educated, informed. We use tools like 
Yammer, which is an internal social media tool to post interesting documents and updates, 
share all our information and probably operate under the philosophy you share everything 
except remuneration information so there's a lot of in-sharing. Everyone has their own 
individual development plans where you formally put people on the programs for the year, 
whether they want to do post-grad or whether they're doing some kind of self-paced study. 
There's a lot of a lot of free stuff as well so it won't necessarily be expensive. 
Researcher: (06:22) Exactly you're saying about, I was expecting that because anybody or a 
newer department about what about that FRM, if anybody has a certificate or something like 
that, production of development or commercial education side, I would call it like.  
Tier 3 Participant: (06:37) A lot of the people I recruiting because the team is 60% recruited 
by me in the last eight months so I recruit for the right balance between educational experience 
and probably people skills or networking. 
Researcher: (06:54) Networking. 
Tier 3 Participant: (06:56) A lot of those people have got high level education levels and we 
don’t have a mandatory requirement for any particular qualification and I’m not necessarily a 
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big believer that you should go and do a particular course because you get a FRM or something. 
I’d rather have–because the world is changing so quickly that some of those courses actually 
aren't that relevance so it's a mix of different skills that sometimes are outside the formal 
education process. 
Researcher: (07:29) That's good. What determinants the effective Financial Supply Chain 
Risk? 
Tier 3 Participant: (07:33) Say again? 
Researcher: (07:36) What are the determinants that are affecting the Financial Supply Chain 
Risk? For example, demand operation or new system operation or supply operation or product 
management or any other you happen– 
Tier 3 Participant: (07:46) A whole lot of things, but I think that one of the biggest–there's a 
couple of factors. One of them is them is commercial understanding. One of the biggest 
challenges is that we have, sometimes, is we have a whole host of third-party relationships 
which power the supply chain, which we have because we need to have them as a retail bank, 
but they haven’t been created in the most commercially sensible ways because it's a lack of 
contractual knowledge by either party or it's a lack of understanding the broader domain in 
which those contracts or relationships are formed. 
Researcher: (08:27) –asking me about the contract and about other things. 
Tier 3 Participant: (08:31) Yeah, I've also got a background too so I focus heavy on contract 
rights and obligations in real-life third party relationships. 
Researcher: (08:37) Yep, Dicken university, graduated from law. 
Tier 3 Participant: (08:40) Yeah, you did do your research. 
Researcher: (08:42) Oh yeah. 
Tier 3 Participant: (08:43) But practically, a lot of costs that are embedded in supply chain are 
because we don't set them up well and then secondly we don't manage them well, so there's 
two key parts to it: contract formation and contract management. 
Researcher: (09:01) Or contract knowledge 
Tier 3 Participant: (09:04) Yes so the contract formation follows having superior negotiation 
skills based on knowledge, education, understanding of the domain. Everything from a why 
did we lock in a three year contract when we know that technology is changing, we should 
only go for a 12 month contract. The cost of production is x but we can see there's innovation 
overseas–it should be y. 
Researcher: (09:27) Especially in IT industry as well. 
Tier 3 Participant: (09:29) Yeah, so we just lay the whole piece of work reviewing our IT 
security capability across the bank which has led to a whole three year program with work that 
the board has just approved, which fills in gaps in our supply chains which relates to IT security 
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because we took a fresh look at what’s the state of the world more broadly and how rapidly 
are things changing. 
Researcher: (09:55) The technology, especially in technology. Now look to the bank in more 
being–I was looking at BANK's strategy. In order to digitalise and also the other example if 
you remember. When BANK and ***** used to have same return until *****, between 2000-
2006 they have changed their IT systems 
Tier 3 Participant: (10:18) Yeah. ****** drove a massive program and different to BANK, so 
my perspective theory is projects can get too big unless they’ve got absolute discipline to the 
top–cut through clear strategy, clear objectives, and that's not the case usually. 
Researcher: (10:41) That is exactly– 
Tier 3 Participant: (10:42) So next June from BANK– 
Researcher: (10:43) This June they have been working with it for three, four, five years and I 
was talking with one of the executives in ******* and he said to me, "No, no. (10:52) What's 
that?" I said, "I know about next June what's happening up there." I don't know if the project's 
still working or they're going to centralise everything and the course involved, but they're 
spending a lot of money, but it’s too late I think. 
Tier 3 Participant: (11:06) Yeah now that they've wasted so much money. 
Researcher: (11:08) Yeah, I don’t to say that at the moment. 
Tier 3 Participant: (11:11) I'll say it. They've wasted so much money. 
Researcher: (11:14) And the person who was implementing this program in the first place, 
David Thompson. And he left. Now they still have the last few years doing that. But you know 
this last two minutes that you answered this questions and the other question about the contact, 
about supply contract, or the order allocation and supply relationships, and all those things. 
Other question what does information system management impact? How would information 
system manager impact the organisation? 
Tier 3 Participant: (11:46) I ran around supply chain. 
Researcher: (11:47) Around the risk. 
Tier 3 Participant: (11:48) Ran the risk around supply chain. Clearly there are a whole bunch 
of systems that help you manage your supply chain risk. In Michael's world, contract 
management is a very sophisticated domain if done properly because you need to manage to 
your SLOs, you need to manage the emerging risks, not necessarily reflected in the contracts, 
so it’s not just managing what you have signed up for. It's managing how the risk is changing 
over time. 
Researcher: (12:20) You have to be up to date what's happening in the market. What about 
outsourcing? What's in play? 
bbb: (12:27) Well clearly there's an APRA standard that is relevant in terms of outsourcing 
and recognising the account–outsource your risk or your responsibilities necessarily, but we 
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tend–not we need as in me but we in the industry–tend to outsource without understanding 
enough about who owns the risk and what other what other overheads do you need to actually 
manage the process well, but again, technology is the 50% eBankler and support for managing 
risk in supply chain because it it’s the mechanism by which you manage your data and do the 
analysis to make better decisions. It's the transmissive conduit for the sharing information and 
presenting information. 
Researcher: (13:23) Which is exactly my philosophy. I think maybe you agree with me. When 
I'd done my study I said, "I want to do in bachelor in IT," and then I done bachelor in IT and 
then after that I said, "I work in IT. I want to do a masters in finance," and then I did a masters 
in finance and then I said, "I want to do in accounting" and then masters in accounting. Then 
my family and (13:47) my sister said you are busy, why this study? For example when you 
drive your car and you have alarm and you ignore the alarm and after that what will happen to 
your car? You will stop in the middle of the road and you can't do nothing, so exactly this is 
the risk. Risk is good indicators for us to see what's happening in the business and what's going 
on in the business but unfortunately people have different perspective. 
Tier 3 Participant: (15:03) Risk is more important than ever, I think, in supply chain because 
other issues like first mover advantage and if you're looking to be really commercial you want 
to get into emerging spaces before anyone else or lock in better pricing or better arrangements 
so to do that you need to–to me risk is just about making better business decisions 
Researcher: (15:28) Okay. I agree 100% with you because you exactly monitor the business 
what's going on, but what the about now complexity and simplicity in the IT system. 
Tier 3 Participant: (15:39) I guess my view there is you have to look at materiality and have to 
have proxies for managing complexities. You have to have the right tools to turn–you can't 
talk chaos theory and massively complex scenarios every day of the week if you're talking to 
the exec about making a business decision between options so you have to have a mechanism 
to– 
Researcher: (15:59) –support your decisions. 
Tier 3 Participant: (16:01) big data down to, here's an AB decision. How do you do that? It’s 
not just technologies. It's also intellectual curiosity about the best way to take what matters 
into a decision so in some ways it’s stripping out a lot of noise. 
Researcher: (16:19) That's good. What about the impact of the product management, like a 
new product, life cycle, innovation, in-house built, or outsourcing, or any other you have? 
Tier 3 Participant: (16:32) We are developing products in ME and we’re not doing it 
necessarily in the best way that we can all the time because you’ve got to have all the right 
minds around the table when you making product decisions because a lot of the things that will 
hurt a product's success are not the things that the product manager thinks of at the very first 
instance. They will be things like the ability of the supply chain to actually meet the 
requirements of the products. So that's a live example of something going on at the moment. 
So you think, Well base a product on XYZ, but and if the vendor can’t meet those timeframes, 
the cost of leaving them is carving to the benefit. There is innovation disruption happening in 
that space. Did you not see that? There are compliance complexities to that which we are not 
mature enough to manage so you've created a product which is beyond our compliance 
 300 
 
capabilities. I think the answer is you’re going to have all of the SMEs, or subject matter 
experts, contribute. 
Researcher: (17:45) Knowledge or experience expert, you mean? 
Tier 3 Participant: (17:47) Yeah, it's both, I suppose. 
Researcher: (17:53) Okay. Can you just give me a small, brief explanation between the 
financial supply chain risks? When I'm talking about the Financial Supply Chain Risk, about 
the money movement, about cash delivery, about a product that they have–a mortgage and all 
that thing–and the performance of the financial institution. What’s the relationship? Or there’s 
any what the factor for KBI, because another example, like BANK now they're giving 40% of 
their scorecard on the risk–40%. And the XY Bank, they’re given 35, something like that. 
Tier 3 Participant: (18:29) Yeah, so executives? 
Researcher: (18:30) Yeah. I'm talking about that because it's not about operational. What about 
a new bank and what you think about that? What’s the relationship between Financial Supply 
Chain Risk and the performance and what’s the KBR indication that you have? 
Tier 3 Participant: (18:45) We have a minimum of 10% KBR for executives on risk generally, 
so risk identification, risk management, so regardless if it's supply chain or something else, 
which is too low but that’s just a starting point. So 30 or 40% would be great because basically 
every decision they make is a risk-based decision. It's more a cultural change. I just got to look 
at the loss effects that any organisation has incurred or the lack of business case benefit 
realisation when you look at the new product or something else which hasn’t been captured by 
a loss effect, so you're looking at: what do we lose and what did we not get the benefit of and 
look at the root causes of that. You can look to the supply chain and go, "Well, we didn’t know 
enough, we made too many assumptions, we didn't have the required maturity in the system, 
we didn't engage more broadly across the business, we didn't have the right contracts or rights 
of obligations." So there are so many ways to have negative performance in the business by 
not managing all those critical success factors in the supply chain. 
Researcher: (20:04) Okay. Do you think about any other (20:05) repracticant you are using in 
your organisation, in addition? For example, six sigma or Kaizen? What do you think about 
Kaizen and continuous improvement theory? 
Tier 3 Participant: (20:15) Well I think it’s good in particular environments. For supply chain, 
I think some parts of the supply chain it does make–pretend, for example, if you are developing 
a new car product and looking to a new car manufacturing process and you want to look at 
(20:34) ages/HR's head of that whole process, but I think a lot of executive thinking is so 
removed from the disciplines of the Six Sigma that there's too much biased emotional 
stakeholder judgment at that level 
Researcher: (20:58) Especially about the number of the debt that we have collected. Everyone 
gives you their own. 
Tier 3 Participant: (21:02) Yeah, absolutely. It’s not enough discipline on the way through. 
Researcher: (21:06) What’s the relationship–do you think that Six Sigma or Kaizen affects the 
relationship between the Financial Supply Chain Risk and the performance of an organisation 
 301 
 
if we ever implemented in our organisation. For example, we have one of the big auditing 
company uses Kaizen and they have reduced the costs to 40%. 
Tier 3 Participant: (21:28) Yeah, the answer is absolutely yes. I just think you need to tailor it 
for different parts of the supply chain; one size doesn’t fit all. 
Researcher: (21:40) Definitely, there's the exception. 
Tier 3 Participant: (21:41) Yeah, so if you look at your legal services providers, for example. 
I wouldn't use Six Sigma on that. 
Researcher: (21:45) Exactly. No, you can't. It's a different industrial so you can't use everything 
or make the–for one thing in one industry, you can't use in all different structures. 
Tier 3 Participant: (21:59) But I would use it, for example, if you’re looking at the homeland 
chance or broker channels for examples. You could do end-to end of the broker origination. 
You could do something there. Credit cards. All the standard retail products but not a 
sophisticated bank so all those things could be done. It’s more you're eBankling services like 
your insurers, your legal services, advertising–you could probably do that too. 
Researcher: (22:21) Okay Tier 3 Participant, thank you very much for that information and 
that the great information that you have provided and I really appreciate that you support  
Tier 3 Participant: (22:29) No problem. 
[Static] 
 
Collated participant quotes from informal validation interviews (various dates) 
 
Tier One Participants 
 
Participant 1  
 
 The different banks are often very similar, in my experience of the sector, despite 
volume differences in retail or wholesale banking, or the range or mixture of other 
financial products offered. 
 
 Certain issues which I can put down to lack IT knowledge, which I can put as a supply 
chain system failure, which I can put in human errors and all that. I know the impacts 
to the business in terms of tests happen that we are approving loans by–there's a service 
agreement complement, like where the person can service that loan amount so an error 
is causing the customer's income to be calculated incorrectly which means you'll get a 
loan, even if you are not earning that much. So that's a major impact and that's 
happening in some loans. Capacity and capability are what comes to mind. Where 
you've got here–staff capability–it's part of that and I do see it coming from supply 
issues. We're also talking about resources. Across our point of view, I see those are the 
main drivers for HR issues. From a capability and a capacity. You manage those two 
things in HR, usually that translates to a bit of a cross, which is what you've got here. 
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 The effective implementation of corporate risk appetite driven control over product risk 
is often blocked or reduced by a silo mentally of individual areas. They go about their 
business somewhat disconnected from controls whose intention is to monitor and 
moderate risks, but these intentions often don’t bear fruit because of the disconnects, 
and can cause issues I’ve seen with swapping exchange rates for example. 
 
 We want the big plan about how to apply all the risk reduction and control processes. 
What happens now where we might have similar things in place, is that each of these 
systems or processes at times start looking silos. So then developing silos, they become 
kind of quite obstinate about what needs to be done, how it needs to be done. There 
should be a flexibility. There should be plans and guidance’s. 
 
Participant 2  
 
 The common denominator across credit risk, operational risk, all these types of risk, is 
the risk management framework that sits in its own bubble and that drives issue 
management, change management, obligation adherence, compliance adherence, 
operational risk business environment, definition, and how I said what the most 
important thing is would be risk appetite settings at the very top. That framework 
should ideally drive all this interaction and provide input into process improvement 
after the fact. 
 
 The challenges that banks historically have had large, big, monolithic, centrally run 
technology systems which are incredibly hard to maintain, incredibly hard to update 
large amounts of investment that require multiple years of delivery to do. That's not 
the customer's experience when they can get a new app in three seconds right now 
and if they don't like that app they'll go and try another one. So that's part of the 
challenge we're facing is that we have a business model that's based around having 
central, everyone access to the data and customers are used to providing their data to 
25 different apps, but that each of those apps are something very unique, very 
specific, and very value adding for the customer, and that's the challenge we’re 
facing. 
 
 Technology, absolutely. We are increasingly reliant on outsourced or third-party 
providers. I'm interested in HR and the payments process. This is a consequence of 
that. We're saying is there's also driver there that relates to the impact that regulations 
and policies have on how the business can do–what activities they can do and how it 
can do them. On top of that, if the staff aren't trained well, then there will be errors 
leading to compliance risks and other impacts. Not enough people, capacity, 
capability–all those sorts of things related to people skills So it is a cultural issue and 
an HR issue. In operational risk, we talk about people, processes, and systems. You're 
aligned.  
 
 In our organisation, the responsibility for training exists with the business, not the HR 
area. So those failures or the drivers that relate to people. Its people-centred failures, 
that would include error, lack in training, lack of capability. This is a pandemic that 
fuels multiple risks–all of those sort of things–not enough people, capacity, capability–
all those sorts of things related to people skills 
 
 Capacity and capability are what comes to mind. Where you've got here–branch staff 
capability–it's part of that and I do see it coming from supply issues. We're also 
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talking about capacity? Across our point of view. I see those are the main drivers for 
HR issues. From a capability and a capacity. You need to manage those two things in 
HR. 
 Whether its big IT, retail issues affecting customer satisfaction, risks with product 
development outsourcing, or just that are so big and diverse, we have written off large 
amounts because the risk trade-offs are wrong. Because we didn’t understand properly. 
We need a system of controls that can get good intelligence about risks to make better 
decisions and to more effectively implement controls, I think the what you show here, 
reflects well how things should be in place. 
 It's important that communication and messaging comes from the top. Communications 
and messages, some of the policies and messages that get rolled out has to come from 
the top and then that disseminates across the organisation’. 
Participant 3 
 
 It looks like risk is like snow balling picking up momentum and increasing in size as it 
rolls along. 
 
 that would include error, lack in training, lack of capability. You know, pandemic–all 
of those sort of things– we need enough people, and to build their capacity and 
capability– all those sorts of things related to people skills that causes issues across the 
board. 
 
 Effective collaboration and monitoring are critical elements in the central role of the 
interface between the corporate side of the business and can have real impacts on 
operational risks. Risk mitigation action that is well coordinated, mutually informing 
and communicated can have a positive effect on things like training, recruitment, 
customer service levels and innovation. You really need a strongly connected and 
aligned supporting context that is cross-functional... 
 
 
Tier Two Participants 
 
Participant 4  
 
 And then cross divisional collaboration. It’s very difficult. I don't think any company 
has got that down pat. It's too difficult. …To get uniformity, whether it's in processes, 
whether it's in procedures, whether it's in reporting, is very difficult and takes a 
deliberate and planned effort.  
 
  “the push to outsource has produced efficiency benefits but perhaps at a cost of 
increased risk that was not foreseen through reduced internal capability to control the 
risk”. 
 
Participant 5  
 
 One of the problems that you've got in major financial institutions is people in divisions 
like IT don't see a full vantage of it. That's the operating effect that's occurring within 
the value chain, if you like, because one of the problems that you've got, for example, 
usually ATM failure. You may have been able to avert that if you had sufficient 
capacity to apply controls over that to actually identify the problem earlier or even 
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before it occurred. The actually underpinning of cause of not having a control, but the 
reason why it didn't have a control over it was I didn't have enough capacity in my HR 
to build a control. 
 
 reference to culture, I have a saying that you can create the perfect mousetrap. It’s not 
an original saying, but if people won't use it, it's useless. So, I think your risk design, 
you're getting the full value chain, working together, owning responsibility. That comes 
down to your culture, so you've got to make sure that culturally that is seen as the 
preferred direction. You've got to make sure you don't build the pocket of resistance to 
the culture of the organisation.  
 
 “It has an impact on their reputation, bank reputation, and safety because the bank looks 
into the safety as well. The interesting factors that are starting to apply to my mind is 
with digital technology, the customer can probably, in most cases, see what your 
internal system can see. These layers of non-disclosed control, are starting to become 
more and more blurred as the system starts to digitise themselves. What occurred in 
that situation was they sought to maximise their capital market value in the short term 
(instead of investment in IT risk controls) which is an unsustainable business model 
and because they were doing it via cost control, not carrying business efficiency with 
it as well, you effectually had a breakdown in controls and you had a calamity or 
multiple calamities.” 
 
 We have a whole host of third-party relationships which power the supply chain, but 
they haven’t been created in the most commercially sensible ways because it's a lack 
of contractual knowledge by either party or it's a lack of understanding the broader 
domain in which those contracts or relationships are formed So the contract formation 
follows having superior negotiation skills (person-centred) based on knowledge, 
education, understanding of the domain. Everything from a why did we lock in a three-
year contract when we know that technology is changing, we should only go for a 12-
month contract. The cost of production is x but we can see there's innovation overseas–
gaps in our supply chains which relates to IT security. We need a fresh look at what’s 
the state of the world more broadly and how rapidly are things changing 
 
 What we had previously defined as independent risks and effects, they now appear 
interconnected and they influence each other This is a highly complex environment that 
we are operating in at the moment and we have interdependencies that, when you start 
to think about them, you realise how interconnected everything you're doing is. 
 
 The need for a consolidated view where for each performance unit, it does have an 
effective control environment in place to mitigate the risks. You need to have a 
reporting and collaboration centre between the business and the corporate level of the 
organisation. 
 
 ‘to avert risk effects in retail you need to have the control capacity in place to identify 
and respond before it occurs to prevent it.’ 
Participant 6  
 It could be any sort of process really, so it could be how we transfer funds between 
banks over ten years old. There's a written process around that and that will have a 
number of controls built into it, but the person executing that process, following it, 
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could follow the process as it's written and if there are errors in the actual way that it's 
documented, you could still end up with a risk or an actual disruptive effect. 
 
Tier Three Participants 
Participant 7  
 it might vary in the very specific details and in the names given to a function in a 
particular organisation, but overall it is a reasonable representation of the generalised 
structure of Australian Banks 
 If you're getting the full value chain, working together, owning responsibility. That 
comes down to your cultural adaption, so you've got to make sure that culturally that is 
seen as the preferred direction 
 
 More leadership around reinforcing a view of IT external service providers, internal 
business needs and IT system integration should be more driven by delivering 
information that supports business decision-making rather than an unbalanced focus on 
isolated technical risks. You know, having a connected risk control soft-infrastructure 
in place is necessary to mitigate risk in the hard enterprise infrastructure. 
 
Participant 8  
 
 Through this process I have become more aware that for each of the core reasons, they 
were manifested by several   specific unwanted risks that were related to each other, 
when they are not always seen that way in practice. 
 
 The way I see it, the common denominator across credit risk, operational risk, all these 
types of risk, is the risk management framework that sits in its own bubble and that 
drives issue management, change management, obligation adherence, compliance 
adherence, operational risk business environment, definition, and how I said what the 
most important thing is would be risk appetite settings at the very top. That appetite 
framework drives all this interaction and provides input into process improvement after 
the fact. 
Participant 9  
 A lot of the things that will hurt a product's success are not the things that the product 
manager thinks of at the very first instance. They will be things like the ability of the 
supply chain to actually meet the requirements of the products. So that's a live example 
of something going on at the moment. So, you think, we’ll base a product on XYZ, but 
if the vendor can’t meet those timeframes, the cost of leaving them is carving into the 
benefit. There is innovation disruption happening in that space. There are compliance 
complexities to that which we are not mature enough to manage so you've created a 
product which is beyond our compliance capabilities. 
 ‘in foreign currency options, part of the reason for the failures was that the managing 
office was under resources which in turn was because of human error and HR capacity 
and capability’. 
 We in the industry–tend to outsource without understanding enough about who owns 
the risk and what other what other overheads do you need to actually manage the 
process well, but again, technology is the 50% enabler and support for managing risk 
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in the supply chain because it it’s the mechanism by which you manage your data and 
do the analysis to make better decisions. It's the transmissive conduit for the sharing 
information and presenting information 
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Appendix C: Interview derived raw list of risks sample 
Risk Effect Type Level   
Execution, Delivery and Process Management 
Clients, Products and Business Practices 
Internal Fraud 
Employment Practices and Workplace Safety 
Business Disruption and System Failures 
Execution, Delivery and Process Management 
Clients, Products and Business Practices 
Internal Fraud 
Damage to Physical Assets 
 
Risk Category  
Accounting Error 
Bribery 
Casualties from External Effects 
Collateral Management Failure 
Conflict of Interest 
Damage to Physical Assets 
Data Error - Incorrect Recording of Risk Exposures
Data Error - Loading
Data Error - Maintenance 
Data Error - Manual Entry 
Denial of Access to Facilities 
Disruption of Technology due to Complex or Ageing 
Systems 
Disruption of Technology or Telecommunications
Employee Relations Failure 
Employee Theft from Customer Accounts
Employee Theft from Group Company Accounts
Employee Theft of Information 
Exceeding Client Exposure Limits 
External Fraud 
External Malicious Destruction of Assets
External Malicious Technology Service Disruption
External Theft from Customer Accounts
External Theft from Group Company Accounts
External Theft of Information 
External Vendor or Service Provider Breach of Contract
Failed or Inaccurate Reporting 
Health & Safety of Employees or Third Parties Failure
Inadequate Advisory Activities 
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Inadequate Client Disclosures 
Inadequate Client Investigation (KYC - Know Your 
Customer) 
Inadequate Client Management 
Inadequate Complaints Handling 
Inappropriate Contractual Terms 
Incomplete Client Documents 
Incorrect Client Records 
Insider Trading (for personal gain)
Internal e-Fraud 
Lost or Missing Client Documents 
Malicious Destruction of Assets by Employees
Market Misconduct 
Missed External Deadline or Responsibility
Missed Internal Deadline or Responsibility
Mis-selling 
Misuse of Confidential Information
Model or System Failure 
Money Laundering 
Poor Vendor Performance 
Product Design Flaws Excluding Contractual Terms
Unauthorised Transaction Activity by Employees
Unlicensed Activity
 
Categorised raw list of risks (interview derived) 
 
Accounting Error 
Inadequate Model Validation 
Incorrect Client Position/Transaction Status Reporting 
Accounting error/calculations 
Rates validation errors 
Inaccurate/Incomplete Provision Assessment 
Bribery 
 Staff Inducement Influencing Vendor Selection
 Bribery 
Casualties from External Effects 
 Causalities from External Effects 
Collateral Management Failure 
 Inability to achieve securitisation targets agreed
Conflict of Interest 
 Conflict of Interest 
 Client confidentiality/conflict of interest
 Failure to manage conflicts of interest
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 Failure to manage conflicts of interest
Damage to Physical Assets 
 Failure to Manage and Maintain Infrastructure Supporting Critical Sites  
Loss of Commercial Building 
Loss of PC and IT Equipment 
Damage to Physical Assets 
Data Error - Incorrect Recording of Risk Exposures 
Counterparty Collateral Risk 
Maintenance of customer information
Risk of failure to meet customer workplace and accommodation demand requirements
Data Error - Loading 
Data Error - Loading 
Payroll Management 
Data Error - Maintenance 
Master and reference data errors
Data Error - Maintenance 
Failure to maintain policy changes and updates
Inability to ensure data integrity 
Data Error - Manual Entry 
Data Error - Manual Entry 
Ineffective vendor payment processes
Data Input Error 
Instructions/Payments/Confirmations missed or processed incorrectly 
Instructions/Payments missed or processed incorrectly
Accounts Payable Error 
Failure to ensure security interest held
Manual Data Entry Error 
Transaction Establishment 
Denial of Access to Facilities 
Denial of Access to Facilities 
Business Continuity 
Denial of building access 
Failure of Operations  
Business Continuity - Business Interruption
Disruption of Technology due to Complex or Ageing Systems 
Technology Failure Risk  
Delays in service restoration of our complex, orchestrated technology environments 
negatively impacting business operations and customers
Data Quality/ Integrity 
Disruption of Technology or Telecommunications 
Disruption of Technology or Telecommunications
loss of technology support 
Employee Relations Failure 
Succession Plans 
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Staff Morale 
Loss of key personnel 
Employee Theft from Customer Accounts 
Employee theft from accounts 
Internal Fraud 
Internal Payment Fraud 
Fraudulent payment instructions
Internal Fraud from External Instruction or Internal Generated Instruction 
Misappropriation of fees/funds 
Employee Theft from  Group Company Accounts 
Internal Fraud 
Risk of Internal and External Fraud
Employee Theft from Group Company Accounts
Employee Theft of Information 
Employee Theft of Information 
Privacy breaches from inappropriate access to data
Internal theft of information 
Exceeding Client Exposure Limits 
Breach of credit limits 
Verification Failure (Pre-Unconditional)
Unreliable and/or Inappropriate Valuations
Unauthorised Payments 
Failure to undertake verification checks in support of the credit decision 
Poor manual credit decisions 
Middle Office Risk 
Lending outside of Risk Appetite
Data Service Automatic price upload
Credit Assessment Failure 
External Fraud 
Fraudulent Lending Applications
External Fraud (microfinance applications)
External Fraud-loans used for unauthorised purpose
External Malicious Destruction of Assets 
Service disruption due to external attacks
Unauthorised Access 
Failure to protect  Assets & Infrastructure
External Fraud 
Service disruption due to external attacks
External Malicious Technology Service Disruption 
External attacks on HIS assets 
Misuse of security managed data
Customer and enterprise impacts as a result of external attacks
Inability to operate in disaster scenario
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Information Systems Failure 
External Theft from Customer Accounts 
External fraudulent activity 
Third Party external fraud committed
External Fraud from external party or client generated instruction
External Theft from  Group Company Accounts 
 External Fraud Risk 
External Theft from  Group Company Accounts
Failure to identify and protect against evolving landscape of cyber threats in a timely 
manner 
Lost/stolen large value cheques 
External Theft of Information 
External Theft of Information 
Theft of information from external party
External Vendor or Service Provider Breach of Contract 
Counterparty fails to receive and/or send orders
Failure to govern and realise the value of end-to-end management of Third-Party 
Suppliers (EST risk)
Failed or Inaccurate Reporting 
External Reporting Failure Risk 
Inaccurate or Untimely Submission of Regulatory Reporting
Failed or Inaccurate Reporting 
Inability to Leverage Enterprise Data
Health & Safety of Employees or Third Parties Failure 
Health & Safety of Employees or Third Parties Failure
Failure to respond to workplace incidents
Occupational Health & Safety 
Inadequate Advisory Activities 
Inadequate Advisory Activities (Secretariat Function)
Inadequate Advisory Activities (training)
Adequate levels of suitably skilled staff
Skill Sets 
Inadequate Client Disclosures 
Disclosure of required information
Communications to customers 
Failure to deliver cards services on time/qual
Inadequate Client Investigation (KYC - Know Your Customer) 
Risk of money laundering via branch 
AML / KYC 
AML/CTF compliance 
Inadequate Client Management 
Insufficient Scanning Algorithms 
Strategy & Reporting 
Failure to maintain a current OFAC db 
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Change Management Failure 
Incorrect Credit Listing 
Cash Activities  
Inadequate Complaints Handling 
Complaint Management Compliance Failures
Complaints handling and dispute resolution
Complaint Handling 
Inadequate complaint management
Increased litigation
Inappropriate Contractual Terms 
Unfair Contract Terms in IDPS contract
Misunderstanding and categorisation of RMCs
Incorrect or Poor Credit Decisions
Incomplete Client Documents 
Incomplete Client Documents ( Master Agreement)
Failure to process inbound correspondence
Incorrect Client Records 
Client Static Data and Tax Information Management
Insider Trading (for personal gain) 
Insider Trading/ Conflict of Interest 
Insider Trading (for personal gain)
General Regulatory Compliance Failure
Insider Trading 
Insider Trading/Conflicts Interest 
Internal e-Fraud 
Internal Fraud Through Delivery of Process Automation Solutions (value transactions 
only) 
Lost or Missing Client Documents 
Lost or Missing documents 
Ineffective batch and backup processes
Inability to manage pace/volume of change
Failure to manage physical record holdings
Lost or Missing Customer Documents
Malicious Destruction of Assets by Employees 
Internal Fraud (Operations ) 
Internal Fraud 
Market Misconduct 
Authorised Representatives Misconduct
Market Misconduct (on behalf of business)
Missed External Deadline or Responsibility 
Confirmation Failure Risk 
Lack of Employee Capacity & Capability
Change Risk Failure 
Missed Internal Deadline or Responsibility 
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(PROPOSED DIVISIONAL RISK) Regulatory Change Implementation Failure 
Inability to meet internal colleague service requirements
Change Delivery & Implementation failure (including CSR)
Failure to deliver and effectively embed change in line with the defined business case 
resulting in benefits & outcomes not being realised
Failure to execute business activities
Mis-selling 
Provision of advice or incorrect information via telephone
MIS-SELLING 
Misuse of Confidential Information 
Misuse of Confidential Information
Misuse of Customer Information
Leakage and Misuse of Confidential  Information
Confidentiality / Data Protection Breach
Privacy Breaches
Model or System Failure 
Model Error 
Insufficient workforce agility 
Workforce Agility
Insufficient Workforce Agility 
Money Laundering 
Noncompliance with Global AML/CTF Regulations
Regulatory Compliance Breach (Operations US)
 Non adherence to AML / Sanctions legislation
Failure to report Suspicious Activity
Failure to satisfy AML requirements
Inadequate Client AML-KYC applications and PEPs/Sanctions Screening 
Non-adherence to Regulatory Obligations
Poor Vendor Performance 
Poor Vendor Performance 
Poor Vendor Performance 
Poor Vendor Performance 
Product Design Flaws Excluding Contractual Terms 
System apps not supported by Technology
Change not implemented within risk framework
Unauthorised Transaction Activity by Employees 
Internal Fraud 
Financial Impact due to Internal Fraud
Internal and/or external fraud 
Risk of Excessive System Access Rights
Loss of commercially sensitive information
Unauthorised Transaction Activity by Employees
Fraud 
CHNB-Corruption Risk associated with bribery
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Office Account Management 
Internal Fraud 
Risk of Lost or Stolen cash and Valuables
Insider Trading/Fraud 
Violation  
Theft of Confidential Information
Unlicensed Activity 
Unlicensed Activity 
Unlicensed Activity 
Regulatory Compliance Breaches
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Appendix D: Participant interview exhibits to elicit current state causes and effects 
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Appendix E: Interview Data Process Map Example 
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Appendix F: Ethics Approval 
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Appendix G: Letter to Participants 
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